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Abstract: This paper aims to reconstruct the fortune of the semiotic analysis of 
cartomancy, considered as a proper semiotic system, focusing in particular on the point 
of view of Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics (TMS). TMS, founded by the renowned 
semiotician Yuri Lotman, offers one of the most interesting semiotic approaches to 
culture and communication yet is still partially ignored in the West with the exception, 
of course, of its founder. 
Many TMS scholars approached cartomancy not only as an interesting cultural 
phenomenon but as a case study allowing them to test analytic tools that fit for many 
different forms of communication. Cartomancy is, at the same time, a quite simple 
semiotic system and a very sophisticated cultural phenomenon; this makes it a very 
useful object of study, allowing us to manipulate an entire (and rich) language while 
looking for the basic workings of all kinds of communication. The article will show how 
TMS analysis of cartomancy has already been quite productive and has had a few entails 
as well as how these analyses could help us to reach a better understanding of play, 
which is one of the biggest challenges that communication studies are facing today. 
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Cartomancy has been a privileged object of study in Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School. 
Uspenskij and Lekomceva dedicate to it a speech (published in the proceedings in 1964) 
and an article (1965), and Egorov also wrote a paper on it (1965). Cartomancy, the form 
of divination exploiting playing cards, is a simple semiotic system that is highly 
schematized and relatively easy to reconstruct. For this reason, cartomancy has been 
considered not only a metaphor of natural language but also a similar modelling system of 
an inferior order of complexity. What started as almost a pretext – using cartomancy as a 
training object in order to pursue heuristic goals – later become the basis of several works 
fully dedicated to divination. Aphek and Tobin (1989) used this work as starting point for 
their fundamental book on semiotics of fortune telling that is still an unavoidable work of 
reference today. Also, Maria Corti (1973), in her semiotics analysis of Calvino's “Il 
Castello dei Destini Incrociati” (1969), retrieves a lot from the Tartu-Moscow works on 
cartomancy. 
In this paper, we will illustrate the positions of the Tartu-Moscow scholars on cartomancy 
and show how their works have not only been useful in the past to other researches but 
can still provide solid tools of investigation to other branch of semiotics, in our case to 
semiotics of play. 
   
 
“This process repeated itself more than a quarter 
of a century later with the founding of the 
Moscow-Tartu School of Semiotics. As if 
reproducing the structure of the first stage, the 
scholarly movement that sprang up formed at the 
intersection of two traditions: the Moscow 
Linguistic School and the Tartu Literary School, 
which was genetically linked to the Leningrad 
School of Formalism. The joint work of brilliant 
academics, such as the late M.I. Revzin and Ju.K. 
Lekomcev, and of an entire pleiade of scholars 
from Moscow, Tartu, and Leningrad (the circle 
later grew to include scholars from Erevan, Riga 
and other cities), as well as the work of 
philologists from abroad, determined the general 
contours of the scholarly movement. At first, their 
interest was focused on structure and on the 
language of the phenomena under investigation. 
During this period semiotic researchers went 
through a period of “spacial expansion.” One 
after another, the most wildly different aspects of 
human activity—art, games, everyday behaviour, 
and so on—were described as languages.”  
 
Y. M. Lotman, The unpredictable workings of 
Culture p.51-52. 




Uspenskij and Lekomceva  
 
In the Moscow Symposium of 1962, B. Uspenskij and M. I. Lekomceva presented 
together an analysis entitled Cartomancy as a Semiotic System in which they approached 
fortune telling through cards as a proper language. This work was hence further 
developed in an article published in 1965 with the title “Describing a Semiotic System 
with a Simple Syntax.” 
The aim of Uspenskij and Lekomceva was to provide the description of a simple semiotic 
system in order to participate in the creation of a method of descript ive semiotics and to 
enhance the possibility of a comparison between natural languages and other semiotic 
systems. In the article, the authors implicitly admit that they have no true interest in the 
cultural phenomenon of cartomancy but that the semiotic analysis of cartomancy could 
have an heuristic value. 
Uspenskij's and Lekomceva's approach to cartomancy is articulated in three steps, and to 
each step, they dedicate a paragraph: “Field data of cartomancy described in the 
metalanguage of linguistic terminology,” “A semiotic description of cartomancy,” and 
“The system of cartomancy compared to natural languages.” 
The first step, then, is the attempt to describe cartomancy using the metalanguage of 
linguistics. According to the authors, linguistics owns the more elaborated among the 
metalanguages of semiotic disciplines, making it the more suitable choice for any 
description of a semiotic system. According to linguistic terminology, then, cartomancy is 
indeed a language and is composed of two elements: a mechanism for the distribution of 
the cards, which generates sentences, and a vocabulary that explains the meaning of each 
card or idiomatic combination of cards. The authors proceed with the description of a 
popular method of fortune telling in which card distribution is articulated in two phases 
and determines the formation of nine sentences composed by a group of up to four cards. 
In addition, the distribution also determines attributes that contextualize each sentence 
(e.g., “What will happen” or “What you do not expect”). Uspenskij and Lekomceva also 
propose a table reporting the meaning that each card assumes in the act of fortune telling 
and showing how cards of the same suite and/or denomination often share semantic links.  
The main part of the analysis, however, is focused on the semiotic description of 
cartomancy and, in particular, in its pragmatics, semantics, and syntax.  
Fortune telling always involves two people of differing status. The first one (A) is the 
fortune teller, and the second one (B) is the person whose future is being told. For A, if 
the signs on the cards only pertain to a code, B replaces the variable signifiers with 
specific meaning issued from his personal situation. In order to make cartomancy work, 
therefore, the meanings of the cards have to cover every possible life situation. In other 
words, according to a Saussurean conception of signs, A only has access to the signifier 
and the signified, while the referent is only accessible to B. 
The distribution of cards in fortune telling determines that some sentences will focus on 
the past and the present of B. This step is the more delicate for A because he has to prove 
his abilities in a sort of test; B also knows the rules of cartomancy, the meanings of the 
cards, and, of course, his own past and present. Uspenskij and Lekomceva compare this 
situation to a game for two passive opponents in which all the moves are personal. The 
distribution makes it a game of chance (or alea, according to Caillois 1967), and systems 
of fortune telling that exploit all cards correspond to a game with complete information. 
Winning this game is the only way to keep the fortune telling from being a failure, thus A 
has to be able to interpret the reactions of B and, if possible, gather some information on 
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him before the session. Winning the game, on the other hand, will also win B's 
confidence.  
If telling the past and the present can be hard, according to the authors, telling the future 
is much simpler. B ignores his future as well, hence cartomancy becomes almost a self-
generating system. The situation has already taken shape, and the fortune teller has much 
less freedom than before (he only needs to read the cards). 
After the pragmatics, the authors analyse the semantics of cartomancy. Cards indicate 
both subjects (persons indicated by the faces) and predicates. The key planes used to 
interpret the meaning of the cards are simultaneously issued by the kind of situation 
manifested (usually marital or financial) and by the particular plane of each sentence 
(“What will happen,” “What you do not expect,” etc.). 
Finally, the syntax of cartomancy is very simple because there is a high degree of 
freedom in the order of reading the signs, as often happens in simple languages with 
limited vocabulary. Even if it's not a rule, generally, the subjects are read first with the 
predicates read later. 
The last paragraph of Uspenskij’s and Lekomceva’s article is devoted to comparing 
cartomancy to natural languages; the semiotic system of cartomancy can be considered a 
language with a finite number of states, limited semantics, and very simple syntax. 
Cartomancy share many features with natural languages; as in natural languages, 
preceding words and sentences influence the following. Additionally, different readings 
of the cards' meanings, which depend on the initially given situation, are analogous to 
variations of meaning depending on context in natural languages. Like natural languages, 





Boris Egorov's article on cartomancy was published in 1965 in the same issue of Sign 
System Studies than Uspenskij's and Lekomceva's, and is entitled The Simplest Semiotic 
Systems and the Typology of Plots. His approach, different from the previous, 
concentrates on cartomancy as a plot-generating mechanism. 
The author acknowledges the work of Uspenskij and Lekomceva, but he's also critical. In 
particular, Egorov disagrees with the claim of the fortune teller (A) having a high degree 
of freedom while reading the cards. According to him, in professional fortune telling, A 
has an enormous advantage over his customer (B) that generally ignores the rules and 
meanings of cartomancy, and so A is granted an infinite amount of freedom. Cards, 
therefore, are pure fiction, and the game is played with the mind of B with his own 
expectations and reactions.  
On the other hand, in honest fortune telling (as among friends) or when someone is telling 
their own fortune (A=B), the degree of freedom is very little if not non-existent. Honest 
fortune telling is the more interesting to Egorov because in that case, each card has an 
only meaning, which may vary only in strictly stipulated instances and which nuances are 
determined only in the context of the entire distribution. 
In his article Egorov describes a different method of cartomancy which is similar, but 
different, from the one described by Uspenskij and Lekomceva. If the main features are 
still the same, both the distribution and the meaning of many cards are sensibly different. 
The most significant variation in the rules is a syntactical one: in this form of cartomancy 
the order of cards is fixed and meaningful and different sequences of the same cards have 
different meanings.  
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Egorov, in the same way than Uspenskij and Lekomceva, is not particularly interested in 
the cultural phenomenon of cartomancy, but he prefers to focus on the way cartomancy is 
effective for generating plots. According to him, every reading of a series of sentences 
creates a new plot and the number of possible combinations of the 36 cards – and thus the 
number of possible plots – is immense: countless combinations can spring from a very 
little number of signs. This signs are particularly interesting to him because, when the 
author was writing, plot theorists were looking exactly for the “primary elements” of plot: 
“Obviously such a system is elaborated during a centuries-long developmental process in 
which the most significant and diverse actions and consequences are selected, and in this 
form it attracts our attention as a system of plots.” (Egorov 1977: 77) 
Egorov traces also a sort of history of plots, recalling that Vladimir Propp (1928) outlined 
thirty-one functions in fairy tales. Despite the possibility of reducing those functions in 
few smaller elements, not all their combinations would appear in fairy tales. Fairy tales 
are composed by functions that are, in fact, short plots: not every combination of the same 
elements fits. The increasing complexity of narrative through the centuries, however, 
brought to wider range of possible combinations of elements and thus to an increasing 
decomposition of this motifs in sub-motives. The number of elements increases 
proportionally to the number of ties between them, which in turn complicates the 
structure as a whole. It's impossible, therefore, to reduce all the different narrations to a 
small number of plots. 
Even if cartomancy is extremely antique, contemporary cartomancy is a product of the 
modern era: the cards don't indicates short plots, but each one represents a single, 
indivisible element (a subject or a predicate). The method described by Egorov hosts 
twelve predicates, and the majority of them do not have a thymic value. Most of the 
predicates are identified by their value. When this happens, the suite introduces 
something qualitative, evaluative, or attributive to the meaning defined by it. Nonetheless, 
some of these elements still have an unspecified value depending on the context. 
Predicates such as “change” comprehend everything. These elements are not already part 
of the table of predicates, and their value is determined only by the context. Furthermore, 
Egorov also underlines that it is impossible to define a hierarchy of predicates by their 
meaningfulness, the latter depending on the interpretation given by the person whose 
future is being told (and thus variates according to the receiver and the context).  
The author states that the sequence of subjects and predicates indicated by the cards can 
be easily represented with a formula (formed by the cards' conventional signs). Such a 
transcription of the plot would be objective and could be read by anybody. Unfortunately, 
according to Egorov, such a formula is still not possible with artistic works.  
The article ends with a programmatic allegation from Egorov that a science of plots 
would be highly desirable. Such science, composed by a grammar, syntax, and history of 
plots, should create a complex table of all the possible elements pertaining to plots and 
investigate the ways they are interconnected. The analysis of cartomancy is then a model 
based on a simple system that should be applied with a higher degree of complexity to 
every form of narration.   
 
 
Influences and Entails 
 
The works of the Tartu-Moscow semioticians was, as we said, concentrated in using 
cartomancy as a model object of analysis in order to direct future academic efforts. 
However, these works have been among the basis of the monumental work from Edna 
Aphek and Yishai Tobin in Semiotics of Fortune Telling, published in 1989. Opposite to 
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Egorov, Uspenskij, and Lekomceva, the main interest of this book is to actually shed light 
on the cultural relevance of fortune telling. In the fifth chapter, entitled “The Visual and 
the Textual in Cartomancy,” Aphek and Tobin approach cartomancy as a complex, 
multilayer, semiotic system. It could be interesting quoting here the paragraphs in which 
they explain the differences of their approach from the previous works.  The first 
paragraph underlines their divergences from Uspenskij and Lekomceva:  
 
We, on the other hand, believe that cartomancy represents a complex semiotic system 
where the meaning part of the card symbol functioning as a sign is oftentimes an 
index of exhaustive graded sometimes polysemic and "reversible" meanings which 
are part of a larger relative dynamic thematic continuum. The meanings of the cards 
may be seen as exhaustively classifying a larger thematic continuum if we view the 
"divinatory" meanings attached to each card as representing most, if not all, the 
possible semantic, cultural and social attributes of an umbrella term or theme related 
to that particular card. (Aphek and Tobin 1989: 138.) 
 
The second one, on the other hand, is related to Egorov's work: 
 
We, on the other hand, have also included in our work, the notion of the separate and 
individual plot building of the members of the fortune-teller/client dyad and have 
extended the discourse plot to include both a visual semiotic system which revolves 
around the moment of reading: i.e. the line or direction followed by the eye in a 
particular spread, as well as a broader semiotic system of color, shape, form and 
number, since these elements of the various suits of the regular playing cards add to 
their meaning and interpretation. (Aphek and Tobin 1989: 138.) 
 
As we can see, Aphek and Tobin don't completely reject the previous works, but they 
deepen and complicate their theories on the topic in the frame of a much wider study on 
all forms of fortune telling. 
The work of Egorov Uspenskij and Lekomceva also influenced Maria Corti's “Le jeu 
comme génération du texte: Des tarots au récit,” published in 1973. In this article, the 
Italian semiotician focuses on Italo Calvino's novel Il castello dei destini incrociati, 
published in 1969. In this novel, a series of characters tell their own stories using tarots  as 
support. The cards are distributed according to rules similar to cartomancy, and the signs 
that they display are exploited in order to develop the plot. Corti refers several times to 
both theories (from Uspenskij and Lekomceva and from Egorov) that she uses to carry out 
her analysis. In particular, she focuses on the way in which Calvino is able to exploit the 
cards and their distribution in order to tell well-known stories, such as the one of Roland. 
Additionally, she shows the great awareness that Calvino had of the mechanics of plot 
generation by using a specific set of complex signs and their disposition.  
Corti's article is an interesting way of retrieving useful and general concepts from the 
previous works on cartomancy and using them to shed some light on Calvino's way of 
thinking and writing. 
What is still missing, however, is a semiotic analysis of cartomancy that takes into 
account the irrational and transcendent aspects that this practice may entail. Even if many 
scholars have already approached prophecy and divination from a semiotic perspective 
that also takes in account its sacred and transcendental aspects (see, for example, Volli 
2011), such an approach has not yet been used to analyse cartomancy. The heritage of the 
strongly linguistic perspective adopted by Tartu-Moskow scholars has probably heavily 
influenced later semiotic works on the subject. Nevertheless, an extension of the analysis 
beyond this horizon would be, in fact, a new and interesting asset for understanding the 
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phenomenon of cartomancy and its cultural relevance; therefore, in the author's opinion, it 
would be a desirable future addition to the theory.   
 
 
Cartomancy and Playfulness 
 
Even if Lotman did not write about cartomancy, in 1975, he wrote The Theme of Cards 
and Games in Russian Literature of the 19th Century (in Russian, тема карт и 
карточной игры в русской литературе начала XIX века, the translation I used was 
Lotman 1980), mainly focusing on Dame of Spades by Pushkin. In this work, Lotman 
stresses the fundamental duplicity of cards, being at the same time playful artefacts and 
instruments used for fortune telling. According to him, this duplicity becomes even more 
evident in literature, where games of cards often have the features of a struggle against 
destiny. 
On the other hand, however, one can argue that the contrary is also true: every experience 
of cartomancy shows some feature that is properly game-like. As we have seen, Uspenskij 
and Lekomceva have compared fortune telling with a game between the fortune teller and 
his customer, a game in which the first player has to successfully interpret the reactions of 
his opponent in real time and act according to his interpretation, reconstructing the 
opponent's past and present life. However, the game-like features of cartomancy are not 
limited to the struggle between the people involved but run deeper in its mechanics. 
The reflection of these mechanics can be seen, for example, in the order in which 
Lekomcheva and Uspenskij approach the three aspects of the semiotic system of 
cartomancy (pragmatics, semantics, and syntax). Natural languages are generally 
analysed in the opposite order: starting from syntax, going through semantics, and 
investigating the pragmatics only in the end. This epistemological reversal happens 
because, if natural languages are semiotic systems with a syntactical-semantical 
determination, cartomancy – this is what Uspenskij and Lekomceva appear to suggest – is 
a semiotic system that features a pragmatic determination. If this is true, it entails the 
subordination of the meaning and of the order of the signs to the rules that, in a very 
game-like way, regulate the disposition of the cards and the interactions between the 
people involved. Furthermore, considering cartomancy as a pragmatically determined 
semiotic system could also explain the relatively great amount of freedom and 
idiosyncrasy featured by cartomancy that is absent from less playful semiotic systems as 
natural languages. 
Egorov, on the other hand, stresses the importance of fortune telling with cards as a way 
to create new plots through the recombination of a series of elements. Maria Corti echoes 
him, stating that tarots can be used to joindre et disjoindre les elements constitutifs d'une 
intrigue pour les transformer en matrices poetiques et ideologiques . [Join and separate 
the constituent parts of a plot, in order to transform them into poetic and ideological 
matrices.] (Corti 1973: 43) 
This definition of cartomancy as a sort of matrix of plots and is very close to Ferri's 
definition of games that he considers an interactive matrix that actualizes the elements of 
the game's repertory into a single narration (or game-text) (Ferri 2007). Thus, games 
feature both a repertory and a set of rules that mixes and brings together the repertory's 
elements. These components are the same that Uspenskij and Lekomceva indicate as 
constituting cartomancy: a vocabulary and a system of distribution. Additionally, if cards 
change meaning according to the ones that form the same sentence in cartomancy, in 
many games, the value of the cards depends fully on the combinations they makes with 
the others. 
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However, while the interactive matrix of games is, by definition, interactive, the 
distribution of the cards is determined only by randomness and by the rules without any 
decision made by the players involved. The choice of the reading order, nevertheless, can 
be considered a part of a playful behaviour, and it works like a sort of puzzle that the 
fortune teller has to solve. A cartomancy session, from this perspective, is not very 
different from a solitaire: the player has to find a new order to randomly distributed 
cards.  
Finally, we can say that cartomancy is characterized by rules, a certain amount of 
creativity and make believe, and even a dose of risk, which are all elements typical of 
games. 
On the other hand, cartomancy is not always perceived as game-like because it can be 
taken very seriously. Lotman describes play as a twofold activity: the player is 
simultaneously following a conventional (thus fictional) behaviour and a practical one 
(Lotman 2011). The player acts as the world of play were real, and at the same time, he 
knows it is not. Also, Caillois (1967) states that one of the characteristics of play is that it 
has to be conscious of its own fictionality. It follows that, if the fortune teller does truly 
believe in what he's doing, he is not playing, thus cartomancy, for him, is no game. 
However, if the fortune teller's faith in his ability to tell the future it is not so strong or, 
more likely, if cartomancy is either a profession or a hobby for him, we could harmlessly 
define fortune telling with cards being a game. Either way, the relationship between 
games and cartomancy shouldn't be surprising. According to Lotman, play often models 
the randomness of our world (2011: 256). Henceforth, if we believe that the apparently 
random events of life are, in fact, already written and predetermined, play becomes a 





Aphek, E. and Tobin, Y (1989) Semiotics of Fortune Telling. Amsterdam and 
 Philadelphia:  John Benjamins. 
Caillois, R. (1967) Les Jeux et les homes. Paris: Gallimard. 
Calvino, I. (1969) Il castello dei destini incrociati. In Italo Calvino and S. Samek 
Ludovici Tarocchi: il mazzo visconteo di Bergamo e New York. Parma: Franco Maria 
 Ricci. 
Corti, M. (1973) Le jeu comme généation du texte: Des tarots au récit. Semiotica 7(1), 
 33-48. 
Egorov, B. (1965). Prosteyshiye semioticheskiye sistemy i tipologiya syuzhetov. Sign 
 Systems Studies 2, II: 106-115. Translation: Egorov, B. 1977. The Simplest 
 Semiotic Systems and the Typology of Plots. In Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology, 
 edited by Daniel Lucid, 77-86. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ferri, G. (2007) Narrating machines and interactive matrices. A semiotic common ground 
 for  game studies. In Situated Play. Proceedings of DIGRA 2007 Conference, 
 466-473. 
Lekomceva, M. I., and Uspenskij, B. A. (1962) Cadanie na igralnikh kartakh kak 
 semioticheskaya sistema. Simpozium, 83-86. 
Lekomceva, M. I., and Uspenskij, B. A. (1965). Opisaniya odnoy semioticheskoy sistemy 
 s prostym sintaksisom. Sign System Studies 2, II: 94-105. Translation: Lekomceva, 
 M. I., and B. A. Uspenskij. 1977. Describing a Semiotic System with a Simple 
 Syntax. In Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology, edited by Daniel Lucid, 65-76. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Thibault, M.                                                                                                                               9 
 
 
Lotman, Y. M. (1980) “Il tema delle carte e del gioco nella letteratura russa dell'inizio del 
 secolo XIX.” In Salvestroni, S. (ed.), Testo e contesto. Semiotica dell'arte e della 
 cultura, 151-190. Roma-Bari: Laterza. 
Lotman, Y. M. (2011) The place of art among other modelling systems. Sign Systems 
 Studies 39(2/4), 251-270. 
Lotman, Y. M. (2013) The unpredictable workings of Culture. Tallin: TLU Press. 
Propp, V. (1928) Morfologiija skazki. Leningrad: Akademia. 
Volli, U. (2011) "Previsione, profezia, senso”. in De Maria Gian Marco (ed.) Ieri,oggi, 




Original Article                                                                                                 
 
Address for Correspondence: Evan L. Kropp, email: elk[at]Reinhardt.edu                                                      
Article received on the 8th September, 2015. Article accepted on the 28th November, 2015.                                    















Evan L. Kropp 




Abstract: This article transcends the issue of conflicting theoretical schools of thought 
to formulate a method of social scientific style theory evaluation for cultural studies. It 
is suggested that positivist social scientific models of theory critique can be used to 
assess cultural models of communication to determine if they should be classified as 
theories. A set of evaluation criteria is formulated as a guide and applied to Stuart Hall’s 
Encoding/Decoding to determine if it is a theory. Conclusions find the sharing of criteria 
between schools of thought is judicious, Encoding/Decoding fits the established criteria, 
and Encoding/Decoding should be referred to as a theory. 
 







In The End of Mass Communication?, Chaffee and Metzger (2001) suggest that new media 
will change our notions of mass communication and, as a result, the theories used in 
communication research. In more recent years, these types of implications about the rise of 
new media technologies, their role in society, and their influence on existing structures and 
industries have become increasingly ubiquitous. In this same spirit of capitalizing on the 
changes occurring in our modern era to re-evaluate existing ideas, this article suggest that, in 
addition to changing our notions of the theories we use, it might also be prudent to reconsider 
the methods used to label cultural theories as theories. When answering the question “what is 
a theory?” each school of thought provides different answers. For example, scientific theories 
have goals of explanation, prediction and control and scientists suggest that ideas supported 
by empirical data become a set of “laws” or theory after being evaluated according to existing  
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sets of criteria. (Reynolds 1971). Contrastingly, cultural theorists’ goals are to reveal systems 
of oppression in social structures and examine their underlying values, attitudes and beliefs. 
They have no set of criteria to determine what ideas should be labeled as theories. Cultural 
theories do not become “laws,” but they more simply provide an abstract understanding of 
some communication process (Miller 2002). Despite these contradictory assumptions, it 
would benefit all parties to share tools or methods that can move us forward towards 
achieving our collective goals of answering questions about how and why things work.  
To demonstrate how the different approaches used by these schools of thought can be bridged 
and how concepts can be mutually beneficial despite different epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, one set of scientific criteria will be modified and used as a sample 
method of determining if a cultural theory should be called a “theory.” The theory selected 
for this purpose is Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding. This theory was chosen for several 
reasons.  First, Hall’s ideas are the foundation for the interdisciplinary field of cultural 
studies. Showing how this process can work with such an important theory will demonstrate 
the processes usefulness for other ideas. There has also been no consensus on how to label his 
concepts about the semiotics of meaning-making in media. Although I have just referred to 
Hall’s work as a theory, his ideas have been referred to by many names including a “model,” 
“theory,” “process,” “Hall’s Theory,” or simply “encoding/decoding.” These multiple forms 
of reference are a result of a lack of clear criteria for defining cultural theories as “theories” 
and for this reason, no process to determine how Hall’s ideas should be labeled.  Finally, 
using a four-decade-old theory demonstrates how the method presented here can be used to 
evaluate a theory of any age. A brief evolution of media theories is first presented to situate 
the innovative variations in thought provided by Hall’s ideas. A review of the concepts 
presented is followed by examples of how the approach has been put to use. Next, the criteria 
for evaluating a theory are provided, defined and put to use evaluating Hall’s ideas.  This 
assessment concludes that Encoding/Decoding fits the established criteria of a theory and 
should be referred to as such.  
 
 
Evolution of Media Theories 
 
This brief review provides a foundation of theoretical thoughts key to understanding what led 
up to Stuart Hall’s development of Encoding/Decoding.  
Arising during the late nineteenth century, early media theories developed in an historical 
context, often referred to as the era of mass society, when industrialization was on the rise 
and societies were transitioning from predominantly agrarian lifestyles to a more 
commercially centered industrialized structure based around the growth of large cities. The 
transformations of the industrial era were far more than economic, giving rise to changes in 
every aspect of daily life, including social structures and interpersonal interactions. 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies described one result of this transformation, 
introducing the dichotomous concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. These concepts 
explained the breakdown in society where “people were bound together by personal, 
traditional, and communal ties which characterize social relations” (Geimeinschaft) into a 
society where “personal relations are anonymous, impersonal and isolated” (Gesellschaft) 
(Williams 2003: 25). This disconnect from traditional family structures and interpersonal 
relationships was believed to leave people “atomized and exposed to external influences, and 
especially to the pressure of mass propaganda of powerful leaders, the most effective agency 
of which was the mass media” (Morley 1992: 41). The rise of Adolf Hitler and Fascism 
occurred during a period of concern within German society about this transition from 
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Geimeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Hitler capitalized on the perceived vulnerability of the 
population through his use of propaganda to promote his messages and recruit followers.  
In the 1960s and early 1970s, mass communication researchers such as Elihu Katz, Jay 
Blumler, Denis McQuail and Michael Gurevich, building upon earlier research in the 1940s 
by Herta Herzog, developed an innovative type of active audience-based theory that they 
referred to as the “uses and gratifications” approach (Lull 1998). This approach operated on 
three basic assumptions; people are active users of media, people know why they use the 
media and can explain these reasons, and there are common patterns to media consumption 
among users (Williams 2003: 177). Stuart Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham built upon several aspects of the uses and 
gratifications model such as focusing on audiences as active users and understanding how 
people experience media content in different ways. This focus on users by concentrating upon 
audience-based research was the antithesis of the top-down critical theory of Frankfurt 
School researchers that emphasized the imposition of cultural ideologies by the hegemonic 
media industries and positioned the audience as passive and vulnerable. Cultural studies 
found its audience-based niche as it highlighted how media audiences interpreted messages, 
focusing on the needs of the audience in relation to the messages and exploring the 
“openness” of audience members to receiving messages as well as their reasons for media use 
(Morley and Brunsdon 1999). This marked a significant paradigm shift from investigating 
how the media influenced people to how people used media.   
Another major influence on Hall was the development of the structuralist school of thought, 
represented by the works of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, whose application of 
semiological models developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (and the American semiotics of 
Charles S. Peirce) to an analysis of cultural phenomena such as kinship, ritual and religious 
life had a profound effect on continental thought across disciplines. Hall’s very use of 
semiotic concepts places his work squarely in the lineage of semiotics, influenced perhaps 
even more directly by the post-structuralist semiotic philosophies of Roland Barthes. Barthes 
significantly expanded the application of semiotic principles from the realm of language to 
encompass visual encoding of meaning as well; Barthes also married the seemingly 
oppositional approaches of semiotics-structuralism with the post-Marxist paradigms of the 
Frankfurt School concerning the way hegemonic ideologies become encoded into mass 
media. This marriage would also serve as the basis for Hall’s work, which became the 
foundation for the interdisciplinary field of cultural studies. Drawing upon Barthes, whose 
work examined symbols and culture from a Marxist perspective, Hall sought to explain the 
relationship between the producers of messages, the messages themselves and audiences. 
Hall argued that “researchers should direct their attention toward (1) analysis of the social 
and political context in which content is produced (encoding), and (2) the consumption of 
media content (decoding)” (Baran and Davis 2012: 257). This led to the publication of his 
ideas about the semiotics of meaning-making in media, first elaborated in his 1973 article 
Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse but more widely known and studied as a 
subsequently published 1980 edited extract entitled Encoding/Decoding. 
 
 
What is Encoding/Decoding? 
 
In 1973, Hall was motivated to develop his model of encoding and decoding mediated 
messages as a “reaction against a tradition of Marxist film criticism found in the film journal 
Screen” (Baran and Davis 2012). He viewed Screen’s approach as cultural elitism by which 
movies were presented in support of the status quo of society. However, Hall believed that 
cases existed by which movies did the opposite and instead challenged the status quo; as a 
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result, audiences did not always interpret the messages in the ways intended by the producers. 
Hall viewed the communication process as more complex than the Shannon and Weaver 
transmission model centered on the idea of communication as a “transmission of signals or 
messages over distance for the purpose of control” and was defined by terms such as 
“imparting,” “sending,” “transmitting,” and “giving information to others” (Carey 1989: 15).  
To Hall, communication was a process of  “linked but distinctive moments – production, 
circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction” (Hall 1980). Although each of these is a 
distinctive practice, together they form a “complex structure in dominance” (Hall 1980: 128). 
This describes “the relationship between the producer of the media text and the consumer” 
(Davis 2004: 60). 
Message intent and dominance are important aspects of Hall’s ideas. Arguing from a Marxist 
perspective, he argued that through the media, the dominant and most powerful factions of 
society imposed their ideological values. Therefore, he believed “research should be 
concerned with the ‘ideological effects’ of the media; on how the media are used to promote 
or reinforce a particular set of dominant values and how successful they are in doing this” 
(Williams 2003: 195). In other words, the very process of media production involves 
encoding meanings and messages in every aspect of content that the audiences must 
necessarily interpret.  Hall argued that existing media theories and models did not grant 
audience members with enough agency concerning this interpretive process, perceiving 
audiences as passive instead of active recipients of messages. Hall argued that scholars must 
acknowledged that there is activity at both levels if we are to understand the relationship 
between media producers and media receivers (Davis 2004). Producers communicate 
messages based on assumptions of shared understandings, while audiences decode the 
content according to their own norms. Media messages are symbols and symbolic vehicles 
that create meaning because “if no ‘meaning’ is taken, there can be no ‘consumption.’ If the 
meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect” (Hall 1980). These symbols (verbal, 
visual and other culturally specified codes) become the vehicles for passing meaning-loaded 
messages from sender to receiver at different moments in the process.  
When applied to the medium of television, this model commences with the production 
process. This is where the messages, which later become content to be distributed, are created 
and encoded. The encoding, or reproduction of ideologies in the production process, is not 
necessarily overt and can be done at an unconscious level (Hall 1980). What this means is 
that the producers are not always consciously aware of every nuance they may be encoding, 
since the very nature of filmic communication captures meanings encoded into the mise-en-
scène (the setting, the lighting, the choices of costumes and wardrobe, the casting, the body 
language and gestures and vocal intonation of the actors) as well as the cinematography 
(camera angles, movements, styles) and editing choices. The influences on what these 
messages say come from institutional constraints on the production process, professional 
codes and practices as well as the influence of those people in control attempting to promote 
their ideologies (Williams 2003). Although multiple meanings may be encoded within each 
text, Hall refers to the one dominant ideological message intended by the producers as the 
preferred meaning; this would be the interpretation shared by the majority of the audience. 
Since these messages are transmitted through symbols, the audience actively works to decode 
them. As Hall’s schematic (Fig 1.) describes, frameworks of knowledge, relations of 
production and technical infrastructure make up meaning structures that are encoded within 
television programs. These programs then act as sites of meaningful discourse; here, in the 
process of viewing and interpreting, the audience members decoded the previously encoded 
meaning structures into their own, new meaning structures. The decoder also utilizes their 
own personal and cultural frameworks of knowledge, relations of production and technical 
infrastructures to interpret meaning.  








It is at this point that Hall’s model presents its largest deviation in concepts from previous 
semiotics models of communication. Clearly influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s theories of 
hegemony and resistance, Hall acknowledges the cultural politics of interpretation in his use 
of differentiated ways of “reading” a media text (using the literary metaphor of reading-as-
interpretation borrowed from Barthes). Despite the fact that a preferred or hegemonic 
ideological meaning may be encoded in each text (in our example, a television program), Hall 
distinguishes between three distinct approaches to decoding the messages, which he labels as 
dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings. A dominant (i.e., preferred) reading would 
be an unconditional acceptance of the preferred meaning, through which process the product 
is interpreted as the producer intended and the viewer accepts the message at face value, with 
no critical analysis of the media in this type of content reading. However, Hall provides for 
two other approaches to interpreting meaning. An oppositional interpretation occurs when the 
individual viewer decodes the text according to his or her own cultural influences; in this 
case, the preferred ideological meaning may be understood but not accepted or agreed upon 
by the viewer. In fact, the viewer may interpret the message in a hostile or comical way, 
finding its very premise to be untenable. Hall’s third approach is a negotiated reading, which 
is a hybrid of sorts: the audience member will understand and partially embrace the preferred 
meaning but may feel conflicted about some aspects of that interpretations; therefore, instead 
of completely rejecting it, the interpreter will find a way to negotiate or change its meaning to 
more closely suit his or her needs (Kropp 2011).  
While Hall’s model has face validity, making sense on the surface, it was only hypothetical, 
as he never provided any empirical evidence to support his claims.   Fortunately, since Hall 
first introduced Encoding/Decoding, many studies of both the process of encoding and the 
process of decoding television have tested these ideas. 
 
 
Use of Encoding/Decoding 
 
Over the past four decades, many researchers have applied Encoding/Decoding concepts to 
an analysis of television, film, and other forms of cultural expression. The table located in the 
Appendix section identifies exemplars these studies. Listed chronologically, the table 
identifies the use, focus, method and findings of each study. This list represents a compilation 
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of well-known and often cited projects, smaller projects with unique findings, multiple 
methods (textual analysis, focus group discussions, observation, letters, questionnaires, 
interviews) and various areas of focus (gender, class, culture, age, race, religion).   
The largest of these studies was David Morley’s and Charlotte Brunsdon’s 1978 textual 
analysis of the BBC evening news magazine program Nationwide and a later audience 
experiment completed by Morley. The researchers examined the program to uncover the 
preferred meaning presented by the show’s producers, or what the researchers interpreted to 
be the encoded messages. Nationwide was chosen for this study “because an earlier analysis 
had identified it as a program that routinely offered status quo explanations for social issues” 
(Baran and Davis 2012: 258). For the experimental study, Morley recruited a group of 
individuals to watch the show. The viewing was followed by a group discussion through 
which the researcher sought to determine how each viewer decoded the show. Morley, a 
former student of Hall’s, followed the path of thought that economic class was a major 
determinant in understanding how viewers would decode a program.  His findings were 
mixed. Consistent with Hall’s hypothesis that viewers are active and that different groups of 
people decode messages in different ways. Morley found that the viewers in his study could 
be placed into all three of Hall’s categories -- dominant, negotiated and oppositional -- and 
that category placement correlated with socioeconomic class.  Those with dominant readings 
were mostly upper class white-collar workers. Middle-class, blue-collar workers and 
university students performed negotiated readings, while black students and trade union 
activists decoded the show as oppositional readings.  These findings were summarized by 
Morley (1981), who stated, “Members of a given sub-culture will tend to share a cultural 
orientation towards decoding messages in particular ways. Their individual ‘readings’ of 
messages will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices” (51).  
Inconsistent with Hall’s model, however, Morley also found that although class could 
anticipate decoding most of the time, it was not true all of the time and, for this reason, the 
relationship between the two variables was not causal. This showed that there were other 
variables that came into play including a person’s ability or motivation to decode a message.  
Morley’s study had limitations. Researchers who deconstructed the Nationwide study like 
Justin Wren-Lewis (1983) and Sujeong Kim (2004) have raised issues with the study’s 
methodologies, conceptualizations of the encoders, the reliance on cultural stereotypes and 
the lack of inclusion of other social factors beyond class to name a few. Kim also argues that 
Morley may have underestimated his findings on the importance of socio-economic class and 
its influence on the decoding process. Despite some criticisms of Morley’s study, however, it 
is considered one of the most influential investigations of audience reception. It served as an 
important precedent for other researchers, showing how Hall’s concepts of 
Encoding/Decoding might be applied to television programs and test for the relationship 
between reception and social factors. Several of the better-known studies since Nationwide 
include Dorothy Hobson’s Crossroads – The Drama of a Soap Opera (1982), Tania 
Modleski’s examination of soap operas in Loving with a Vengeance: Mass Produced 
Fantasies for Women (1982), Ien Ang’s Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic 
Imagination (1985), and Sut Jhally and Justin Lewis’ Enlightened Racism: The Cosby Show, 
Audiences, and the Myth of the American Dream (1992).  These projects of varying size, 
depth, and focus apply the ideas presented in Encoding/Decoding to different television texts 
as they reinforce and expand upon Hall’s concepts.  
Another significant study that furthered Hall’s concepts was when Katz and Liebes (1990) 
used Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model to study the American television series Dallas from an 
international perspective to understand how a show produced and encoded in one country 
might be decoded differently in another country. Their study consisted of fifty-five small 
groups, located in both the United States and Israel, each of which viewed and discussed the 
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show. They discovered differences in how members of dissimilar cultures decoded the 
messages within the programs. One important aspect of this study is the linking of ideas such 
as cultural imperialism to the process of Encoding/Decoding. While Israeli groups found the 
show to be a reflection of America, the Russian participants believed the content was not 
simply a reflection but a manipulation; they decoded the messages about American life as 
propaganda about American values. 
In another Encoding/Decoding study, Evan Cooper’s analysis of Will and Grace (2003) 
focused on how heterosexual audience members received the shows gay humor, characters 
and themes. Cooper argues that the show is encoded with indicators of gay culture. These 
indicators occur in the show’s “plot lines, pacing, stylistic conventions, character ‘types’, 
insular upper-middle class environs and, of course, gay sensibility” (Cooper 2003: 517). 
Although not expressly stated, Cooper argues that heterosexual viewers of this show will 
decode the content in a negotiated manner--viewers will enjoy the entertainment provided by 
some of the gay cultural indicators, such as the character Jack’s humor, but they will fail to 
identify with him. Additionally, Cooper believes the viewers’ gender will cause differences in 
decoding whereas the males will be more critical of gay characters alternative sexuality than 
female characters. The twenty-five college students used for this project watched a 
representative sample of the show, then participants were asked to complete questionnaires 
after viewing. Results indicated that viewers consumed the messages within the show in a 
negotiated manner, finding both consistencies and differences between hypothesized 
perceptions and results.  Despite some criticisms in sampling and methodology utilized in this 
study, it serves as a good example of how researchers have put Hall’s Encoding/Decoding to 
use.   
In a final example, Susan Thomas’s (2010) study addressed both encoding and decoding on 
the television show What Not to Wear. She focused on the encoded message of materialism 
and the message that consumption of products can improve the viewer’s life and lead to 
increased happiness, which she found was the dominant message or preferred reading 
presented. Thomas found that viewers decoded this message in different ways due to their 
pre-existing attitudes and cultural constraints. Thomas found that while most participants in 
the study experienced negotiated readings, all types of decoding were possible. Despite the 
small size and limited nature of Thomas’s study, it reinforces Buckingham’s (1987) research, 
which found that messages were negotiated during viewing and that multiple ways of 
interpreting a television program could co-exist during a single viewing. Thomas notes, 
“What was particularly interesting about the viewing process was how many focus group 
members changed their perspective or role during the program” (Thomas 2010, para. 13).  
This is an important finding that warrants further investigation, because Hall’s original work 
does not discuss the possibility of viewers shifting their interpretations throughout the 
viewing process but rather is limited to measuring outcome. Studying how this outcome is 
achieved and the steps that are taken to achieve it is a provocative question raised by this 
study.  
From large studies in the 1970’s like Nationwide to smaller ones like Susan Thomas’s, the 
application of the Encoding/Decoding has been prevalent in communication literature. 
Researchers have tested the ideas, put them to use and critiqued each other’s studies as well 
as the original process proposed by Hall. In the various articles and textbooks that discuss or 
utilize Hall’s work, this approach to Encoding/Decoding has been referred to as a “process,” 
a “model,” and a “theory.” Often, these terms are loosely used, but it is important to utilize 
the correct terminology while discussing this concept. So, I ask the question, is Hall’s 
Encoding/Decoding a theory?  To begin, we must first determine what a theory is and how a 
theory is evaluated. 
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Evaluating a Theory 
 
A theory explains how and why things work; it is “a set of constructs that are linked together 
by relational statements that are internally consistent with each other” (Chaffee and Berger 
1987: 101). A theory is also broad in scope and can be reduced to an overarching concept 
(Heath and Bryant 1992). This concept should accomplish the objectives of describing, 
explaining and predicting. This means a theory should conceptualize its constructs while 
explaining some aspects of the human experience and making predictions about future 
relationships while guiding speculation.  
For example, Agenda Setting is a theory that describes the role of media in the social world. 
This theory explains the idea that the media’s influence on audiences is that they tell people 
what to think about, not what to think. The overarching concept here explains the link 
between audience’s exposure to media (television, radio, Internet) and how people perceive 
public issues. The constructs of television, audiences, exposure and effects in this example 
are internally consistent with one another. The theory acts as a “bridge” explaining the 
relationship between the independent variables like television exposure and dependent 
variables like influence because researchers can predict an impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable (Creswell 2005). 
When speaking of impact, using the language of “influence” as opposed to “cause” is 
important. If causality is established as being necessary, then an extraordinarily high standard 
is being set since cause is often impossible to prove due to the influence of other factors. For 
example, if we observe a child who commits a violent act after watching TV, can it be proven 
that the cause of the child’s actions was the television viewing? Can it even be stated that 
there was a cause? Possibly, the television program was one part of the meaning structures 
that made up the child’s meaning structures including his/her frameworks of knowledge, 
relations of production and technical infrastructure that are also used to interpret meaning as 
laid out in the earlier schematic.  
When evaluating a theory, it is important to first establish criteria that can be used for 
measurement. It is essential to note that we should not judge theories as being “good” or 
“bad.” Instead, a theory is judged by its’ usefulness. As such, there should be no divisions 
between theory and practice in the field. The theory should advance knowledge on a 
phenomenon and contribute to the field by proposing a new image of reality and helping us 
move forward.  To assist in identifying these theories, Chaffee and Berger (1987) offer a list 
of attributes of a good theory. These criteria are used here because they are foundational 
concepts the authors identify as being similar to the list of attributes of a good theory that 
“most communication scientists – who are typically professors – outline for their beginning 
graduate students” (Chaffee and Berger 1987: 104). While Chaffee and Berger’s list of 
criteria may not be new, they transcend time, are specific, and easily understood. Although 
they are presented as being useful only for communication scientists, we will see how their 
usefulness extends beyond the scientific realm. Chaffee and Berger’s original attributes have 
been modified and expanded to create the following evaluative list that includes: explanatory 
power, predictive power, parsimony, testability, internal consistency, heuristic 
provocativeness, organizing power and boundary conditions.  
 
Explanatory Power. Explanatory power is the most important aspect of any theory. If it does 
not explain anything, then it is not a theory. The greater the range of explanations provided 
and number of people affected, the more power a theory possesses.  If the idea can be 
generalized and applied to a larger group, then it has greater explanatory power than if it is 
only applicable to one person.  
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Predictive Power. The ability to foretell future events determines the predictive power of an 
idea. The act of predicting events is sufficient. This criterion does not include the requirement 
of a prediction to be explained further.   
 
Parsimony. Parsimony refers to how simply the theory can be explained. Simple theories are 
preferred over complex theories. Simpler ideas will correlate with more parsimonious 
theories and similarly, more complex ideas will be less parsimonious. 
 
Testability. Chaffee and Berger (1987) utilize the concept of falsifiability or the capability of 
a theory to be proven false.  Instead of provability, the criterion of testability is more useful.  
If a theory is not testable, we can then simply assess the empirical value of the constructs. 
This allows for more observational and descriptive methodological designs. 
 
Internal Consistency. Internal consistency addresses the theories internal logic and seeks to 
understand if what is intended to be measured is being measured. This consistency is also 
known as validity. Beyond Chaffee and Berger’s (1987) definition, the concept can be 
expanded to include seven questions of validity: 
 
1. Content validity: Are the items representative of the field? 
2. Criterion validity: can it be tied to an outside variable? 
3. Face validity: does it make sense on the surface? 
4. Construct validity:  why does it operate? 
5. Convergent validity: do the measures show agreement? 
6. Discriminant validity: do the established scales agree with the hypothesis? 
7. Nomological validity: do the basic entities fit together?  
 
Heuristic Provocativeness. Heuristic Provocativeness seeks to understand if the theory is 
useful.  A theory having high heuristic value will generate new research hypothesis and 
encourage thought beyond a concepts original boundaries. 
 
Organizing Power. Organizing power explains the ability of the idea to make sense of 
existing knowledge. It describes attempts to understand how other theories may have been 
built around an idea and if it has guided speculation in the field. 
 
Boundary Conditions. A theory should specify the extent of its generalizability and the 
phenomena it explains. It should be aware of the conditions that bound its existence and not 
attempt to explain conditions outside of its range. 
 
Criteria analogous to these are most often applied to the evaluation of theories that fall within 
the four major categories of social scientific communications theory (Postpositivist, 
Hermeneutic, Critical, Normative). However, this process is equally useful when evaluating 
cultural theories.  This is especially appropriate when the criteria are not used as a strict list of 
rules, but rather as a general guide; not all criteria are taken to be equally important in the 
evaluation process.  
Cultural theories differ from social scientific theories in that they are heavily value-laden and 
admittedly less objective in their search for knowledge. Cultural theories, unlike social 
scientific theories, seek knowledge through dialectic, advancing knowledge through the 
formation of schools of thought in which there is consensus on validity and gaining power 
through the attraction of adherents defending against attacks from opponents (Baran and 
Davis 2012). But despite differences in epistemology and ontology, the primary goals of 
Kropp, E.L.                                                                                                                               19 
 
 
explanation, description, and acquisition of new knowledge are compatible. Therefore, the 
complimentary objectives allow for the sharing of evaluation criteria. 
 
 
Evaluating Encoding/Decoding as a Theory 
 
References to Encoding/Decoding most often refer to the concepts as a model of 
communication. This is likely, in part, the result of two features in Hall’s writing. First, he 
begins his article with a discussion of a linear model of communication. Using a model to lay 
the foundation for his discussion might lead some readers to assume his concepts should be 
classified in the same manner. Second, Hall provides a visual model of his concepts (as 
shown earlier in Fig 1.1) to help readers understand what he is describing. He uses the model 
as a tool, as a purposeful representation of reality. Yet the presence of a visual representation 
should not limit the classification of the information it explains.   
A theory goes further than a model. It seeks not only to describe or represent, but to explain, 
and that is what Hall’s ideas do. As Helen Davis states, “Hall’s contribution to the research 
was to theorise(sp) what people actually do” (Davis 2004: 60). Instead of seeking solely to 
provide a new model, he proposed new hypothetical positions, new ways of explaining, 
understanding and organizing. For these efforts, Hall is recognized as a leading scholar and 
theorist of media, the “father” of the British Cultural Studies movement.   
Coincidentally, one formal recognition of Hall’s work was his being recognized with the 
Steven H. Chaffee Career Achievement Award in May 2014. That honor is bestowed 
annually to one scholar “for a sustained contribution to theoretical development or empirical 
research related to communication studies over an extended period. The selection committee 
favors research that is innovative, asks conceptually rich questions, and elaborates new 
theoretical possibilities and/or compelling directions for empirical investigation” 
(International Communication Association). It is this type of recognition that exemplifies the 
value of Hall’s contributions and the necessary classification of work like 
Encoding/Decoding as more than a model.   
To determine if Hall’s Encoding/Decoding is indeed a theory, let us apply the modified 
Chaffee and Berger constructs of what a theory is. 
  
 
What does it explain? 
 
If a concept does not explain anything, then it is not a theory. Hall’s Encoding/Decoding 
details the  “determinant moments” that describe the production and reception of meanings 
and codes in televised communication (Hall 1980). It explains how television is a meaningful 
discourse and provides a greater understanding of both how media construct messages and 
how people make sense of what they see and hear.  If the explanatory power of a theory is 
also measured by the range of phenomena and the number of people influenced from the 
intra-individual to the macroscopic societal level (Chaffee and Berger 1987: 107), Hall’s 
concepts and their influence upon the entire field of cultural studies of media can be 
classified as having great explanatory power.  
 
 
Is it easy to understand? 
 
Encoding/Decoding has been called an “elaborated formula, which appears overly technical 
and abstract” (Davis 2004: 61). Despite the initial complexity, deeper analysis of Hall’s 
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arguments and the application of those concepts to practical examples make the ideas more 
easily understandable. To help increase the degree of parsimony, Hall provides a visual 
model and explains each concept. So, while not simple, the ideas are explained in a 
reasonably straightforward manner.  
  
 
Is it internally consistent? 
 
Encoding/Decoding contains varying internal consistency. The idea has high face validity. To 
understand the concept that ideologies can be encoded in media content and that audiences 
decode these messages in varying ways based on varying factors makes sense. However, as 
noted in the Nationwide study, problems with validity may be perceived due to the reliance 
on qualitative and interpretive methods rather than quantitative methods. This is a 
disciplinary and methodological issue. While cultural studies heavily favors a qualitative 
method, interpretive approach, the inclusion of quantitative data in Encoding/Decoding 
studies might be perceived to be beneficial. This poor validity issue also places limits on how 
generalizable the findings may be beyond each circumstance. However, here lies the power 




Is it testable? 
 
The concepts presented by Hall are easily testable, and the ubiquitous presence of studies that 
test Encoding/Decoding demonstrates the concepts testability. The studies listed in the 
Appendix are a representative sample of the many studies that have been performed since the 
late 1970’s. There have been studies focusing on the processes of encoding, the process of 
decoding and both processes combined. These studies have been undertaken for a wide 
variety of programs, in different countries and have focused on different variables as being 
influential in the decoding process.  
 
 
Is it heuristically provocative? 
 
Encoding/Decoding has proven to be highly useful. It has high heuristic provocativeness and 
organizing power that guides speculation and research in the area of television audience 
studies. For example, building on Hall’s ideas regarding encoding and deoding, 
communication researchers now incorporate the concept of feedback. Feedback is the activity 
in which viewers can participate after decoding a text as the meanings they make are 
communicated back to the encoder. One recent study on this process focused on a modern 
phenomenon called Social TV. Investigating the popular FOX show Bones, I found that 
audiences were transmitting their decoded meaning back to the show’s writer’s room, one site 
of encoding (Kropp 2014). In addition to applications in television studies research, the 
applicability of Hall’s ideas has also extended into the study of other mediums such as 
magazines and books (Modleski 1984, Radway 1984). Additionally, the concepts can 
transcend mass media and applied to other forms of communication. For example, Keyan 
Tomaselli’s work (2015) where he combines Hall’s concepts with Peircean semiotics to 
analyze the use of a military dirty tricks campaign in South Africa.  
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Does it have organizing power? 
 
Encoding/Decoding has proven to be a foundation for growth that has moved the area of 
audience reception studies forward. Challenging the prevailing beliefs in direct or limited 
media effects, Hall’s concepts asked important questions, provided explanations and helped 
make sense of existing knowledge. As Hall states: 
 
The encoding/decoding model wasn’t a grand model…I don’t think it has the 
theoretical rigour, the internal logic and conceptual consistency for that.  If it’s of any 
purchase, now and later, it’s a model because of what it suggests. It suggests an 
approach; it opens up new questions. It maps the terrain. But it’s a model which has 
to be worked with and developed and changed (quoted in Davis 2004: 66). 
 
As Hall explains, the organizing power of his ideas lies with their ability to guide speculation 
in the field. By challenging prevailing beliefs, proposing new ideas and providing options for 
researchers to investigate, Hall first organized the ideas that audiences are empowered and 
have the ability to interpret messages. 
 
 
Does it have boundary conditions? 
 
The arguments presented in Encoding/Decoding create clear boundaries. In literary or 
television studies, the ideas can be classified as part of audience reception theory. The 
concepts have been generalized to other media beyond television and researchers have started 
to revisit the ideas and apply them more broadly, but the work itself does not attempt to 
explain conditions outside of its range.  
 
For these reasons, I would classify Encoding/Decoding as a theory. It was not a grand theory 
but would be best classified as a paradigm variation.  When introduced, it offered a variation 
of emphasis in the area of active audience research, integrating and extending existing 
theoretical paradigms from semiotics, structuralism, Marxism and cognitive communication 
studies. Hall’s perspective has proven to be useful. It can be applied, and it is practical, 
synthesizing theory and its practice in the field.  Hall’s conceptual work advanced knowledge 
about the phenomena of audiences and made a large contribution to the field by creating a 
new paradigm that focused upon active audiences. With the introduction of his work on 
encoding and decoding in the early 1970s, Stuart Hall opened the door for textual content 





Despite being a smaller theory, Encoding/Decoding represented a breakthrough paradigm 
variation in audience reception studies. Among other theories, it moved discourses of media 
effects from foundational stimulus-response models based on human behavior and then 
beyond an individualized cognitive thought-based model making effects or influence 
dependent on interpretations by the viewers to a larger culturally-based theory rooted in a 
Marxist understanding of the mechanisms by which cultural power circulates through 
ideology and the many ways that individuals may actively resist or negotiate that ideological 
power.  
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One important factor of these interpretations is that this theory allows for differences in 
interpretation of and acceptance of (or complicity with) the dominant ideological meanings of 
a work of media. Hall’s concepts encouraged subsequent audience research into two areas: 
investigation, first, into the content that media produces and, second, into the audience 
themselves to gain better understanding of how messages are decoded, why people decode 
message in certain ways, why different people can interpret different and often contradictory 
meanings from the same messages and how these people form communities or social groups 
around others with shared interpretations. This leads to debates about the level of autonomy 
audiences have to interpret messages or if they are constrained by situational factors such as 
pre-existing beliefs and behaviors or environmental factors.  
Encoding/Decoding, and the decades of research which has built upon it, certainly does not 
provide all of the answers regarding audience research. Many questions have been rigorously 
debated as well as those that remain to be examined. Does the cultural studies approach 
provide viewers with too much agency? Can we assume that all viewers are always decoding 
meanings from every text they are presented? During the process of decoding, do viewpoints 
remain consistent or can interpretations change? How long do the influences of decoded 
meanings continue to last? Does the process work in the same manner for people all of the 
time? What is the best way to measure decoding? Are producers of media content always 
aware of what meanings they are encoding? What influences? Furthermore, as Osgood and 
Schramm’s circular model of communication suggests, how might the receiver influence the 
encoding of the sender to complete the circular communication loop? 
The lack of answers to many of these questions should not be seen as a limitation but as a 
benefit of the theory. Raising questions indicates the richness of the theory’s contribution to 
sparking further research in the field. Although critique is necessary and useful, we must still 
move forward and take advantage of the heuristic value of the theory.  
The current trend of textual analysis in media studies is positive for increasing the number of 
tests performed on this theory and its heuristic value. However, focusing on one type of 
methodology does limit the application of the theory.  These studies are relatively easy to 
accomplish because content is readily available, especially today with playback options 
provided by DVRs and online services such as Netflix and Hulu. There is a need for studies 
to continue to expand all of the concepts contained in the theory as well the new questions 
arising from new research. For example, Buckingham (1987) and Thomas (2010) found that 
viewers could actively change their views during consumption. This idea of alternating 
decodings leads to many new questions about the decoding process. Is there a specific time of 
decoding? What other factors affect decoding? Dorothy Hobson’s (1982) study found that 
housewives were often distracted during viewing. Today, we can ask questions about how 
new technologies like the Internet might contribute to audience distraction and influence 
decoding processes. The Internet, as mentioned earlier, also provides a method of feedback 
for viewers to communicate with the parties responsible for the creation and encoding of 
messages. This raises new questions about how new media can introduce challenges to 
existing theories and offer opportunities to reevaluate, extend or even replace them. 
As Hall stated, he did not see Encoding/Decoding as a grand theory, but according to this 
method of theory evaluation, it does earn the label of being a “theory.” Applying a modified 
version of social scientific criteria in this instance was efficient, effective, and demonstrates 
how differences between schools of thought can be bridged. 
Therefore, divergent assumptions should not prevent the use of advantageous tools that can 
help achieve our goals, which are on a more profound level, collective. We should remember 
that theories can advance our knowledge and contribute to our fields while serendipitously 
proposing new images of reality. We are all bound by our search for answers and our desires 
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to understand. So now is as good a time as any to stir the conversations about the ways we 
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Select Studies Utilizing Encoding/Decoding, Listed Chronologically 
This table identifies exemplars of studies using Hall’s Encoding/Decoding concepts. Listed 
chronologically, the table identifies the use, focus, method and findings of each study.  This 
list is not meant to be comprehensive or include all of the most well-known studies. Instead, 
it represents a compilation of well-known and often cited projects, smaller projects with 
unique findings, multiple methods (textual analysis, focus group discussions, observation, 
letters, questionnaires, interviews) and various areas of focus (gender, class, culture, age, 
race, religion) to demonstrate a breath of research. 
 
 
Year Author(s) and Title Use Focus Method Findings 
1978 







Identified the "preferred reading" of Nationwide.  
1980 






People from different socioeconomic classes 
decode meanings in different ways. Yet, social 
class does not determine how messages are 
interpreted. People from the same class can have 
different interpretations. Meaning is the outcome 
of the viewer’s interaction with the text. Viewers 
are not passive. Researchers need to study 





Drama of a Soap 
Opera 
Decoding Gender Observation 
 
Challenged 'preferred reading' concept. 
Emphasized the power of the audience to 
construct their own meanings from a text by 
combining the text, personal experiences and 
opinions. 
 














Identifies an oppositional 'female' aesthetic in 
viewing through identification with multiple 
characters, the use of camera techniques, and 
narrative structure. 
1985 
Ien Ang: Watching 
"Dallas": Soap Opera 
and the Melodramatic 
Imagination 
Decoding Gender Letters 
 
The pleasure women viewers experience 
watching Soap Operas supports arguments for 
active viewing. Dominant Ideologies are 
circumvented when viewers are shaping their 












The degree to which an encoded text 
communicates its preferred decoding is a 
function of production techniques utilized in the 





Decoding Culture Interviews 
 
Viewers in different countries decode meanings 




Public Secrets: East 








Active viewing by children during viewing can 
shift from deep involvement in the dramatic 
story to critical detachment. Differences in 






Elihu Katz and Tamar 
Liebes: Interacting 
with "Dallas": Cross 













Differences between ethnic groups in how 
television is watched and interpreted. 
 
1991 
Andrea Press: Women 
Watching Television 
Decoding Class Interviews 
 
"Middle-class women watch television 
differently from working-class women in that 
they use a different set of criteria for evaluating 
programs and identifying with television 





Sut Jhally and Justin 
Lewis: Enlightened 
Racism: The Cosby 
Show, Audiences, And 
The Myth Of The 
American Dream 
 
Decoding Race / Class 
Focus Group 
Discussions 
Viewers become involved with shows and see 
content as reality. Televised images distort 
reality and results in viewers of different races 





Cowboys and Indians: 
Perceptions of 
Western Films Among 






Different cultural groups can decode texts both 





and Cultural Change 
Decoding Culture Ethnography 
 
Television content can be used as a means of 
constructing new modes of identity. Viewers can 
decode the culture of characters and make 
comparisons with their own culture. 









Screening the Los 
Angeles "Riots": Race, 






Viewers constructed negotiated readings of 
television news. Racial differences played a 
significant role in decoding. Differences in 
social networks and sense of group solidarity 





Decoding Will and 
Grace: Mass Audience 
Reception of a 
Popular Network 
Situation Comedy 
Decoding Gender Questionnaires 
Despite not being a group member, viewers from 
an "outsider group" who experience "culturally 








Analysis of the 
Discourse of Mormon 
Couples Regarding 
Television and 
Popular Media culture 
 
Decoding Religion Interviews 
Supports Encoding/Dcoding idea that 
marginalized groups may at times offer resistant 











Television and Taste 
Hierarchy: The Case 










Enjoyment of comedy programs is based on the 
ability to decode that is predicated on 
knowledge, which varies by social group. Age 
and Education were found to be two variables 















Preferred readings do not always equate with 
dominant cultural discourses, they might 

















Viewers can recognize hegemonic messages 
encoded in texts. If they are oppositional to the 
viewer’s position, they can set aside the 
difference and continue to enjoy the program. 
Viewers can actively change their readings of 
















Combines Hall’s Encoding/Decoding with C.S. 
Pierce’s theory of the interpreter and 
interpretant. This is said to strengthen Hall’s 
theory. 
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Abstract: Communicative action is the coordination mechanism of social actions. 
However, being a social action itself, it needs coordination in case of obstruction. Such 
obstruction is especially frequent in late modern constellation burdened with the 
“individualization of life forms” (Beck) and the “dissolution of a mutual ground” 
(Lash). I call the mechanism capable of overcoming such obstruction the “coordination 
of action coordination.” In the following essay, this notion is elaborated. Firstly, on the 
level of formal pragmatics, situations that implicate action coordination are specified. 
Secondly, the coordinating mechanism of action coordination is elaborated in the frames 
of the Habermasian theory as the harmonization of different concepts of justice 
underlying action coordination. Thirdly, a paradoxical aspect of this solution is 
introduced, which originates from the strict linguistic-intentional character of 
Habermas’s theory.  Fourthly, based on Levinas’s pre-intentional ethical 
phenomenology, an alternative description of the coordination of action coordination is 
elaborated. Finally, the broader theoretical consequences of the new solution are 
detailed. 
 






In one of his recent essays, Honneth evaluates the different postmodern philosophical 
projects from the perspective of the Habermasian discourse ethics (2007). He argues that the 
attempts of authors like Lyotard or Stephen K. White to overcome the limitedness of Kantian 
moral philosophy by leaving behind the questions of justice are unsuccessful. As these 
attempts can be reformulated within discourse ethics, which is a rephrasing of the Kantian 
ideas, they cannot reach their goal. However, other postmodern authors, like Levinas or 
Derrida, provide new perspectives beyond the horizon of Kantian moral philosophy. Their 
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Communicative Action and the 
Other of Justice  
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most important ethical notion, human care (Fürsorge), refers to an alternative source of 
morality, “the other” of the cognitive, universalistic notion of justice.  
On the foundational level of the Habermasian communication theory and social philosophy 
lies the concept of discourse ethics. The key notion of Habermas’s thinking, communicative 
action, is supplemented by a theory of justice, as the willingness to pursue an undistorted 
discourse depends on the actors’ moral perspective. That is where Honneth’s idea becomes 
important: if an alternative concept of morality can be introduced based on the notion of care 
(instead of justice), it has consequences for all communication theories rooted in a moral 
philosophy based on the notion of justice. All of them – including the whole Habermasian 
theory – could be revised from the new moral perspective as questions arise: What is the 
relation of the two types of morality (complementary, ambiguous, or conflicting)? How and 
in what situations do they interfere? 
In the following essay, an attempt will be made for such a revision by introducing a 
phenomenon wherein the two types of morality complement each other. In The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas elaborates a synthesis of a phenomenological and a system 
theoretic answer to the question of how social action is possible. While on the 
phenomenological level, the coordination of social action is explained with the harmonization 
of the actors’ meanings, on the system theoretic level, it is explained with the non-linguistic 
mediums. According to Habermas, mutual understanding is a phenomenological 
presupposition of social actions. It is basically guaranteed by a common lifeworld of the 
actors, which provides the same unreflected interpretation of a situation. In situations where 
this common horizon is not pre-given, an explicit effort is needed to create it. This effort is 
referred to as communicative action, a process of coming to an agreement concerning the 
interpretation of the situation. In this sense, communicative action is the mechanism of action 
coordination, complementary of the lifeworld. Simultaneously, communicative action is not 
just the coordinating mechanism of social actions; it is a social action on its own as well. 
Therefore, questions concerning its coordination mechanism may legitimately be posed. How 
can the situation be described when action coordination is obstructed? And how can the 
mechanism be described that may solve this disturbance?  
In the late modern constellation, these questions are becoming especially important, as the 
life paths individualize (Beck 1992) and “difference” becomes the ground (Lash 1999). In 
this constellation, not only the mutual lifeworld dissolves but the frames of those 
communicative processes are also weakened, which is supposed to recreate a mutual horizon. 
Despite these diagnoses, Habermas himself did not pose questions concerning the obstruction 
of action coordination. Therefore, the following attempt will be made to fill this gap. I will 
argue that these questions lead to the fundamental problems of meaning formulation – to the 
problem of “coordinating action coordination” – and may be answered only by leaving the 
Habermasian concept of morality based solely on justice and stepping back to the alternative 
source of morality carefully analyzed by Levinas. 
In what follows, firstly, the problem of coordinating action coordination will be elaborated by 
briefly evoking Habermas’s formal pragmatics. The problem will be introduced as the 
interruption of a series of speech acts constituting the communicative action and resulting 
from the discrepancies of the actors’ concepts of justice defining the order of speech acts. 
Secondly, a harmonization process will be shortly outlined solely within the Habermasian 
frames. To describe the mechanism that coordinates action coordination and to elaborate a 
linguistic-intentional solution, the dynamics of moral development (discussed in the 
discourse ethics) are recalled. Accordingly, the coordination of action coordination may be 
introduced as a harmonization of the underlying concepts of justice. Thirdly, the limits of the 
linguistic-intentional solution will be pointed out, and a new approach potentially 
transcending them will be outlined. At this point, Levinas’s ideas on the moral obligation 
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invoked by the experience of the Face of the Other will be applied in order to describe a 
mechanism capable of reestablishing the moral basis of speech acts. Finally, in the 
concluding remarks, the broader theoretical consequences of this solution will be outlined.1 
 
 
The problem of coordinating action coordination 
 
The Theory of Communicative Action is grounded on the level of formal pragmatics, that is, 
on the level of a theory of mutual understanding. Habermas describes the conditions of 
mutual understanding by reconstructing the potential sequence of speech acts. The 
reconstruction results in a script, which might end either in the suspension of the 
communication or in the mutual acceptance of the validity claims of a speech act, that is 
mutual understanding.   
 
Table 1: Undistorted sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B” 
1. round formulates speech act “p” → 
raises validity claims (what 
she is saying is true and 
right and she is truthful) 
 
2. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “p”→ mutual 
understanding (successful 
ending of communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “p” → formulates 
speech act “q”  
3. round either accepts the validity 
claims of “q”→ revokes “p” 
→ mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “q” → formulates 
speech act “r” 
4. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “r”→ revokes “q” 
→mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “r” → formulates 
speech act “s” 
5. round etc.  
 
Table 1 shows such a script: every time a speech act is formulated, three validity claims are 
raised, which claims can be accepted (resulting in the new consensus) or refused (resulting in 
a new speech act that raises three validity claims that can be accepted or refused etc.). In case 
of undistorted communicative action this sequence is continued until a speech act is mutually 
accepted and a common interpretation of the situation is born. However, this sequence may 
be interrupted in at least two ways. Firstly, one of the speakers may willingly shift from the 
action oriented to mutual understanding to the strategic use of language. The latter may take 
the shape of open violence (threat) or hidden violence (manipulation, lie). In these cases 
                                                 
1 The main argument of the article concerning the synthesis of Habermas’ and Levinas’ concepts has been 
elaborated in a socialization theoretical context in my book A modernizáció ingája (Sik 2012). This time 
however, the problem of coordinating action coordination is analyzed from a communication and social 
theoretical perspective. 
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action coordination is blocked due to reasons external to the communication (i.e. the intention 
of an actor) so the process may be restored by eliminating the external reason.  
The second, less obvious case is connected to the limited rationality of the lifeworld, to 
dogmatic meanings. A meaning is called dogmatic if it is not open to critical evaluation, that 
is, if it is sustained without proper justification. Dogmatic meanings are originally acquired 
through distorted communicative processes and as such, they can not be justified with 
rational arguments.2 At this point it is important to emphasize that according to Habermas’ 
theory (and to the late Wittgenstein’s heritage) meanings are not closed units of sense that 
can be either dogmatic or open to criticism per se. Instead they are born and exist only in 
interactions, therefore they are valid only for the actors and only during the given action 
situation. Furthermore, in addition to knowing the rules of its use, knowing a meaning 
includes knowing its justification as well.3 Accordingly in this theoretical setting dogmatism 
is neither the characteristic of the meaning itself (because meanings are embedded in 
situations) nor that of the actor (because meanings are created in interactions not by single 
subjects), but belongs to the interaction it is born in. Dogmatism is a characteristic of the 
process within which the meanings are formulated, i.e. it is a characteristic of the sequence of 
speech acts. It shows itself by causing a rupture in the sequence: it occurs when one of the 
speakers holds on to her speech act without being able to justify it with rational arguments. In 
this case the other speaker is hindered in continuing the series because neither was her speech 
act accepted, nor has she anything to accept or refuse. 
 
Table 2: Full sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B”  
1. round formulates speech act “p” → 
raises validity claims (what 
she is saying is true and 
right and she is truthful) 
 
2. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “p”→ mutual 
understanding (successful 
ending of communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “p” → formulates 
speech act “q”  
3. round either accepts the validity 
claims of “q”→ revokes “p” 
→ mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “q” → formulates 
speech act “r” 
or changes to open or hidden 
violence → willing 
interruption of 
communicative action → 
unsuccessful ending of 
                                                 
2 Communicative action is not only a mechanism of action coordination, but it is the mechanism of reproducing 
the different aspects of lifeworld as well (that is socialization, cultural reproduction and social integration). 
Hence the distortion of communicative action leaves its mark on these processes potentially causing 
psychopathologies, loss of meaning and anomie (Habermas 1987: 143). Habermas discusses the problem of 
dogmatic meanings extensively in his essay Reflections on Communicative Pathology (1998). There he argues 
that the occurrence of this phenomenon is most probable in families characterized by asymmetric power-
structure, by the impossibility of open discussion of conflicts.  
3 This is a key idea of The Theory of Communicative Action, because Habermas establishes his whole theory of 
rationality on the basis of an accountable actor capable and willing to justify her actions (1984: 22). Only an 
actor capable and willing to justify her motives can participate in the above sketched sequence of speech acts. 




or refuses “q” without 
justifying “p” (i.e. without 
formulating speech act “r”) 
→ unwilling interruption of 
communicative action  
4. round  ??? 
 
 
Table 2 shows all possible variations of the sequence including the two types of distortion. As 
mentioned before, the willing interruption of communicative action may be corrected by 
eliminating its cause external to the communication (i.e. by changing the intention of the 
actor). However, in case of unintended interruption, the correction is far more complicated. In 
this case the cause of the interruption is not external to the communication. The speakers are 
probably willing to continue their action oriented to mutual understanding, when they face 
the unexpected disturbance of communication: a speech act whose validity claim is not 
accepted, and which is in the same time sustained but unjustified. It is important to see, that at 
this point of interruption the pragmatic order of communication is damaged: sustaining 
without justifying a speech act is a pragmatic paradox, a violation of the very rules of 
communication. This violation mirrors a dissent concerning the fundamental structure 
underlying the order of speech acts. It expresses that the speaker does not perceive the other 
as someone to whom she is obliged either to justify or to give up her validity claim. 
Consequently, it may be stated that in fact it is an attribute of the actors’ relationship that is 
responsible for the interruption. As the relationship of the speakers is an inherent feature of 
the interaction, the cause of the interruption is internal to communication. As such, unlike in 
case of willing interruption of communicative action, the unintended interruption may be 
corrected only within the frames of communication, by special interactions. In this sense, 
unlike in the first case, the unintended interruption does not necessarily lead to the ending of 
the communication; it may be successfully treated within its frames. 
To describe the exact nature of such a correcting mechanism, two questions have to be 
answered. Firstly the nature of the fundamental structure underlying the order of speech acts 
has to be specified. Secondly the mechanism capable of reestablishing communication has to 
be outlined. In the following section I will elaborate an answer to these questions, leaning on 
Habermas’ early reception of psychoanalysis and later ideas on discourse ethics. 
 
 
The coordination mechanism of action coordination 
 
Even if he does not explicitly analyze the problem of coordinating action coordination, in his 
early major book, Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas discusses a structurally 
analogous problem (1971). In this book, he attempts to differentiate the critical social theory 
from other social sciences by specifying its underlying interest, the “emancipatory interest.” 
To describe the emancipatory interest, Habermas carefully analyzes the interest underlying 
psychoanalytic therapy. In the therapeutic situation, the therapist and patient share the same 
goal of critically reflecting on the patient’s meanings and reformulating the ones being born 
in distorted communication. Therefore, psychoanalytic therapy serves not only as a model of 
identifying the restrained elements of the lifeworld, the results of distorted communicative 
socialization, but also as a model of overcoming the dogmatism by a re-socialization 
process.4 This re-socialization process is basically an undistorted communicative action 
                                                 
4 This mixing of praxis and theory was criticized by many commentators. Thomas McCarthy mentions for 
example that the synthesis of the basically theoretical-epistemological ideas of Kant and Hegel and the mainly 
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serving the purpose of reevaluating the meanings by the standards of communicative 
rationality. Those meanings that were originally formulated in distorted communication are 
disapproved; those that were formulated in undistorted communication are maintained.5 
Albeit Habermas used psychoanalysis as an example of the praxis of critical social science, 
its application may be fruitful for our purposes as well. In my opinion, the problem of 
coordinating action coordination may be best approached in comparison with the 
psychoanalytic therapy. Therapy may be defined as a special social action situation wherein 
the de-dogmatization of certain meanings occurs. During therapy, the roles of the therapist 
and patient are mutually accepted, establishing a mutually accepted order of speech acts. The 
patient wants to overcome her dogmatic meanings, and to do so, she follows the instructions 
of the therapist. Accordingly, their relationship can be characterized as a legitimate authority 
(in the Weberian sense) that is a mutually recognized order. Based on her authority, the 
therapist can motivate the patient to face her meanings and judge them on the basis of their 
justifiability, even if it is difficult. At this point, the similarity and the difference between the 
therapy and the coordination of action coordination may be phrased. Both processes aim to 
open up the dogmatic lifeworld to criticism. In the first case, however, the frames of the 
emancipatory communication are well defined and mutually accepted, contrary to the second 
case in which these frames are absent. Therefore, the main question arising in processes of 
coordination of action coordination is as follows: How do we establish a legitimate order 
wherein the speaker has the mutually recognized right to motivate her partner either to resign 
or justify her speech acts? 
Habermas discusses the question of the order underlying the speech acts in his essay Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990). Therein he reconstructs the link between 
the Kohlbergian concept of moral development, the social perspectives, and the types of 
action coordination. Kohlberg identifies six levels of moral development, each characterized 
by a more general concept of justice.6 The concepts of justice determine the moral obligations 
of the subject. Moral obligations define, among others, the perception of the other and hereby 
the order of the speech acts. They determine to whom the subject is supposed to be obliged to 
either justify or resign her validity claims. Accordingly, the key to the problem of 
coordinating action coordination lies on the level of moral development. As described above, 
situations that require coordination of action coordination can be defined by an actor who 
does not recognize the other as someone to whom she is obliged to justify or resign her 
validity claims. According to Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, it may be 
claimed that these ruptures of communication are moral in nature. They occur if an actor’s 
concept of justice does not implicate the justification or the resignation of a validity claim in 
the given situation (i.e., in relation to her given partner). Thus, the dogmatic interruption of 
communicative action may be traced back to the narrowness of an actor’s concept of justice. 
Therefore, it may be corrected by changing the actor’s concept of justice.  
                                                                                                                                                        
practical ideas of Marx and Freud leads to the unfortunate illusion that Habermas tries to solve the problems of 
praxis and theory in the same time (1978: 96). 
5 In his book On the Logic of Social Sciences, Habermas formulates a similar idea opposing Gadamer’s position. 
There he argues that one’s prejudice-structure may be critically evaluated according to the quality of the 
processes of its formation (1989) 
6 On the pre-conventional level the concept of justice is either based on the complementarity of order and 
obedience, or the symmetry of compensation, the social perspective is egocentric and the interactions are 
motivated either by the authority or the self-interest. On the conventional level, the concept of justice can be 
characterized as a conformity to roles or system of norms, the social perspective is based on the primary group 
or the whole group, and accordingly the interactions are governed by the roles or the norms. On the post-
conventional level the concept of justice is either based on general or procedural principles, the other is seen as a 
“goal in itself”, and the interactions take the form of undistorted discourses (Habermas 1990: 166-167).  
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According to Kohlberg, moral development is a unilinear, cognitive learning process. This 
means that in the course of development, the individual has to gradually pass through all 
levels step by step. The transition to a higher level of moral development is motivated by 
frequent experience of the inadequacy of one’s concept of justice. The transition itself is 
realized in the series of moral discourses (Kohlberg 1981). So the changing of an actor’s 
concept of justice (the coordination of action coordination) may be described within these 
frames by characterizing these discourses.  
In situations where the coordination of action coordination becomes necessary, it is not one’s 
concept of justice in general but its narrowness that is responsible for the interruption. So this 
narrowness has to be altered, and the circle of people perceived as recognized communication 
partners (to whom the actor justifies or resigns her validity claims) has to be extended. 
Hence, in order to coordinate action coordination, the actor shall shift to a concept of a higher 
level of moral development. However, this level is not arbitrary; it has to be the proximate 
level because of the gradual nature of moral development. Furthermore, the shifting of a 
concept of justice, as any other mechanism of meaning formulation, is not a monological act 
but an interaction. This interaction may not take any shape; it has to be in accordance with the 
problematic actor’s concept of justice because this concept determines the maximal 
rationality of her action coordination. It may be concluded that the coordination mechanism 
of action coordination is an attempt to shift the actor’s problematic concept of justice to a 
higher level of moral development in the frames of an interaction according to her actual 
concept of justice. By repeating the original communicative action within the frames of a 
new, more general concept of justice, the cause of the former interruption may be eliminated, 
as the former unwillingness to either justify or resign a validity claim will presumably lose its 
ground in the new moral order. 
To clarify the concept, let us review an example. Habermas describes the situation wherein 
construction workers discuss the details of their midmorning snack and there is a debate 
between an older worker and a newcomer concerning the person who should bring the beers 
(Habermas 1987: 121). My example of coordinating action coordination is a variation of this 
scene. Let us suppose that the older worker and the newcomer not only disagree about who 
should bring the beer but in addition to this, their concepts of justice differ in a way that their 
action coordination is endangered. The newcomer is on the second level of moral 
development, which means that he thinks he is obliged to justify his validity claims only if it 
is in his best interest. In the present situation, he sees no reason why it would serve his 
interest if he explained to the older person his reason to refuse bringing beer, so he is simply 
rejecting the elder’s speech act without justifying the rejection, causing the interruption of 
communicative action. The older worker is on the third level of moral development, thinking 
that the roles define to whom one is obliged to justify his validity claims. So he tries to 
handle the situation by communicative means. To do so, he first has to establish the moral 
basis required for action coordination by attempting to change the newcomer’s concept of 
justice within a discourse according to the newcomer’s concept of justice. This means that the 
elder should prove to the newcomer that it is in his best interest to apply the symmetry of 
compensation to the more general level of roles (he may argue that it is worth more to 
compensate between roles than concrete persons, as it is a more stable, economic system). If 
the elder succeeds and the newcomer shifts to third level of moral development, the 
interrupted action coordination may be restarted (the newcomer now perceives the elder as a 
representative of a role to whom he is obliged to justify his validity claims) without the 
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The paradox of coordinating action coordination 
 
In the conclusion of the previous section I described the coordination of action coordination 
as an attempt to shift to a more general concept of justice by a moral debate according to the 
original, narrow concept of justice. In my opinion this conclusion leads to a paradox in a 
short way. The paradox is caused by the double role played by the concepts of justice in 
moral debates, which has not been taken seriously enough either by Kohlberg or by 
Habermas. Concepts of justice underlie every action coordination process by defining the 
moral perspectives of the actors. This causes a certain difficulty in case of debates on the 
concepts themselves. Within these debates, the concept of justice appears on two levels: on 
the formal level of the frame of the action coordination (it defines the moral basis of the form 
of the debate) and on the substantive level of the communication (it is the topic of the 
debate). So whenever an attempt is made to change the concept of justice, a paradoxical 
situation is generated.  
The action coordination process that aims to shift the underlying concept of justice to the 
higher level may never completely succeed because its actual, narrower underlying concept 
of justice inevitably leaves its mark on the new concept. Accordingly, within the frames of 
the purely cognitive-linguistic model, only an apparent moral transition may be grasped. To 
explain this statement the above mentioned features of meaning have to be evoked: knowing 
a meaning includes in addition to the knowledge of the rule of its use, the knowledge of its 
justification as well. Furthermore, the knowledge of justification depends on the original 
process of acquisition: the rationality of the original acquisitive action coordination 
determines the rationality of the justification (a meaning acquired in a distorted process 
cannot be rationally justified). Therefore a concept of justice that is acquired in action 
coordination according to a narrower concept of justice than itself can be justified only 
according to that narrower concept. However this implicates a paradoxical situation: the form 
of justification contradicts the justified proposition. In this sense if a speech act is expressed 
in order to justify a concept of justice acquired in action coordination according to a narrower 
concept of justice, a “performative contradiction”7 occurs: the way the speech act is expressed 
(in accordance with the narrow concept of justice) contradicts the expressed propositional 
content (the broader concept of justice).  
The above described example may clarify this conclusion. In case of the newcomer and elder 
workers who are on the second and third moral level of moral development the problem takes 
the following shape. The elder persuades the newcomer in action coordination according to 
the second level (by saying that it is worth to shift) to accept the order of roles. So the 
newcomer acquires a concept of justice according to the third level of moral development, 
but he can justify it only according to the second level (by arguing that it is better worth it). 
This means that the justifying speech act implicates a performative contradiction: by saying 
that it is worth better to compensate between roles than particular individuals, two 
contradicting concepts of justice is expressed. The form of the argument is based on the 
egocentric perspective while the justified proposition concerns the role based perspective. As 
a matter of fact this justification attests that it is still the second level of moral development 
that determines the newcomer’s moral perspective not the third, as it implicates that in case it 
is not worth it anymore the role based concept loses its validity. 
It is important to emphasize that the conventional concept of justice held for pre-conventional 
reasons does not simply express a “variant of conventional morality”. Instead, as it is 
grounded on a lower level of moral development, actually it expresses a pre-conventional 
                                                 
7 The notion has been elaborated by Apel and Habermas, it occurs when a “speech act k(p) rests on non-
contingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the asserted proposition p” (Habermas 1990: 
80) 
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concept of justice. At the end, it is the reason used in the moral debates that matters: unlike in 
case of the truth based or aesthetic meanings, in case of moral issues, the way of arguing 
itself implies a concept of justice. This creates the chance of a contradiction between the logic 
of argumentation and the expressed concept of justice, which occurs between actors 
characterized by diverging level of moral development.     
In my opinion, from this paradox follows a need for revising Habermas’ theory.8 Since the 
transition between concepts of justice can not be grasped within its frames, its completion 
becomes necessary. In order to find out the direction of the completion, the nature of the 
paradox has to be further clarified. The paradox is basically caused by the limitation of the 
circle of possible meaning-formation processes. In Habermas’ theory meanings are born and 
renewed in interactions motivated by the need to solve a dissent in social action situations. 
More precisely it could be said that he focuses only on these meanings and these meaning-
formulation processes. However these processes have philosophically elaborated alternatives 
and some of these alternatives may be fruitfully used in order to resolve the paradox. The 
wanted alternative meaning-formulation process is required to have two important 
characteristics: first it has to express a mutually accepted equivalent of a high level concept 
of justice (that may serve as a possible basis for a linguistic formulation of the new concept 
of justice), secondly it has to be non-linguistic (to avoid the paradox).9 With other words, the 
wanted alternative is a moral meaning originating from a source that is different from 
cognitive-intentional justice. This is the point where the postmodern ethics could be 
connected to the cognitive theory of justice. In his phenomenological writings Levinas 
describes a meaning-formulation process that seems to satisfy these conditions. So in the 
following section his relevant ideas will be shortly introduced serving as a potential solution 
to the paradox. 
 
 
The Face of the Other and elementary ethics  
 
In his most important philosophical works Levinas aims to describe a special experience, the 
birth of a set of meanings, namely our elementary ethical meanings.10 In Totality and Infinity 
he approaches the problem by identifying two complementary sources of meaning, the 
domain of “the Same” and the domain of “the Other”. The Same (or “the Being”) has been 
the main object of philosophical investigation from the ancient Greek to Heidegger, and 
                                                 
8 Crossley also argues in many articles that the Habermasian theory needs further grounding by 
phenomenologies focusing on the bodily and affective phenomena. He argues that The Theory of 
Communicative Action lacks a theory of affections and a theory of the body, which parts could be elaborated 
according to the ideas of Merleau-Ponty (Crossley 1996, 1998). In the following section I also lean on an author, 
whose ideas are deeply connected with the late phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
9 In another context Habermas discusses the problem of the pre-linguistic basis of communicative action. He 
leans on Durkheim’s ideas on the non-verbal ritual practices constituting the sacred roots of morality. In these 
rites the individual experiences the society itself that is they become a subject of a pre-linguistic meaning-
formation process expressing a moral consensus (Habermas 1987: 52-53). However, Habermas discusses these 
ideas in a historical perspective, in order to identify the evolutionary step preceding the shift to linguistic 
foundation of moral consensus described by Mead. This is the reason why Durkheim’s ideas can not be used to 
our purpose, namely that they represent a historically exceeded stage (the ritual practices of the tribes).  
10 Levianas is often criticized – similarly to other post-structuralist French authors – that his writings are lacking 
clear argumentation, obscure and therefore unscientific. I think that this criticism misses the point. Levinas’ 
purpose is to give a description of a rare, pre-intentional moral experience. That can be done – because of the 
pre-intentional nature of the experience – only in a metaphorical language, which is often closer to poetry than 
to strict philosophical argumentation. However, this does not mean of course that it is lacking any logical 
structure. In this article my aim is not to critically evaluate Levinas’ thoughts, but to use them as a description of 
a rare moral experience, which helps me to solve the Habermasian paradox.  
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accordingly ontology has been the first philosophy. Levinas’ goal is to analyze the alternative 
source of meaning, the Other, and to establish the frames of a new phenomenology whose 
main concern is not the world, but the Other, and whose starting point is not ontology but 
ethics.  
In Totality and Infinity Levinas reconstructs two different kinds of attachment to the world, 
the enjoyment (“living from…”) and the economy (possession, habitation and labor). Our 
original attachment to the world is pre-intentional: we live from it, that is, we are enjoying the 
elements of life (the food, the warm weather etc.). This attachment is completed by the 
intentional economy that is motivated by the urge to gain control over the enjoyable elements 
by producing them. Enjoyment and labor share the same feature of expressing the mastery of 
subject over the elements of life. Even if the subject depends on the elements of life as they 
potentially suffer from their absence, she is master to them as she gives sense to the elements 
by placing them into her meaning-structure. The identification of this feature enables Levinas 
to introduce the alternative of the elements of life. He describes a special experience that 
refuses to be contained, that is, to be placed in a meaning-structure. The source of this 
experience is the Face of the Other.  
The Face resists any attempt to be identified, as it identifies itself, overwrites the meanings 
tried to be attached to it.11 In this sense the Face expresses a meaning from the moment it is 
perceived as a Face. This meaning is a warning that signifies the limits of one’s power, 
expressing that it can not be extended on the Other the same way as on the elements of life.12 
It is an imperative that raises an unavoidable decision: the meaning expressed in the 
experience of the Face may be neglected or may be taken seriously. According to Levinas 
this decision is the root of every ethics as the choosing of the recognition of the Other 
implicates an absolute responsibility, an imperative of turning to the other.13 This 
responsibility effects the subject’s attachment to the elements of life as well. The two earlier 
options – instant consumption or accumulation – are competed by a third option, namely the 
sharing of the elements of life (in literal sense and in the sense of sharing the meanings). In 
this sense the elementary ethics provides a concept different from the ethics of justice. While 
justice – since Kant’s categorical imperative – is organized around the principle of 
universality, elementary responsibility is based on particularity. It expresses a devotion to 
some particular other, which devotion includes even self-sacrifice if necessary.  
At this point it is a central question under what circumstances the Face may be perceived and 
how this process may be described. Levinas examines these questions in detail in his second 
major book Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1998). Unlike in his first book, here he 
plays down the discussion of the relation of the Other and the elements of life. He focuses 
instead on the description of the constitution of elementary responsibility. Accordingly here 
his main distinction refers not to “the Same and the Other”, but to the two aspects of language 
use, “the said and the saying”.14 The said expresses the Being, and the saying expresses what 
is beyond this domain. In this sense the saying is the source of different meanings, which are 
expressed in the act of saying itself. The saying unlike the said can not be characterized as an 
emission of signs. Instead, in the saying the subjects expose, denude themselves to the Other. 
However, the exposure is not an action of the subject as actions implicate interests, that is, 
                                                 
11 As Levinas emphasizes it, the Face is not a phenomenon but an enigma (Peperzak 1998: 116). 
12 Levinas uses the word “murder” to express the weight of the rejection of the experience of the Face: to treat 
the Other as an element of life is to kill her, as killing is only possible if the Other is treated as an object 
(Levinas: 1969: 232-233).    
13 This responsibility has been called by some philosophers – according to the sense Merleau-Ponty used the 
expression “wild” – “wild responsibility” (Tengelyi 2004: 123). 
14 With this step Levinas gives a completely new sense to the expression “phenomenological reduction”, he 
means by it the “epoche of the said” (that leads to the analysis of the saying). For a detailed analysis of the 
distinction see Waldenfels’ essay, “Levinas on the Saying and the Said” (2005) 
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they concern the domain of Being. The exposure of the subject is the result of her passivity, 
as passivity allows the absolute offering of oneself to the Other, the “substitution”, the 
“pledge of taking the pain of the Other”. In this sense only passivity allows pure proximity, 
wherein the experience of the Face is possible and the elementary responsibility may be 
born.15  
Accordingly elementary responsibility is not the result of a process of intentional meaning-
formation (either monological or interactive), but the result of passive, unintentional 
meaning-expression, the result of the proximity of two subjects. The responsibility expressed 
in proximity is absolute (that is, it implicates the complete subordination of oneself for the 
Other). Therefore it has to be limited in the very moment when a third subject appears. The 
appearance of “the third” leads from the elementary ethics to the domain of society and 
politics. The limitation of the absolute responsibility takes the shape of cognitive concepts of 
justice. Accordingly every elaborated theory of justice (political or moral philosophy) can be 
treated as the limited, cognitive explication of the elementary ethics. 
The inevitable limitation of elementary responsibility explains why the experience of the 
Face is so rare in everyday life.16 It occurs only in those unique situations, wherein subjects 
expose themselves to each other in the proximity of their passivity. Levinas’ examples are 
different intimate relations such as the mother and the child or two lovers. However, it is 
important to emphasize that he uses the expression proximity not only in metaphorical, but 
literal sense as well. He refers to caress or embrace as the par excellence characteristics of 
proximity, that is, he considers the expression of elementary responsibility depending on 
circumstances of the subject’s bodily connection (Levinas 1998: 80, 82, 90). In this sense 
caress and embrace are tools of slashing the drape of the socially determined order of bodies, 
that is, a chance of conjuring the elementary responsibility in the place of the cognitive 
concepts of justice.17  
 
 
Coordinating action coordination and the Face of the Other 
 
After outlining the most important ideas of Levinas, we can return to the original line of 
thought and try to answer the question how the transition between different concepts of 
justice is possible. Although Levinas and Habermas are two major figures in continental 
philosophy, only a few attempts have been made to combine their ideas.18 Probably the 
difference of their theoretical goals and their terminology is responsible for this lack. To 
                                                 
15 In passivity the psyche of the subject is expressed, more precisely it is born in this exposition. Accordingly 
Bergo describes the Otherwise than Being as a “psyche-analysis” emphasizing the parallel of the Freudian and 
Levinasian ideas (2005:.122). 
16 Even if in everyday situations it is usually a cognitive concept of justice that determines the relation of two 
subjects, it is crucial to return to the experience of elementary responsibility from time to time, because without 
it, the former becomes empty as well. Accordingly there is a continuous oscillation between the two levels 
(Simmons 1999: 84). 
17 The evoking of elementary responsibility seems even more difficult if we think about Foucault’s analysis, 
which inform us about the penetration of the power/knowledge into the domain of the elementary, intimate 
relations (1990). 
18 However, in the recent past more and more effort has been made to fill this gap. In the first place the works of 
Hendley have to be mentioned, who has made many important contributions to synthetize the Habermasian and 
Levinasian ideas from a moral philosophical perspective. He argues that as Habermas and Levinas grasp the two 
sides of the same coin (the problem of moral significance of language), their ideas complete each other in many 
ways (Hendley 1996, 2000). In addition to Hendley’s work a few other contributions might be mentioned: 
Vetlesen elaborates a comparison of the two moral philosophical concepts (1997), Smith analyses the role of the 
Levinasian ideas played in the “philosophical discourse of modernity” (2008). 
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overcome these difficulties and to prepare the fusion of the two concepts, first their different 
and similar aspects have to be clearly formulated.  
Levinas is interested in the foundation of an ethical phenomenology, while Habermas’ main 
concern is a critical social theory grounded on the level of formal pragmatics. In these 
different theoretical settings they both touch upon the problem of the concepts of justice. 
However they approach it from different directions, with different purposes in mind: Levinas 
is interested in the fundamental level underlying the concepts of justice, while Habermas is 
interested in the role of the concepts of justice played in speech acts. In Habermas’ theory the 
concepts of justice are the final grounds of speech acts as they determine the order of 
justification (that is, in what situations/relations is a subject ready to justify her validity 
claims), which means they serve as explanans. For Levinas the concepts of justice are not the 
final grounds, but the cognitive limitations of the elementary ethical meaning, the absolute 
responsibility, which means that they are only derived meanings serving as explanandum.  
In this sense the two theories are complementary: Levinas discusses the origins of those 
concepts of justice that Habermas leans on, and conversely Habermas elaborates how the 
concepts of justice contribute directly to the order of speech acts (and indirectly to the 
reproduction of the lifeworld) that Levinas ignores.19 The two complementary theories are 
based on two different models of meaning-formation. For Habermas meaning-formation is an 
intentional linguistic interaction. For Levinas it is imperative to escape the frames of 
intentionality as it prevents the perception of the Face in its pure form, independent from 
socially influenced meanings.20 So Levinas describes a pre-intentional alternative of 
meaning-formation, which is not based on activity (interaction), but on the passivity of 
subjects and the proximity constituted by this passivity.  
I concluded the section of the paradox of coordinating action coordination in the hope that a 
pre-intentional process producing moral meanings of alternative source but equivalent 
capacity may solve the paradox. Now that the introduction of such a mechanism and the 
preparations of the synthesis have been done, the details of the solution may be elaborated. 
As described above, the paradox raises at the point where an attempt is made to describe the 
action coordination process within which a higher level concept of justice is formulated. This 
meaning-formation process is necessarily in accordance with the original, narrower concept 
of justice, and because of this the new, broader concept can be justified only according to the 
narrow one, which causes a performative contradiction. To evade this dead-end the phase of a 
pre-intentional meaning-formation process (expressing a concept of justice according to a 
high level of moral development) has to be built into the process of transition. 
Interpreting this problem in the Levinasian frames may offer a solution. If the actors trying to 
coordinate their action coordination evoke the circumstances wherein the elementary 
responsibility may be expressed (that is, if they enter into proximity), a high level, consensual 
morality becomes accessible. The elementary responsibility is an “original impression” 
(“Urimpression”), and as such, if conjured, it overwrites the validity of any other cognitive 
concepts of justice. However, as elementary responsibility is absolute, it needs to be limited. 
                                                 
19 Hendley arrives to a similar conclusion on a different way (2004). His starting point is Taylor’s critique of the 
discourse ethics, because of its incapability to answer the question “why to be good?” (1991). Hendley treats 
Levinas’ ideas as answers to this question: “The position I have been arguing for is (…) implying only that a 
fully intelligible appropriation of the procedural demands of communicative action would be impossible for 
someone not capable of this [Levinasian] form of sensibility” (Hendley 2004: 169). In accordance with 
Hendley’s point of view it may be added, that the complementarity is mutual, as Habermas answers questions in 
return that Levinas ignores.  
20 In order to explain the origins of morality Levinas had to find an empirical source of ethical meanings, which 
is independent from the intentional, socially constructed ethical meanings. And it was exactly the introduction of 
an alternative, pre-intentional process of meaning-formation that allowed Levinas to reconstruct the frames of a 
universal, “original impression”, “Urimpression” in the Husserlian terminology (MacAvoy 2005: 109-118). 
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Therefore the elementary responsibility implicates its transformation into a cognitive concept 
of justice. Furthermore elementary responsibility is equivalent of the concept of justice 
according to the highest level of moral development, and as such, it provides the basis for the 
most rational action coordination process, the undistorted communicative action.21 To 
conclude, it may be useful to summarize these features of elementary responsibility: firstly, 
expressed in proximity, as an alternative concept of justice it may establish the frames of a 
process of action coordination; secondly, because of its absoluteness, elementary 
responsibility includes the urge to be transformed into a cognitive concept of justice; thirdly, 
as it is expressed through pre-intentional processes and as it expresses a concept of justice 
according to the highest level of moral development, it is not encumbered with the paradox of 
the cognitive-linguistic model.  
Therefore, by building the phase of evoking the elementary responsibility into the description 
of the coordination of action coordination, its paradox may be dissolved and an expanded 
model of action coordination may be outlined. 
 
Table 3: Expanded sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B”  
1-3. rounds: the 
same as in Table 
2 
 …   









4. round   either resigns from communication 
or changes to open or hidden violence → 
willing interruption of communicative 
action → unsuccessful ending of 
communication 




either uses only 
cognitive 
argumentation → 
paradox shifting to 
broader concept of 
justice 
or evokes elementary 
responsibility → 
successful shifting to 
broader concept of 




Table 3 shows this expanded model of action coordination that includes the variations of 
coordinating action coordination as well. If a situation occurs in which an actor faces 
unwilling (dogmatic) interruption of communicative action, she has four options: either she 
treats the situation as hopeless and resigns from communication; or she changes to open or 
                                                 
21 The elementary responsibility implicates a maximal willingness to open oneself to the Other, which is a 
commitment to revalidate one’s meaning-structure in the light of the Other’s. As László Tengelyi argues the 
Levinasian elementary responsibility is in close connection with the Kantian categorical imperative as they are 
different sources of morality but none can be imagined without supposing the other (2004: 126). Furthermore 
Levin characterizes Levinas’ concept as the “embodiment of categorical imperative” (2001). Hendley in his 
above mentioned articles shows the same thing in case of the undistorted debate of discourse ethics, which is not 
surprising as it is the reformulation of the moral law within the frames of formal pragmatics (2004: 159-160). 
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hidden violence; or she tries to establish a broader moral order within which the 
communication may be continued in a purely cognitive manner resulting in a paradox; or she 
attempts to establish the broader moral order in an action coordination whose moral basis is 
none other than the elementary responsibility resulting in a potential success. In this model 
the Levinasian and Habermasian elements constitute a coherent unity. The pre-intentional 
meaning-formation is needed to broaden the narrow scope of a theory working solely with a 
concept of cognitive meaning-formation. Conversely, the cognitive model of moral 
development is needed to explain the potential translations of the elementary responsibility 
into different concepts of justice. In this sense only the complementarity of the two levels of 
meaning-formation explains fully the problem of coordinating action coordination.22  
At this point it is useful to return one last time to the example of the older worker (third level 
of moral development) and the newcomer (second level of moral development). Their dissent 
may be solved if in the first step the elder worker – by a friendly gesture (for example a 
friendly tapping on the newcomer’s shoulder) – tries to evoke proximity, and wake the 
elementary responsibility. If he succeeds, then the circumstances of a quality debate are 
ensured, enabling him to argue that it is not the interest, but the responsibility toward the 
other that justifies the recognition of roles. In this way the newcomer acquires the new, 
broader concept of justice in a dialogue whose concept of justice is broad; and by applying 
the new concept of justice, the original debate may be recast without the chance of 
interruption, that is, the action coordination becomes coordinated. 
This conclusion is the answer to our starting question, how the elementary ethics and the 
cognitive concepts of justice may be connected? Their synthesis provides an opportunity to 
give a more complete description of action coordination mechanisms, and to expand the 
frames of the phenomenological concept of The Theory of Communicative Action into a 





In the concluding section, I would like to briefly indicate the stakes of the above line of 
thought and illuminate some of its broader consequences. Communicative action is the 
central notion of Habermas’s theory, so its modification affects his whole system of thought. 
The relevance of coordinating action coordination for social integration has to be indicated. 
Habermas starts Between Facts and Norms with the observation that the late modern societies 
are burdened with the tendency of gradual pluralization of lifeworlds, which endangers the 
social integration of society. Therefore, he concludes that the need for legal social integration 
grows as well (Habermas 1996: 26-27). I think that this observation is hardly disputable, 
unlike the conclusion, which might have several alternatives. The coordination of action 
coordination is such an alternative, as it is also an answer to the challenge of the lifeworld 
pluralization, however not a legal theoretic but an action theoretic one. Accordingly, the 
integration problems being implied by lifeworld pluralization – common in multicultural 
societies – can be solved not just by legal social integration but by the coordination of action 
coordination as well.  
Secondly, it has to be emphasized that the coordination of action coordination has 
consequences not just for social integration but for socialization as well. Communicative 
                                                 
22 Obviously at this point there are many empirical and theoretical questions, which require further analysis. As 
the elementary responsibility is the result of passivity, instead of intentional preconditions, those contextual 
factors need to be identified, which may ensure its emergence. Also those mechanisms need to be analyzed in 
further researches, which are responsible for translating the elementary experiences of responsibility into 
concepts of justice.  
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action is the complementary and, at the same time, reproduction mechanism of the lifeworld. 
It becomes necessary if the lifeworld does not ensure the horizon of mutual meanings. Then, 
it solves the problem in the particular action situation and, at the same time, reproduces the 
lifeworld by creating a new horizon. The connection between coordinating action 
coordination and action coordination is analogous with the connection between action 
coordination and the lifeworld. Coordinating action coordination becomes necessary if action 
coordination is not functioning, that is, if it cannot ensure the recreation of a new horizon of 
meaning. Then, the coordination of action coordination solves the problem in the particular 
situation and “reproduces” a new habit of action coordination at the same time by practicing 
it. As the obstruction of action coordination becomes a more and more frequent problem in 
the individualized, differentiated late modernity, the questions of coordinating action 
coordination become more and more important for a late modern theory of socialization. 
Only such a theory is capable of highlighting potential solutions for the new challenges 
arising because of the dissolution of a mutual lifeworld. 
Thirdly, the consequences concerning Habermas’s normative basis have to be mentioned. 
The original normative basis in The Theory of Communicative Action is the undistorted series 
of speech acts (introduced in Table 1). However, this highly rational type of action 
coordination is itself a result of a socialization process, including a moral development that 
leans on the Levinasian proximity. Therefore, the pragmatic normative basis is indirectly 
dependent on the proximity, which means that lack of proximity could be rightfully criticized 
in the relevant situations. In this sense, Habermas’s formal pragmatic normative basis can be 
complemented on the level of socialization theory with the concept of proximity. 
Finally, the theoretical consequence has to be mentioned, namely the one that concerns the 
historical conclusions and the diagnosis of time of The Theory of Communicative Action. As 
it is well known, Habermas describes three major trends of social evolution: the 
rationalization of lifeworld, the differentiation of the systems, and the uncoupling of the 
lifeworld and system. Furthermore, as a diagnosis of time, he describes the colonization of 
the lifeworld by the system introducing it as a pathological tendency. In the light of what has 
been told about the coordination of action coordination, these ideas may be revised as well. 
As the proximity is an essential prerequisite of coordinating action coordination, which is the 
prerequisite of the rationalization of the lifeworld, it becomes a crucial question regarding 
how proximity can be historically featured and how its historical dynamism affects the 
original Habermasian diagnosis of time.23 Even if these questions require further research and 
may only be mentioned here, it is important to emphasize their relevance, as they are crucial 
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Abstract: When Occupy Wall Street proved able to reach mass circulation in 2011, it 
registered as a threat to the status quo in the United States, where corporate entities with 
close relation to government normally control the flow of discourse. The Occupy 
encampments, therefore, were intolerable, not merely an annoyance that could be 
ignored or ridiculed. Once Occupy’s anti-corporate rhetoric had spread widely, the 
mainstream media took steps to derail the mass appeal of Occupy’s oppositional 
discourse through accusations of incoherence and indecency. However, such “soft” 
means of organizing consent from the public were very weak in 2011 because of the 
2008 economic collapse which had been provoked by Wall Street. With instruments of 
soft persuasion weak, the dominant group turned to instruments of hard persuasion — 
arrests, harassments, beatings, random grabs, and finally the orchestrated assault carried 
out on November 15th, an operation that saw the media censored and sequestered, at 










Norman Fairclough, a leading theorist of critical discourse analysis, states in his 2006 book 
Language and Globalization that discourse has only a limited ability to shape the “actual” 
world. The “real” processes of globalization, he argues, are too complex “to be fully 
controlled by any human intervention” (24). However, to the extent that real processes can be 
influenced, “various groups of people develop strategies to try to regulate, direct and control 
elements of these real processes” (2006: 24). In the U.S., financial elites control the corporate 
media (Bagdikian 2004; Croteau and Hoynes 1994) so pro-business discourses are usually the 
ones most able to inflect the trajectory of globalization. Opposition groups and individuals 
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regularly offer alternatives to dominant pro-business narratives but mass circulation of those 
alternative narratives is rare. The question of mass circulation is a crucial one, because, as 
Fairclough points out, “The mere existence of alternative discourses means little. It is only 
those which pass through the mechanisms and processes of selection and retention that can 
contribute to social (re)construction” (2006: 24). In the U.S., oppositional rhetoric thrives in 
the margins, but it rarely reaches the level of circulation that would yield a meaningful 
contribution to social (re)construction.  
However, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, after an unpopular trillion-dollar 
bailout of private banks with public taxes, pro-business narratives lost their capacity to 
persuasively explain events, which created an opportunity for radical critique of finance to 
gain legitimacy. In 2011, Occupy Wall Street used an illegal encampment in a Lower 
Manhattan park to exploit this opening, developing a functioning delivery system for mass 
circulation and mass appeal. Through Occupy’s improvised apparatus, mass anger at the vast 
power and wealth of Wall Street consolidated and circulated heavily in the mass media for 
several months. 
Long-term, successful mass communications by an oppositional group in the United States 
interferes by definition with the monopoly on mass communications held by financial elites 
with close ties to government elites. This article, then, examines efforts to reassert control of 
mass representation and public discourse in the face of a non-violent movement’s challenge 
to the dominant media’s pro-business narratives. Fieldnotes from my participant-observation 
in Occupy Wall Street, as well as news reports and published meeting minutes, provide the 
raw data for my study, which describes the formidable repertoire of tools that elites turned to 
in order to shore up a public transcript that was severely tested from below.  
Authorities in a constitutional republic (such as the U.S.) prefer to keep physical violence 
limited, but in this case, discursive tools alone proved incapable of keeping radical rhetoric 
from breaking through to mass audiences, requiring the use of paramilitary force in order to 
push radical critique of finance back to the margins. The turn to instruments of hard 
persuasion was most evident in the New York Police Department’s orchestrated assault on 
November 15th, 2011, an operation that saw the media censored and sequestered, at night, in 
the dark, with no filmed images, and all subway stations and street access blocked. Reporters 
with press passes were forced to leave Zuccotti Park and placed in a “free-press zone” 
(Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013) where they were unable to witness or collect video on 
the confrontation.  
If these writers had been able to witness the police attack, they would have seen that a 
massive force of police in riot gear descended on the encampment, unannounced after 
midnight, backed up by sanitation crews dumping the mountain of debris left in the wake of 
the police sweep. Police arrested over 200 people, including a few journalists. Officers in riot 
gear beat campers with batons, tore apart their built environment, littered the floor with their 
books, tents, medical supplies, food, religious artifacts, and personal property. 
The operation started right after midnight, when police trucks took positions along Zuccotti 
Park’s perimeter. Officers set up a perimeter with a one-block radius in order to keep 
supporters away and they arrested 28 people who tried to bust through. At 1 a.m., police 
turned on the klieg lights and loudspeakers; officers spread leaflets ordering demonstrators to 
leave. Those who did not leave by 1:45 a.m. were dragged out. (Baker and Goldstein 2011)  
Sanitation workers followed, picking up any belongings left behind. It took 150 sanitation 
workers from all five boroughs to haul out 26 truckloads of clothes, tents, musical 
instruments, books, sleeping bags, and electronics (Gregoran, Sutherland, and Fredericks 
2011). At 3:30 a.m., the last group of demonstrators locked arms in the Occupy Kitchen, 
refusing to let go of the park. Two demonstrators chained themselves to trees. Police beat this 
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core group with batons in order to get them to delink, and then arrested them. By 4:15 a.m., 
the park was clear. (Baker and Goldstein 2011) 
As I show in this article, authorities turned to paramilitary force only after soft, discursive 
tools proved ineffective. The first strategy for remarginalizing Occupy – ignoring the 
demonstrations – did not succeed, primarily because Occupy had leveraged its own 
communication systems to circulate its anti-corporate message to a wider and wider audience. 
The second strategy – tarring Occupy as unworthy of association – had only limited success 
because Occupy’s message had mass legitimacy after the financial collapse of 2008. 
 
Figure 1: In the heart of New York's Financial District, a marginalized narrative reached thousands of 




Part 1: Occupy’s Challenge from Below 
 
Before suddenly becoming a consequential movement, Occupy Wall Street started as just 
another odd instance of marginal opposition by fringy New York City activists.  But, in less 
than sixty days, the 2011 movement drastically changed the terms of national political debate 
and propelled radical critiques of finance into mass circulation. Occupy erupted from the 
margins into the mainstream where loosely-allied movements delivered a heterodox message 
into the teeth of power, provoked a response, and accumulated large financial and material 
assets which required banking and warehouse services. As it gained material, financial, and 
political clout, Occupy assembled multiple unauthorized discourses against Wall Street 
financial firms recently impervious to criticism or opposition. As occupations spread to many 
towns and cities, and a protest camp in Zuccotti morphed daily into an all-purpose opposition 
center on illegally-seized land, Occupy developed into a consequential threat to elite rule.  
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How, then, did Occupy develop into a threat? What were the conditions that allowed 
Occupy’s oppositional themes and utterances to gain wide circulation and high profiles? How 
did Occupy amplify the discontented voices of ordinary people?  
 




Physical Occupation of Meaningful Space 
 
The first communications’ strategy that I discuss, because I believe it is most important, is the 
physical placement of a protest encampment on the streets of Lower Manhattan without 
permission. Occupy gained mass circulation because it imposed on public space, public 
attention, and mass media a spectacle with a long enough life to attract attention and thus 
compete for the attention of American viewers. Camping out illegally on Wall Street 
amplified outraged voices of ordinary people by being long-term, not transient like a march 
or a rally.  
On the 17th of September, several hundred activists associated with Occupy set out to occupy 
Chase Manhattan Plaza, one short block from the New York Stock Exchange, but the police 
had surrounded the plaza with barricades. Unsurprised, Occupy’s Tactical Working Group 
(TWG) consulted their list of seven alternative spaces. These alternative spaces were a 
closely guarded secret in the lead-up to the 17th, but when Chase was ruled out, TWG spread 
the word that Zuccotti Park, a “privately-owned public park” three blocks from the Stock 
Exchange, was next on their list.  
Demonstrators found Zuccotti free of barricades and moved in. To their surprise, police did 
not move against them, and they woke up the next day residents of the Park. Mitchell L. 
Moss, Professor of Urban Policy and Planning at New York University, explained the City’s 
inaction: “The City had a policy for encouraging commercial developers to create open space 
in exchange for more height. But until now, no one has thought about the issue of what the 
rules are” (Foderaro 2011). The core activists of Occupy, by poking at the downtown 
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landscape, looking for fissures in the state-corporate entente, had found one they could pry 
open – a privately-owned public park with hazy rules and complex ownership.  
Zuccotti Park’s private-public arrangement was a vulnerability waiting to be exploited, but in 
1996, when Brookfield Properties, Inc., took possession of the space, they could not have 
expected that a protest encampment would expose the legal contradictions. They were not 
prepared. John Zuccotti, the former Brookfield executive for whom the park is named, said, 
“We basically look to the police leadership and mayor to decide what to do" when 
complications arise at the park, while Mayor Bloomberg explained that the Occupiers weren’t 
evicted because Brookfield hadn’t requested it. In other words, when the Occupiers arrived 
on September 17th, both Brookfield Properties and New York City officials incorrectly 
assumed that the other would respond. Neither did. (Roberts 2011) 
Occupy sought a spot in the immediate vicinity of Wall Street because they identified banks 
as the place where people could assemble and petition the elites who rule daily life. In the 
lead up to the occupation, the Anonymous hacking group issued several communiqués 
arguing that Wall Street was the place to gather because “the banksters” had cratered the 
national economy and then rewarded themselves with bonuses paid for with taxpayer 
bailouts. Anonymous addressed the criminals of Wall Street directly:  
 
Perhaps you think you are at the eye of storm, luxuriating in tranquility while all 
around is ripped apart and made anew. But it is not so... You are at the center of the 
crosshairs!...You have crystallized this country into a monolithic tyranny and in doing 
so you made brittle the ties that bind people. We are here, gathered at the steps of your 
butcher block four years later, frenzied and furious. Your crimes have united this great 
melting pot into a white-hot alloy of rage. (“Anonymous Press Release for Occupy 
Wall Street Action,” 2011) 
 
In the parlance of urban youth, Anonymous and other Occupy participants “recognized”; they 
publicly acknowledged what is going on and who the central perpetrators are. 
In a talk that I attended at Hunter University in late 2011, Cornell West expressed support for 
the choice of Wall Street as the right target for protests because dominant control of society is 
in the private hands of finance. To support his claim of Wall Street dominance, West pointed 
out that, before the deregulation of finance, business, and industry by government began 30 
years ago, the financial sector took in no more than 16 percent of overall profits but in the last 
decade this sector has taken up to 41 percent. He connected the financialization of our 
economy to American society’s "gangsterization" – putting profits before people.  
In their open-air public space on the footsteps of Wall Street, Occupy participants asserted 
oppositional sentiments, radical social values, anti-market ideas, and even revenge fantasies 
which dared Wall Street financiers and the Mayor’s Office to stop them. Thousands of out-
of-town tourists walking past the park could view “Wanted!” signs portraying criminal bank 
executives like Angelo Mozillo, a six-foot wolf puppet holding a sign that read “The Wolves 
of Wall Street Give Wolves a Bad Name,” and then take home with them newsletters devoted 
to reporting on “what the 1% don’t want us to think about.” Such egalitarian materials could 
not reach such a large audience before the occupation of Zuccotti created a mass disruption in 
the status quo. Writing from a public relations standpoint, in an October 6th New York Times 
op-ed, Richard Beales (2011) lauded Occupy for “picking a good spot,” saying that the 
crowds and street theater made for good television, and also that, because camping in front of 
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Figure 4: Protester holding sign in Zuccotti Park. 
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Figure 5:Tourists in Lower Manhattan frequently stopped  




Occupy posed a threat to the status quo because it performed alternative social relations as it 
critiqued existing ones. As weeks of occupation went by, the camp evolved to house 
hundreds of overnight campers, thousands of daily visitors, and an array of free services like 
meals, health care, clothing, phone calls, education, books, shelter, even cigarettes.  
In addition to viewing the displayed alternatives, people walking past the park could clear up 
any doubts they had about Occupy and get answers about what confused them about the 
movement. One morning in early November, for instance, I witnessed an elderly couple 
stopped on the sidewalk to peer in at the interior of the park. Since they were within shouting 
distance of the west side Welcome Station, the guy working that station shouted out to them 
jovially, “Go ahead in! We’re not crazy like the news says we are!” The woman in the couple 
said, "Well, I know that!" at which point the couple ambled into the park to get a closer look 
at things.  
I also witnessed adults using the encampment as a learning opportunity for kids. The sight of 
children being escorted through the park by approving schoolteachers grew common by 
November. Occupy demonstrators worked to accommodate kids by adding a children’s 
section in the Occupy Library, by discouraging each other from cursing when kids were 
around, by providing fascinating puppetry and pageantry on Halloween, and by improving 
walking lanes in the park. The attraction of kids to the park was yet another reason for 
authorities to feel threatened – Helaine Olen (2011) of The New York Times expressed 
amusement over a four-year old kid holding a sign promoting economic justice at Zuccotti 
Park, noting that four is “an age when girls are generally thought to be more interested in 
Disney characters than protest marches.” 
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Tourists wandering Lower Manhattan – or riding by in double-decker tourist buses – snapped 
countless photos of Zuccotti Park, its inhabitants, and signs on display. These tourists with 
their cameras augmented Occupy’s ability to bypass the mainstream media to gain wider 
circulation.  
Just in case they weren’t planning to already, demonstrators asked tourists to upload their 
photos to Facebook. An Occupier from China, for example, had a sign hanging around his 
neck reading  "Protect Humanity's Peace, Freedom, Democracy… A Long Way To 
Go." After tourists took his picture, he showed them a note on the back of his sign reading 
"please post to Facebook." Ideally, tourists from America’s heartland or from overseas would 
circulate their photos of Occupy within their own social networks. The picture of a smiling, 
friendly Chinese man promoting a message with universal appeal might counter some of the 
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Figure 9: This demonstrator could be found at the edge of  





Unsupervised Channels for Circulation of Unauthorized Discourse 
 
As I describe in Part Two of this article, Occupy’s relationship with major media was much 
more complex than their relationship with tourists passing by the park. Mainstream channels 
did not usually treat Occupy’s message favorably, so Occupy wisely developed its own 
channels for circulating discourse. One of Occupy’s most famous tools for circulation was the 
Occupied Wall Street Journal (OWSJ), a hand-distributed print organ that riffed off The Wall 
Street Journal but disseminated news and opinion from the point of view of the protesters. 
The idea for the OWSJ came about because, according to editor Arun Gupta, “we didn’t think 
there would be much in the way of coverage of the event, so we thought it was important that 
there be a media outlet that reflected what was under way” (Carr 2011). Besides hawkers 
distributing this alternate broadside at Zuccotti Park and at off-site rallies, its circulation 
occasionally copied that of the major dailies in New York City. For example, at the height of 
the movement, I was able to find stacks of OWSJ sitting alongside stacks of the New York 
Post and New York Times at a convenience store in the neighborhood where I live, 5 miles 
from Zuccotti Park.  
Occupy developed online channels as well as print ones. Within Zuccotti Park, activists 
constructed a “Freedom Tower,” composed of two modems and six radio antennas. The 
tower distributed wireless Internet access open to everyone who visited the park. The 
excellent wireless access in the park aided Occupy’s Twitter campaign as they blasted out 
pro-Occupy and anti-Wall Street messages every minute of every day.  
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Awareness of Occupy escalated after the Occupy Media Working Group circulated videos of 
a disturbing incident during a September 24th march to Union Square. The videos showed 
several marchers who had been kettled into a netted sidewalk area and who were not trying to 
force their way out. Among them was an apparently non-violent young woman named Kaylee 
Dedrick. The videos, “made by several protesters at different vantagepoints” (Baker and 
Goldstein, 2011), show Dedrick being pepper-sprayed by NYPD Deputy Inspector Anthony 
Bologna, causing her to collapse in shrieks as Occupy medics rush to help her. The 
sensational and troubling video went viral and aroused new sympathy for Occupy and 
hostility toward the NYPD from people outside the movement. According to a New York 
Times report on September 29th, the videos 
 
have prompted a level of criticism of the police rarely seen outside of fatal police 
shootings of unarmed people. The independent city agency that investigates 
accusations of police abuse said that about 400 people had complained, many from out 
of state. (Baker and Goldstein 2011)  
 
Through its own channels, Occupy was able to circulate the pepper-spray video and force 
into national attention what was going on in Lower Manhattan. The major media were not 
able to quarantine the wave of sympathy that this filmed incident provoked. People who been 
privately seething about the bailout of Wall Street after its greed had torpedoed the global 
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A Radical Critique of Finance Acheives Widespread, Sustained Circulation 
 
In its earliest incarnation, Occupy was just one of many oppositional groups operating in the 
margins; during September 2011, Occupy news never occupied more than 2 percent of the 
nation’s collective coverage, according to Pew’s Research Center for Excellence in 
Journalism. In fact, Occupy did not even register on the Pew charts until the very end of 
September. (Holcomb, 2011) 
However, in the first full week of October, coverage of Occupy jumped to 7 percent of the 
nation’s collective news coverage (Holcomb 2011). An avalanche of unsupervised, horizontal 
communication online and onsite provoked the mainstream media to begin covering the 
movement more energetically. Occupy’s share of the national news jumped to 10 percent in 
the second week of October before leveling out at around 5 percent. The news media had 
signaled, merely by the amount of coverage it was supplying, that Occupy was important, 
that it mattered, and that it had traction. 
By early October, Occupy was internationally known and strong public support for the 
movement meant that the New York City officials could not peremptorily remove the 
activists without seriously harming the credibility of the police and the Mayor. A Quinnipiac 
poll of New York City voters released in mid-October found that nearly three-quarters said 
that they understood the protesters’ views at least fairly well and two-thirds said that they 
agreed with those views. Nationwide, the support was just a bit less, hovering around sixty 
percent. (Muskal 2011) 
 
 
Part 2: Beating Back Occupy’s Challenge 
 
This section examines the dominant elite’s efforts to reassert control of mass representation 
and public discourse in the face of a non-violent movement’s challenge to the dominant 
media’s pro-business narratives. Plan A – ignoring the demonstrations – proved ineffective 
because Occupy had leveraged its own communication systems to circulate its anti-corporate 
message to a wider and wider audience. Plan B – tarring Occupy as unworthy of association – 
had limited success because Occupy’s message had mass legitimacy after the trillion-dollar 
bank bailouts in 2008. After these “soft means” for remarginalizing Occupy were found 




 Plan A: Ignoring or Downplaying Occupy 
 
Although Occupy’s Lower Manhattan actions began in early September and the occupation 
of Zuccotti Park began on September 17th, news about Occupy never occupied more than 2 
percent of the nation’s collective coverage during the month of September (Holcomb, 2011). 
For most of September, Occupy coverage was too scant to even register in the Pew rankings 
(Holcomb 2011). In Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James Scott offers the following 
explanation for why dominant groups might downplay or ignore opposition: “When it suits 
them, the dominant may elect to ignore a symbolic challenge, pretend they did not hear it or 
see it, or perhaps define the challenger as deranged, thus depriving his act of the significance 
it would otherwise have” (1990: 205).  
Those members of the mainstream media who did not ignore Occupy during its first few 
weeks often depicted the movement as incomprehensible or insignificant. In Gina 
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Bellafante’s analysis piece on Occupy, “Every Action Produces an Overreaction,” published 
in The New York Times on October 2nd, she argues that nothing remarkable was going on at 
Zuccotti. “The most threatening thing happening at this disorganized affair,” she wrote, was 
that people were “reading Orwell.”  
After the online circulation of videos showing Deputy Inspector Bologna pepper-spraying 
Kaylee Dedrick, editors at The New York Daily News (NYDN) came to the aid of Police 
Commissioner Ray Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg in an October 7th editorial, suggesting that 
no one, in fact, had engaged in cruelty toward the demonstrators. NYDN editors used their 
platform to downplay violence committed by the police and dismiss the outrage expressed by 
Occupy participants and their supporters. The editorial, titled “Occupy Wall Street protesters 
need to start living in the real world,” referred to “squirts” of pepper-spray and “less-than-
bruising whacks of a nightstick on a backpack.” The Daily News editors encouraged “the 
whiners” to do a Google search for “videos of Chicago Police outside the 1968 Democratic 
Convention.” Viewing those videos would purportedly give demonstrators (and their 
supporters) a sense of how comparatively mild the police violence toward Occupy has been. 
One month later, in yet another editorial show of support for the NYPD, Daily News editors 
dismissed Occupy demonstrators as “tots throwing tantrums,” thereby reinforcing what 
Bellafante and others had been circulating throughout October – that Occupy participants are 
merely “protesting for protest’s sake.”  
Although leading factors in the media represented Occupy as insignificant and/or lacking a 
comprehensible message, one might say that Occupy was obvious in its critique of the great 
inequality of wealth and power in the United States. Activists had gathered to protest things 
that are quite meaningful to regular Americans: corporate influence in American politics, a 
federal response to the 2008 financial crisis that was heavily biased toward the rich, war 
profiteering, declining access to education, etc. Despite the widely-circulated “protesting for 
protest’s sake” meme, there is evidence that members of the public were not having a 
difficult time deciphering Occupy’s message. According to one poll released by Quinnipiac 
University on October 17th, 72% of New Yorkers understood the demonstrators’ views 
“fairly well” or “very well” (Oresmus 2011).   
Allowing Occupy to continue might have further mainstreamed their widely-shared feelings 
about economic inequality that elites preferred to keep repressed. Although the movement 
had been launched by a relatively small group of anarchists and other dissidents, it attracted 
and consolidated many forms of unauthorized discourses against the status quo. 
 
Plan B: Undermining Opposition Once They’ve Reached Mass Circulation 
 
By mid-October, with Occupy’s discourse circulating heavily through mass media outlets, 
defining the movement merely as “unclear” or “insignificant” would not suffice. Re-
marginalizing this robust opposition to Wall Street dominance required that Occupy be 
redefined in the public mind as dangerous fringe elements, or, in the words of New York Post 
columnist Steve Cuozo (2011), “anarchists, vagrants, and zanies” driven “by a nihilist 
impulse to disrupt life and commerce." Although planning for such a rhetorical offensive 
might be expected to occur behind the scenes, Congressman Peter King, who represents the 
2nd District of New York, went public on October 7th with a plea for the media to undermine 
Occupy’s credibility. “It’s really important for us not to give any legitimacy to these people 
in the streets,” King said on Laura Ingraham’s right-wing radio show, adding, “I remember 
what happened in the 1960s when the left-wing took to the streets and somehow the media 
glorified them and it ended up shaping policy. We can’t allow that to happen” (Miller 2011).  
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Rep. King’s proposal to undermine the legitimacy of Occupy resembles schemes that 
authorities often deploy, according to James Scott (1990), in order to keep opposition groups 
from gaining “the status in public discourse they seek” (206). In civilizations around the 
globe, Scott has found that, through control of mass communications, elites can “assimilate 
the opposition’s acts to a category that minimizes its political challenge to the state” (206). 
Scott points out, for example, that “there is little doubt that it often serves elites to label 
revolutionaries as bandits, dissidents as mentally deranged, opponents as traitors” (206).   
The New York Post circulated dozens of articles portraying Occupy as, at best, a drag on 
ordinary people’s quality of life. For instance, on October 16th, City Councilman Vincent 
Ignizio (2011) published an op-ed in The Post arguing that “we cannot keep footing the bill 
for these protests,” which he said cost the city millions of dollars in overtime for police 
officers and which might force cancellation of a new police-academy class scheduled for 
January.   
Ignizio’s commentary represented just a single shot at Occupy in a volley of discharges from 
The Post. On the day after Occupy was evicted from Zuccotti on November 15th, reporters for 
The Post admitted, “The Post has led the charge to shut down the Occupation – after 
exposing how a large number of the park’s OWS inhabitants were freeloaders and ex-cons 
who were not supporting the cause. The paper called on city leaders to return the space to its 
intended purpose” (Gregoran, Sutherland, and Fredericks 2011). Articles within The Post 
suggested, among other things, that demonstrators advocated bloody revolution (Saul 2011), 
that they were led by an anti-Semite (Goodman 2011), and that the park “smelled like an 
open sewer” (Cartwright and Fredericks 2011).  
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For Todd Gitlin (2011), a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia, the expressions 
of disgust by commentators in The New York Post were to be expected. Gitlin wrote in a New 
York Times op-ed,  
 
If some aspects of the Occupy Wall Street protest feel predictable — the drum circles, 
the signs, including “Tax Wall Street Transactions” and “End the FED” — so does the 
right-wing response. Is it any surprise that Fox News and its allied bloggers consider 
the protesters “deluded” and “dirty smelly hippies”? 
 
 Perhaps more surprising were the smears against Occupy that emerged from seemingly non-
partisan news outlets. For example, a free newspaper called Metro New York ran a front page 
article on October 23rd which claimed incorrectly that core Occupy activists were hoarding 
hundreds of thousands of donations and using the money for luxuries like “gourmet dinners, 
down blankets, and flat-screen televisions” (Epstein 2011).  
 
Plan C: Turning to Monopoly on Violence 
 
As I have shown, the mainstream media first tried to downplay the significance of Occupy by 
ignoring it or representing it as “protest for protest’s sake.” But that couldn’t keep Occupy’s 
message from gaining mass circulation, so members of the mass media tried a second 
technique – undermining Occupy’s legitimacy by depicting the group as unworthy of 
association. However, these tactics yielded limited success in remarginalizing Occupy 
because Occupy didn’t invent the anger at Wall Street. It only forced it onstage, acting 
against and for things which spoke to orientations that are widely felt but rarely acted on in 
public. Alexander Stille, Professor of International Journalism at Columbia, wrote, in a New 
York Times op-ed published on October 19th, 2011,  
 
In an era in which money translates into political power, there is a growing feeling, on 
both left and right, that special interests have their way in Washington. There is 
growing anger, from the Tea Party to Occupy Wall Street, that the current system is 
stacked against ordinary citizens. 
 
Polls support Stille’s contentions. In February 2011, for example, seven months before the 
occupation of Zuccotti Park, a Gallup poll found that 67% of Americans were dissatisfied 
with “the size and influence of major corporations in America today” (Saad). A New York 
Times/CBS poll taken in October 2011 found two-thirds of Americans want wealth to be 
distributed more equally while the same amount object to tax cuts for corporations (Zeleny 
and Thee-Brenan 2011).  
Occupy’s ferocious circulation of anti-Wall Street discourse from its unauthorized staging 
area uniquely consolidated, propelled, and projected popular opposition to a financial and 
political system that was at its most vulnerable moment, a financial collapse revealing how 
the status quo socializes risk and privatizes profits, that leaves some bankers wealthy and 
many citizens indebted. Therefore, “soft,” discursive, means for remarginalizing OWS could 
not, on their own, push OWS discourse back to the margins.  
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The City’s first eviction attempt occured on October 14th. Mayor Bloomberg had moved to 
clear the camp but the Mayor and the police had telegraphed their plans, allowing the 
opposition to prepare for what seemed like a daylight raid with journalists attending. The 
attempt failed, thwarted by 1) mass support for the camp expressed in many calls and emails 
to the Mayor from liberal politicians and others, 2) the onsite civil disobedience of Jesse 
Jackson who linked arms in the park with occupiers when a police attack was rumored, and 
3) the many hundreds who came downtown to physically defend the encampment (Barbaro 
and Taylor 2011). In a New York Times report, Michael Barbaro and Kate Taylor wrote, “By 
6 a.m., just before City Hall announced the cleanup was canceled, the crowd had grown to 
more than a thousand, their numbers swelled by Internet pleas for reinforcements.” The idea 
of a violent battle between the police and 1000 Occupy participants didn’t seem like a good 
idea to many powerful politicians in New York. Barbaro and Taylor elaborated, 
 
Behind the scenes, interviews suggested, the change in course was fueled by an 
intensifying sense of alarm within city government, shared even among some of those 
who work for Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, that sending scores of police officers 
into the park would set off an ugly, public showdown that might damage the 
reputation of the city as well as its mayor. 
 
Clearing Zuccotti Park required that the city win the image wars, and the October 14th 
attempt was not equipped to do so.  
However, by the November 15th eviction, Mayor Bloomberg had learned his lesson well. The 
NYPD won the final battle of the images because City authorities destroyed the encampment 
with police power in the middle of the night, with all news media quarantined and no live 
coverage possible. Reporters in the park with press passes were forced to leave and placed in 
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a “free-press zone” (Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013) where they were unable to witness 
or collect video on the confrontation.  
According to police spokesman Paul Browne, the creation of the free-press zone was for the 
journalist’s own safety, comparing the perimeter for the press to perimeters created around 
crime scenes and calamitous events. Mayor Bloomberg said that the media was kept away “to 
prevent a situation from getting worse and to protect members of the press.” But several 
journalists and journalism groups spoke out against the police tactics.  
 
 The New York Press Club said in a statement that “the brash manner in which 
officers ordered reporters off the streets and then made them back off until the 
actions of the police were almost invisible is outrageous.” (Stelter and Baker 
2011) 
 Andrew Katz, who was writing for The Brooklyn Ink, said that the police 
“wouldn’t let us get anywhere near Zuccotti.” Mr. Katz said that at the corner 
of Broadway and Fulton Street, three blocks from the park, some police 
officers told him to stand on the sidewalk while others told him to stand on the 
street. (Stelter and Baker 2011) 
 The Managing Editor for DNAInfo.com, Michael Ventura, said that one of his 
journalists was “doing his job and was arrested for that.” (Stelter and Baker 
2011) 
 Lindsey Christ, a reporter for NY1, a local cable news channel, said that, as 
the police approached the park, they did not distinguish between protesters and 
members of the press. “Those 20 minutes were some of the scariest of my 
life,” she said, adding that police officers took a New York Post reporter 
standing near her and “threw him in a choke-hold.” (Stelter and Baker 2011) 
 A writer for The Village Voice told a police officer, “I’m press!” to which the 
officer responded, “Not tonight.” (Stelter and Baker 2011) 
 
As I described in the opening to this article, the police power of the state erased the material 
base of Occupy’s anti-corporate opposition, leaving the demonstrators with no physical 
center to develop and display alternatives to the market system. Demonstrators were forced to 
rally for a few hours and disperse or march a few blocks and disperse. These were very 
different material conditions in comparison to a self-evolving, self-recreating village camp. 
Without a fixed and charismatic operational base, they were forced to make their arguments 
with words unattached to an inchoate alternative camp. Because Occupy refused to offer 
itemized demands or an easily digestible agenda, their message was easily garbled and 
distorted by the mainstream media.  
In the months after the eviction, the movement’s national profile declined steadily, as did 
material support from the public. By January 3rd, 2012, when the Occupy General Assembly 
finally achieved consensus around a specific demand – a Constitutional amendment to end 
corporate personhood – the public had largely stopped paying attention. By the one-year 
anniversary of the occupation, Occupy’s decision-making bodies had long since stopped 
meeting, their website was no longer interactive, and they had still had no central camp. Their 
focus on economic inequality smartly shifted to a focus on debt, whether it be student debt, 
consumer debt, or the debt that small nations owe to the World Bank. Off-stage now, activists 
still oppose economic inequality, but, without mass circulation of their discourse, they are no 
longer positioned in a way that would allow them to contribute to social reconstruction. 
 





In the United States, the corporate mass media typically refuses to circulate information 
produced by dissenting groups, thus quarantining it from mass circulation and public 
perception. Without a doubt, individual critics have space to publish online or in print or hand 
out flyers on the street, or even yell on a street corner because the U.S. Constitution formally 
guarantees legal rights to dissent. Oppositional groups perform isolated demonstrations and 
rallies, even large ones, but elites are not threatened by those actions, which are neither long-
term, nor amplified, nor widely circulated, nor received meaningfully by large audiences.  
In contrast, Occupy’s actions in late 2011 were long-term, amplified, widely circulated, and 
meaningfully received by large audiences. Occupy marched to the center of high finance, 
denounced the nation’s financial elite, and encouraged others to do the same. This is what 
charismatic leadership does – it acts against and for things that speak to the orientations of 
masses of people who can’t or won’t act on those orientations publicly. As a movement, 
Occupy put into words and actions “the essence of thousands upon thousands of bitter jokes, 
resentments, and outrage accumulated around kitchen tables, in small groups of workers, in 
beer halls, and among close companions” (Scott 1990: 226). Occupy assumed a charismatic 
posture, perhaps even becoming national heroes not only because their tactics were bold and 
clever, but because they made the first public declaration of what so many had been saying 
offstage without the amplification of mass media or mass movements. 
On the day after the Zuccotti encampment was destroyed, Mayor Mike Bloomberg issued an 
official statement stating that Occupy’s encampment was “an intolerable situation” and 
declaring that “inaction was not an option” (Halbfinger and Barbaro 2011). Bloomberg’s 
statements ostensibly referred to problems with safety and sanitation in the park, but my 
analysis suggests that Occupy was intolerable to the City primarily for 
reasons having nothing to do with public health: Occupy’s oppositional discourse had 
reached mass circulation and mass legitimacy and the soft means for marginalizing the 
movement were very weak because of the 2008 bank bailouts which were heavily biased 
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Abstract: Some animated movies use humor to capture the full attention of its audience. 
In so doing, the movie’s messages have become a great concern for many theorists and 
critics by virtue of the idea that a movie can be a repository of ideologies meant to 
construct a certain type of easy-going and noncritical audience. This paper, therefore, 
takes the example of Max Fleischer’s Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty 
Thieves (1937) and Robert Clampett’s Ali Baba Bound (1941) as its case studies aiming 
at spotting the different manifestations of humor, taking Arabs as its subject-matter, 
becoming a leaked ideology and taming the discourse that is amplified, manipulated, 
and delivered to the Western public in unwarrantable ways compared to the imagery of 
Westerners. 
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The bleak visions of quite a few novels of the period are 
couched in a bitterly irreverent humor that has the capacity to 
shock readers out of their apathy and self-pity; to produce an 
angry laughter that is hopefully more productive than despair; 
to disorient in order to reorient.  (Al-Nowaihi 2005: 295) 
 
It has often been remarked that part of the philosophy of humor is to draw unexpected results 
from unexpected situations. It can often be noticed in some novels or films that what should 
not be laughed at becomes, though, the butt of the joke. In a movie, for instance, one would 
notice that sometimes the oppressed or weak gets laughed at (which is contrary to what 
normally people should do: empathize with the weak) and is thus made to seem to deserve 
what happens to him or her and be the butt of the movie’s joke. Readers or spectators, this 
way, are oriented to adhere to the ideologies of humor and are shocked out of their apathy. 
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Quite dexterous in many animated movies about Arabs is the way in which humor is utilized 
quick-wittedly with the purpose of leaking ideological messages to spectators.   
In this respect, this article deals with the complicated and controversial issue of humor in 
relation to ideological manipulations. By drawing particularly on two Hollywood cartoons, 
Max Fleischer’s Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves (1937) and Robert 
Clampett’s Ali Baba Bound (1941), this mental enterprise is bent on analyzing how these 
short films construct a comically ideological view of Arab life. This is to say that such types 
of movies not only encourage spectators to totally drown in a state of reverie, and thus absorb 
all is transmitted without questioning, but also, through comical humor in animated films, 
cartoon producers tend to amplify the implementation of stereotypic, anachronistic, and 
anecdotal features of Arabs, which could also have long-term destructive consequences to 
both Arabs and Westerners.  
Indeed, Media provide the possibilities, in various forms, for entertaining spectators, 
particularly through the genre of comical humor presented in animated films. Having 
engaged in such an entertaining enterprise, Media, in this regard, has provided an outlet for 
film producers to rally as big a number of audience as their films can entice so as to make 
significant profits. At this stage, profit has come to occupy the main interests of most film 
producers, and the attainment of such profits would require seeking attractive themes for their 
film production. Arabs would perfectly suit the moment by weaving romantic and 
stereotypical stories around them, exactly in conformity with the worn and torn fantasized 
imageries of The Arabian Nights. In so doing, some film producers have relied on film 
messages to manipulate the public and direct the course of actions in their countries to their 
advantage. There are, in fact, plenty of messages filtered through different media outlets that 
have helped best weave the schemes of movie producers in their quest to control the minds of 
the masses. 
Such mind control, desired by movie producers, is conditioned to mesmerize spectators into 
believing every single idea and scene presented to them through TV screens. The idea is to let 
film ideologies flow, one after another, unnoticed and uncritical. The noticeable figure of 
spectators turns into devoted and almost uncritical admirers and applauders for all the 
movie’s scenes or TV messages. They, accordingly, fail to realize when a scene can be 
ideological, becoming noncritical applauders who do not take the quest for content control 
against producers and, as  a result, filmic ideologies have gone unnoticeable because of the 
overlaid humor. At this stage, we may find someone hysterically laughing at a character 
being comically beaten even though that same character is the oppressed and the one who 
should be commiserated. This is simply the case because it is widely believed that “for most 
of the audience, most of the time, the film is a form of escape” (Stevenson 2002: 88) from 
their habitual, dreary lives. In a nutshell, the film’s audience “is rendered as virtual and 
univalent as the images which are being referred to” (Bignell 2000: 161).  In such a context, 
the usage of humor in films becomes a hypnotizing tranquilizer serving the purpose of 
relieving people’s problems. What matters more now is to laugh, not to think about the 
subject of the laughter. This is also a truism because, “these films seek no criticality from 
their audiences, there are no spaces invested by themselves for creative interpretation; instead 
these films seek a compliant investment of power from the individual” (Fuery & Fuery 2003: 
3-4). These types of movies are in fact more than just entertaining ones in the sense that they 
have gone beyond their initial entertaining and humorous functions and have been permeated 
with political and ideological propensities while becoming technically more sophisticated and 
aesthetically more attractive.  
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In fact, reading the immense amount of discourse surrounding animated films, one might 
begin to think that some of those within the cartoon audience are forced into accepting and 
believing what they see on cable TV. They are now made to look like they are badly needing 
to be scolded into watching what is good for them (Curtis 1994). In view of that, “the 
[viewer] is ‘positioned’ ideologically; certain [cinematic] features ‘determine’ how the 
[viewer] will respond to the represented events or the depicted characters; viewers have no 
choice but to accept the ideological ‘demands’ of the narrative system” (Jenkins 1992: 64). 
This kind of disciplinary view of the movie has shaped an easy-going audience who only 
needed some so-called entertainment to absorb whatever ideology is in the air at any given 
period of time, (Curran & Donelan 2009: 143) for, in fact, it can be argued that many people 
have enjoyed animated films not only because of their comic-based nature but also for the 
free and instant vicarious travel they have guaranteed.  
The standard line about animated films has been that they have made travel available to 
everyone. Cartoons have been continually celebrated for having made it possible to 
experience other fantasy places without actually having to travel. In this mode of 
experiencing, “the world is laid out on a table to be viewed and classified by the viewer who 
can now hope to attain the position of God by viewing that world as a picture” (Gere 2010: 
154). Importantly, such rhetoric of animated films assumes that the more fantastical and 
funny things are, the more excited and interested the audience will become. The spectators, 
be they children or adults, find animated films appealing because they have made it 
accessible for them to experience some place (any place) different, thereby enabling them to 
leave their current monotonous conditions. Like all desires, this relies on the drives of fantasy 
and humor more than anything else. Here lies the cartoon’s appeal: it provides fantastical 
images molded humorously to fit the frame of culturally-determined exotic fantasies. 
Clearly, the lure of the fantasy worlds being depicted comically is what brings spectators to 
cartoons. In such a context, different kinds of spectators have been shaped: the ones who 
enjoy the films thanks to the kinds of reverie they inspire, but not a spectator who watches in 
order to better educate him or herself. A cartoon film here, therefore, plays the role of 
transporting its viewers to the simulated world of televisual imagery, for it incessantly 
hypnotizes them into unquestionably absorbing the multitude of film images in a total state of 
reverie – for the notable theorist of reverie Gaston Bachelard (1969), reverie is “a flight from 
out of the real” (1969: 5). This situation has resulted in producing a passive/silent 
spectatorship cast into a state of reverie when they become part and parcel of the movie. 
What they see comes to constitute part of their daily lives. Their presence in the movie is 
elongated so that it can last as long as the movie is exhibited. This kind of motive has allowed 
spectators to happily daydream about different places and different ways of life. At this stage, 
the world as a whole “takes form in our reverie, and this world is ours. This dreamed world 
teaches us the possibilities for expanding our being within our universe” (1969: 8). In fact, 
one of a comic cartoon’s primary appeals has been to offer a space apart for contemplating 
other possible visions of dwelling in the world, a quiet space for speculation and laughter, 
even if this is brought about through stereotypical conventions.  
It should be noted that this reserved space of daydreaming that the cartoon offers seeks to 
construct an experience of a comic and quiet life by washing over the viewer and shutting out 
critical rationalization instead encouraging a reverential mental transportation cloaked in a 
humorous fashion. This transportation always leads to fossilizing stereotypes and ready-made 
judgments in the mind of spectators, thereby creating new realities and worlds for them to 
enjoy. In support of this, many scholars have viewed cartoons as participating in the act of 
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producing reality instead of reflecting it. Following the same path, cartoons create new 
humorous realities and shape popular perceptions according to the society’s structures of 
domination. According to this approach,  
The control of point-of-view is the most powerful means of inducing a kind of 
imaginary response on the part of the spectator, “positioning” the spectator by 
addressing the viewer through visual devices such as the point-of-view shot and 
shot/reverse-shot cutting in order to fashion a very tight bond between spectator 
and text. In this way, the text may be said to “inter-pellate” the spectator into the 
fictional world so that its values, and its ideology, become one with the viewing 
subject. (Stam et al. quoted in Persson 2003: 145) 
In a nutshell, films not only reflect the world but also produce reality and shape public 
perceptions. Thus, some cartoons often promote stereotypical attitudes about a people being 
represented or made the subject matter of humor. Worse yet, such stereotyping has not gone 
without its ensuing devastating results in the sense that it vilified a people and made their 
descendants a target of numerous heinous attacks, especially in many different Western 
countries. This is the case mainly because films have exerted much of their power on their 
audiences’ minds and turned them into apathetic, non-questioning, noncritical audiences who 
absorb any televisual content whatsoever. To account for this latter claim, suffice it to 
contend with the idea that some film producers, more than ever before, have targeted younger 
generations to implant the seeds of hatred and thus keep the wheel of animosity between East 
and West, as binary antagonistic entities, rolling from one generation to another. This also 
explains the reason why animated audiences are readily open to influences in media content 
more than any other type of audience. 
In fact, targeting younger generations through ideological messages in films have had many 
different negative effects both on Arab and Western children. Unfortunately, the objectives of 
many cartoon movies are not just to educate, but also to instill hazardous and discriminatory 
views in the mind of Western children about others. Basically, children and young adults are 
socialized by the media to identify Arabs by the use of Orientalist stereotypes. The 
continuous circulation of these stereotypes from one generation to another will allow such 
derogatory images of Arabs and Muslims to exist in discourse. As a result, by five years of 
age, 
Many children have definite stereotypes about blacks, women, and other social 
groups. Children don’t have a choice about accepting or rejecting these 
conceptions, since they’re acquired well before they have their own cognitive 
abilities or experiences to form their own beliefs… they must compete with all the 
forces that would promote and perpetuate these stereotypes: peer pressure, mass 
media. (Paul 1998: 58) 
While it seems easy for non-Arab children to learn and accept what they learn from Disney 
and Hollywood’s negative stereotypes, it seems that things are more difficult for children 
from Arab descent to combat those stereotypes amongst some of their peers. Shaheen (2000) 
states, “Arab-American children have been subjected to physical and verbal harassment, and 
also have to endure stereotypes of the Arab and Islamic world that trickle down through 
children’s books and cartoons;” worst still, “children have experienced humiliation and fear 
among their schoolmates and the climate of prejudice and hate only deepens the wound of 
discrimination” (Merskin 2004: 172). 
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Certainly the comic vilification of Arabs in some animated movies has had continuous 
negative effects on Arabs, especially those living in the West, since “propaganda standardizes 
current ideas, hardens prevailing stereotypes, and furnishes thought patterns in all areas. Thus 
it codifies social, political, and moral standards” (Ellul 1969: 163). In view of that, some 
cartoon films about Arabs have adopted and adapted to different modes of comic 
representations whereby they can be able to translate Arab locations and people in humorous 
veins by classifying and depicting them according to the codes of Orientalist1 configurations. 
This kind of comic translation has allowed Arab locations and people to be apprehended by 
the cartoon viewers as frozen and raw materials liable to total conversion and imaginative 
transformation. Simply put, such comic translations constitute a way of perceiving the world 
that changes what the world is and what happens there to suit the tastes and agendas of the 
presenters. In support of this, one would argue that the worlds of animated cartoons transform 
territory and people, thereby making them fit the already existing Western views of the past, 
in which people and things are framed based upon funny and debased terms of exoticism. 
As a case in point, Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves (1937) (Fleischer 
1937) draws on both Arab folktales – including The Arabian Nights – as well as traditional 
Western notions about Arabs and the desert. This short animated movie features a host of 
common stereotypes of Arabs, including their portrayal as tricky schemers, avaricious 
villains and sorcerers, among many others. What is more intriguing about this animated 
cartoon is its usage of anecdotal features to represent the Arab people and land. The desert is 
pictured as barren and dangerous, and it is only populated with a bunch of stupid villains by 
the looks in their eyes and their always wide open mouths showing anecdotal features of 
missing teeth. This bunch of crazies is led by a sleazy bandit, Abu Hassan, and they can be 
found hanging around the Arab town continuously bent on terrorizing peaceful, funny 
looking hooked nose Arab civilians. Indeed, Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty 
Thieves (1937) draws an image of a desert that functions as a powerful symbol of a landscape 
existing outside of civilization (society/progress). The Arab land is populated with characters 
that best fit the imperial imagination of Europe. The clash between the Arab bandits and the 
Western heroes in the movie perfectly weaves an imperial scenario of two powers (evil vs. 
good), after which the good (apparently Western) ultimately triumphs and brings peace back 
to where it was.  
Furthermore, Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves (1937) depicts the 
Arabian Sahara as an effectively, to use Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) catchphrase, 
“dematerialized landscape” (Lefebvre 1991) provided with anecdotal topographies. The 
movie features some scenes of a tiny group of lined-up camels, and sometimes horses, made 
to move, jump or even act like they are dancing in a foolish manner at hearing the bandits 
(mostly drawn as stocky riders) sing. These Arab Bedouins are heading for an impoverished 
Arab town with dark and dirty streets where all sort of nasty things take place. Back to their 
caves, the bandits sing to their victorious day and the mass of wealth they now have, and 
again the lined up horses move up and down to the rhythm of the music.  
One more intriguing aspect of the comic depictions of Arab characters in the Saharan space is 
the manner in which the villains are punished by the western heroes. Popeye is made a savior 
of Arabia when he tries to restore order. He saves the Arab men, children, and women from 
                                                 
1 By the concept Orientalist, I draw upon Edward Said’ (1978) designation of the term. For him, “anyone who 
teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, 
sociologist, historian, or philologist – either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or 
she does is Orientalism.” (see Said 1978: 3) 
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Abu Hassan and his bandits’ evil wrath. This is, indeed, a construction of a perfect scenario 
for a benevolent war between the good and evil, the hero and the villain, after which the good 
(a Western hero and an avenging angel) always triumphs over the evil (a funny and 
bloodthirsty fool). In exemplifying this Western habit of constructing triumphant Western 
heroes as opposed to vanquished Arab villains, Popeye has come from far to rescue the 
women and children of Arabia from the tyrannical grip of the bandit Abu Hassan and his 
forty thieves. The evil side in this movie’s narrative is an embodiment of a bunch of coward 
bandits set on terrorizing civilians, mainly helpless women, and wreaking havoc everywhere 
they go. By contrast, the good side personifies Popeye’s, a Western character, bravery and 
heroism: these values have made him bridge the distance and instantly answer the call of duty 
– the Western duty or the white man’s burden – towards uncivilized nations. 
The retribution of the Arab characters, in this regard, is presented even in comical vein, as in 
the scene in which Popeye punches the bandits, one after another, thereby systematically 
causing them to fly back to their barrels with wide open mouths and missing teeth. The 
bandits are defeated so easily. Such comic defeat of the Arab villain (as if telling a joke worth 
laughing at rather than feeling sorry about it) certainly falls within the theoretical frames of 
Sigmund Freud’s theory of the joke or when laughter becomes a sort of aggression. In this 
sense, Freud writes that,  
Mankind have not been content to enjoy the comic where they have come upon it 
in their experience; they have also sought to bring it about intentionally, and we 
can learn more about the nature of the comic if we study the means which serve to 
make things comic. (Harper 2002: 2) 
Quite interestingly, the conception of laughter has always been a challenging area of study 
owing to its being one of most sophisticated emotional expression of human beings. In her 
essay, Laughter and aggression: Desire and derision in a postcolonial context, Virginia 
Richter (2005) builds upon Freud’s theory of laughter as an act of aggression to put forward 
the idea that the greatest pleasure one can get is often felt after playing jokes on others. These 
sorts of jokes are called “obscene or tendentious jokes.” In appropriating pleasure to 
aggression, Richter posits that when something (e.g., culture, religion or language) or 
somebody (e.g., a member of an ethnic group) is the object of a joke, these jokes can be 
“subversive”. That is to say, the joke no longer retains its fun aspects, but it becomes 
humiliating and seeks to symbolically vanquish the object of the joke. Therefore, in trying to 
uncover the comic aspects of the object being laughed at, one is, indeed, exposing oneself to 
its ominous repressed drives (Richter 2005: 63). Therefore, “jokes are based on the release of 
repressed sexual or aggressive impulses” (ibid.). In this sense, jokes are also described as, 
Manifestations of a symbolic victory over an enemy, a victory that is confirmed by 
the laughter of the third person (the audience). By laughing, the hitherto indifferent 
listener is transformed into someone who shares the hate and contempt of the 
narrator for the object of the joke. In this way, a ‘coalition’ is formed between the 
first person (who tells the joke) and the third person (who listens and laughs) at the 
expense of the second person (the butt of the joke). Freud makes it abundantly 
clear that the primary impulse of the joke is not ‘funny’ but hostile, intended to 
humiliate and vanquish the ‘enemy’ (Freud: 98). In this constellation, the role of 
the third person is quite crucial: the listener is the authority who confirms the 
defeat of the butt, the triumph of the teller, and, consequently, the establishment of 
a hierarchical power structure. (Richter 2005: 63) 
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It is by inflicting comic retributions upon the Arab villains that some animated movies further 
bond with their audience, thereby expressing their repressed contempt against their common 
Arab enemy. The laugh of the audience is proven to be a sign of the triumph of the movie 
producer over both the audience – for they have accepted to applaud to all that the animated 
movie presents them with – and the Arab villain – since some animated movies’ producers 
believe that in laughing at Arabs, they “touch but their vanity, and [they] attack their most 
vulnerable part” (Watt 2002: 65). It is their feeling of being humans that is touched. 
Therefore, “let them see that they can be laughed at, you will make them angry” (ibid.). 
Comedy in general and jokes in particular perform quite surprising functions. That is to say,  
Jokes often function as neuralgic points, as points at which the conventionally 
censored or repressed find expression, they are performing a permissible, indeed 
institutionalized, function. Thus, comedy in general, and the comic in particular, 
become, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, the appropriate site for the 
inappropriate, the proper place for indecorum, the field in which the unlikely is 
likely to occur. (Neale & Krutnik 1990: 92) 
Implicit in this quote is its stress on the unlikeliness of the comic. Jokes, for instance, perform 
inconsistent functions. For instance, in their dependence on comedy, some animated movies’ 
producers leak their ideologies to audiences in unexpected ways. One of the animated 
cartoons’ strange and intelligent forms of telling stories about Arabs in comic veins is their 
use of anachronistic humor. When unexpected events or artifacts happen to be placed in 
different epochs or settings than those where they are meant to exist, some animated movie 
producers intend to provoke the audience’s hilarious laughter. An example of this kind of 
humor might be the everyday observation of how unintended anachronisms in animated films 
about Arabs become amusing in the eyes of later generations.  
In Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves (1937), for example, it is easy to 
guess the historical epoch the movie intends to shoot, since it is so clearly disclosed by the 
clothing, the desert setting, the Arab trading gold currency or the use of camels, swords, and 
daggers, among many other features. When unexpected details are added to this historical 
epoch, some animated movie producers certainly intend (other than filling the desert land and 
thus laying hands over it) to provoke the audience’s laughter and make their movies more 
entertaining and unexpectedly unique in their own right.  
As examples of these additions, the movie inserts technologies which belong to present time, 
such as Gas stations, electric radios, a tank, the traffic lights in the middle of the desert and a 
sophisticated plane that can also function as a ship. In short, the movie blends stories from the 
Arabian Nights with modern Western artifacts so as to create a new space in the desert land. 
This space is certainly a place where audiences enjoy visiting and discovering in non-
conformist and new ways, and upon which they keep laughing hilariously ever so much and 
frolic to their hearts. 
Quite noticeable is the fact that in some animated movies, “anachronistic humour rarely 
projects modern-day phenomena directly onto the past: it more often tends to disrupt the 
harmony of the epoch by introducing elements from other historical contexts” (Salmi 2011: 
17). This disruption caused by the insertion of unintended artifacts in other historical contexts 
is what makes of anachronistic humor a success and further contributes to the wide reception 
of animated films. In this sense,  
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Anachronistic humour often relies on surprising juxtapositions. This comic 
impression has been explained by using a theory of degradation or psychological 
opposites, which argues that comic effect is produced by the appearance of 
something other than the expected result (for example, something small instead of 
massive or vice versa). The transgressing of boundaries between epochs can be 
seen as utilizing the idea of degradation: the filmmakers thwart expectations by 
bringing in unexpected historical elements, resulting in bathos for spectator 
amusement. (Salmi 2011: 19) 
In fact, what makes anachronistic humor much of a success in animated movies is its ability 
to provoke different interpretations as to a certain scenic situation. The viewer tends to link 
the events seen on screen with those previously read or taught, and thereby come up with 
different interpretations of what the movie intends to transmit as messages. Importantly, the 
laughing element makes animated movies more interesting in that they try to render the 
whole scenes of a movie comic in tone so that audiences will not feel tired or bored while 
watching. More interestingly, anachronistic humor is more distinguishable in animated 
cartoons about Arabs than other movies about other races.  
Consider, for instance, the animated movie of Ali Baba Bound (Clampett 1941) wherein its 
producer tries to insert some artifacts which do not belong to the desert land. For instance, the 
movie features different electric sign posts of Gas stations, the oasis and Soda Pop, among 
others. Taken to even a higher degree, the movie shoots camels as analogs of cars for rent, 
and they feed on gas fuel rather than grass. Camels are even holding sign posts that read, 
“Hump-mobile with 4 heels with gas/ Kiddy Kar. (ibid). In fact, introducing such modern 
features to a desert setting hints at the way the West has always thought about the East. More 
importantly, there is one very important feature adopted by the movie producer as regards 
Porky Pig. As is featured throughout the movie, this character is instilled with Western so-
called ideals of defending the land and the weak (the example of coming to the rescue of 
baby dumping the camel). The humor based nature of anachronism here lies in its very 
adoption of a Western attitude of civilizing not only people but also animals. 
Porky Pig is made a Western soldier defending the Western Fort in the desert. The very idea 
of using an animal as a replacement of a human character yields intriguing results. That is to 
say, dealing with the barbarity of Arabs residing in the desert entails the creation of a 
civilized animal that can better communicate with them since they are by nature thought to 
have animalistic features. The message here is that the West can tame and civilize animals 
that can possess later on human features whereas Arab humans of the desert can still be 
animals and act as ones. Therefore, we better use civilized animals when dealing with 
uncivilized Arab animals cloaked in human bodies. This is what anachronism intends to 
manifest in its adoption of using an animal character (Porky Pig) to further its dissemination 
of stereotypes about a people and their lands. 
In fact, in both cartoons Ali Baba Bound (1941) and Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and 
his Forty Thieves (1937) the desert setting is subject to the “mission civilisatrice” of the 
West, thereby the desert is changing to something more of a Western idea. That is to say, the 
movies are far removed from the imagery of belly-dancers inside tents or the notorious image 
of the Arab sheikh being fed on grapes and drinking wine. Instead, the whole setting is being 
transformed into a more or less modern Western camp. Such move towards modernization is 
described in Edward Said’s (1978) wording as a mission in which “the modern Orientalist 
was, in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness 
which he himself had properly distinguished” (1978: 121). 
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Importantly, in its rescuing of the Orient, some animated cartoons have found relief in using 
anachronisms, since anachronistic humor can mean more than it tends to make us see. 
Therefore, “one of the most distinguishing features of humor is the way in which it forces us 
to shift our initial expectations, and this is true whether the source of the humor is a joke’s 
punch-line or an unexpectedly comic situation” (Niebylski 2004: 12). Accordingly, shifting 
audience expectations is, in fact, a turning point wherein, at times, humor starts to be filtered 
through the lens of fear and, at other times, fear through humor. This situation results in 
confusion since audiences tend to reveal quite different reactions at separate moments during 
the watching of a movie: sometimes they laugh and other times they are scared. At this point, 
the boundaries between humor and fear become blurred. Stephen Hessel (2010) spells out this 
kind of audience oscillation between fear and laughter most clearly in his essay, Horrifying 
Quixote: The Thin Line between Fear and Laughter Hessel (2010) argues that people tend to 
project their social fears, worries and experiences onto a movie. He explains that:  
All of these very real anxieties are tied in literature to infernal forces (corporeal) 
and spirits (incorporeal) that assault the systems of reason and piety. The existence 
of these proto-horror stories employs frightful narrative tools and personalities, but 
they most obviously lay bare the cause of the preoccupation itself; typically a 
preoccupation that comes from an aspect of a society in crisis. (2010: 27) 
Sometimes some film scenes can be reminiscent of spectators’ stories of fear that permeate 
their societies. This fear is a result of the many past atrocities and heinous crimes committed 
against innocent people on cyclical moments and in different parts of the world. There is also 
this fear that these crimes would continue for very long before it is noticed. Although both 
cartoon films analyzed here were produced in the very far past, still they both remind their 
audiences that there are moments tinged with fear that should never be forgotten, for fear that 
they may repeat themselves at any time, just like the myriad terrorist crimes we keep 
watching on everyday TV channels, and the blameworthy of which are always Arabs and 
Muslims. Therefore, people find relief in movies since they are sites upon which to contest 
their fears. Simply put, a movie about Arabs, for instance, projects them in threatening tones 
that perfectly fits the audience’s pre-conceived perceptions and anxieties about them. This 
Arab threat is diminished once Arab terrorists commit stupid faults that bring about their 
funny end and eventually the audience’s relief and serenity. A case in point is the cartoon of 
Popeye the Sailor Meets Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves (1937).   
In this animated movie, Arabs are so stupid and foolish that their silliness can be the cause of 
their own destruction. Such a view coincides with a scene in the movie where the Arab 
bandits try to attack Popeye all at once while crying out in a cacophonous noise. However, 
the bandits and their chief Abu Hassan are so easily defeated and made to drag a huge cart 
full of stolen gold and jewels. At this juncture, the movie becomes comic and provides relief 
to the audience from their anxieties. The message the movie transmits here is that though 
Arabs are the source of fear and danger, they will eventually destroy themselves and become 
transformed into the butt of jokes of every movie and, more than that, even in reality, thereby 
allowing spectators to laugh at them hilariously. 
In fact, this kind of construing a silly and comic Arab life through the Orientalist gaze hides a 
wealth of assumptions about the relationship of the representation to the real world. Such 
Orientalist imaging offers two central and interrelated illusions: that the “Orient” is utterly 
distinct from Europe – unaffected by European civilization – and that this Orient is frozen in 
time, more or less the same as it had been for hundreds of years. Therefore, the Arab subject 
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who lives far away in the desert is funny, uncivilized, and is still living outside of history. 
Considerably, through using humor to appeal to many a spectator’s cinematic tastes, 
animated cartoons about Arabs have indeed offered the Orientalist’s eye a chance to penetrate 
the Arab geography and move along the streets to hysterically laugh and poke fun at the silly 
Arabs, drawing exotic images that appeal to the Western viewers.  
Worse yet, by characterizing an entire region as barbaric and stupid, some animated movies 
cultivate an incredibly negative stereotype of Arab people that children will absorb and retain 
for generations. Still one very important point to keep in mind is the idea that this study 
draws its conclusion from the case study of two animated films produced in 1937 and 1941, 
without contemporary comparisons. The rationale underpinning such choice is that these 
films and their likes, produced around the same period of time, are a kind of reminder of 
spectators’ stories of fear permeating their societies. This fear of something and anything is 
always there lurking in the dark behind walls or air jets awaiting for cowardly moments to 
make contemporary terroristic changes. Therefore, the idea here is not to draw a 
contemporary comparison, but rather to touch upon this idea of fear drawn from past 
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Abstract: By most government statistical definitions, Central Appalachia is one of the 
most impoverished regions in the United States. Many of the region’s residents are low-
income, dependent on government benefits, have high rates of obesity and diabetes, and 
low rates of college educational obtainment. Central Appalachia is historically tied to 
the coal mining and railroad industries. Many scholars believe this historical bond 
created an internal colony of company-dependent residents who have been unable to 
transition successfully from those industry’s boom eras or escape the lingering effects of 
industry environmental, health and economic degradation. While coal mining stripped 
the land of Central Appalachia and often cheated its residents from access to economic 
well-being and opportunity by traditional American definitions, Central Appalachians 
have created a rich culture based on kinship, religion, fatalism and community pride. 
Today, significant questions arise regarding the impact of advanced communication 
technologies and the associated infiltration of a monolithic standard for American 
success; success defined by material gain idealized by middle-class suburban living. 
While advanced communication technologies are often praised for their capacity to 
advance education, employment and cross-cultural understanding, in regions such as 
Central Appalachia, they may undermine the foundation of culture the residents have 
built in order to survive decades of isolation and exploitation. 
 







The relationship between technology, culture and poverty is complex. The advances of our 
new technological age lead some to proclaim that voices from all segments of global society 
are emancipated. In their eyes, the internet and its associated platforms creates a method for a 
globalized mixing bowl of cultural understanding and communication (Best and Kellner 
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2001). Conversely, some proclaim that these same technologies are actually homogenizing 
society.  Essentially, the internet acts as a hegemonic tool through which mainstream western 
culture is setting the accepted standard of discourse (Kellner 2003).  Both viewpoints have 
merit.  On one hand the internet provides users with information about anything within 
seconds and, concurrently, provides space for communication across the globe.  On the other 
hand, those with the most power through website ownership mimic those with the most 
power in standard society (“State of the Blogosphere” 2010).  Within the United States there 
is an important discussion as to whether the infiltration of the internet equals an 
empowerment of cultures while serving as a space to gain knowledge previously unattainable 
for large segments of society or is it a space where a monolithic, standardized culture is 
weeding out subcultures; thereby, changing self-perceptions of those traditional subcultures? 
This is especially important for those traditional subcultures which many believe have been 
victims of internal colonization.   
One disenfranchised subculture within American society that has been referred to as an 
internal colony is that of Central Appalachia.  Central Appalachia is one of the most 
impoverished regions in the United States.  Residents of the region have lower educational 
rates, lower income and wealth, higher levels of obesity and disease and less access to long-
term, stable middle class wages and jobs than the majority of American communities.  
Central Appalachia also has a distinct culture that differs largely from traditional, middle 
class American culture.  The geographic segregation of the region due to its heavy mountain 
terrain, its economic ties to coal mining and the longstanding, developed family networks has 
created an isolated community rooted strongly in the values of familial kinship, Christian 
Protestantism, community pride and fatalism (Appalachian Culture, n.d.).  The strong ties of 
the region’s residents to the coal mining occupation has had a substantial influence on Central 
Appalachian culture and its economic and social conditions.  The long-standing reality for 
Central Appalachian residents has been one of great pride and great poverty.  Geographic, 
cultural and social isolation have, however, always been a key component of that reality.   
This paper explores Central Appalachia by contrasting the sobering statistics on resident 
health and quality of life with the region’s strong traditions and its maintenance of cultural 
values in the face of an ever-changing society. The paper reviews and assesses the role of 
culture and technology in combating and enhancing perceptions and realities of poverty for a 
newly, digitally, non-isolated subculture by exploring the relationship between technology 
and persons in poverty as well as the way in which social issues in the Central Appalachian 
region specifically are being discussed online.   
 
 
Central Appalachia and Internal Colonialism 
 
The internal colony theory is one rooted in the spread of capitalism, globalization, and nation-
building.  There are varying definitions of an internal colony and the process of internal 
colonization.   Loosely, internal colonialism can be defined as, the exploitation of a minority 
by a majority within a country’s boundaries. Economic, social, and political power is 
suppressed to benefit the majority. The experiences of many minority groups have been 
studied utilizing the internal colony framework.  These groups include African-Americans, 
Hispanics and Chinese immigrants in the United States; Inuits in Canada; and, indigenous 
groups across North America.  Each of these groups experienced economic, territorial and 
institutional segregation, the denial of full citizenship rights and economic exploitation for 
the benefit of the majority.  Scholars, notably Helen Lewis (1978) have also examined 
Central Appalachia through the theoretical lens of Internal Colonialism.  It has been said that 
Central Appalachia is an internal colony because of the economic exploitation by the coal 
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mining industry of the region’s residents, the violence of the coal mining industry on humans 
and the environment (leaving a vulnerable, unstable, isolated population), outside ownership 
of local land/minerals/resources and the dependency of the region on this singular, 
institutionalized, corporate sector including the political arena (dependent on coal industry 
donations).  Central Appalachians were working the mines to power the electric grids across 
America at great personal risk (for the benefit of the greater society). 
 
Caught up in the social complex of the new industrial communities, many 
mountaineers found themselves unable to escape their condition of powerlessness 
ant, dependency. By coming to a coal mining town, the miner had exchanged the 
in-dependence and somewhat precarious self-sufficiency of the family farm for 
subordination to the coal company and dependence upon a wage income. He lived 
in a company house; he worked in a company mine; and he purchased his groceries 
and other commodities from the company store. He sent his children to the 
company school and patronized the company doctor and the company church. The 
company deducted rent, school, medical and other fees from his monthly wage, 
and under the prevailing system of scrip, he occasionally ended the month without 
cash income. He had no voice in community affairs or working conditions, and he 
was dependent upon the benevolence of the employer to maintain his rate of pay. 
(Lewis 1978, p. 41)       
 
 
Much has been written on the isolation of Central Appalachia.  Its unique topography, rural 
populace, historical coal mining legacy and strong community culture have led many to 
identify the region as highly isolated.  This isolation has contributed to the popular image of 
local residents as hillbillies; a negative image that serves as a central piece of cultural identity 
and contributes to a suspicion of outsiders. (Slocum 2012) Traditionally, “people raised in 
Appalachia were viewed as unfit for urban life, because it was assumed that their 
acculturation, values, education and training failed to prepare them to adapt to a rapidly 
changing, highly technological, urban America… Appalachians were often forced to choose 
between leaving their environments or risking lifelong poverty.” (Sarnoff 2003, p.124) While 
many Central Appalachians have left the region in pursuit of a better economic future, many 
of Central Appalachia’s people choose to stay.   
Alternatively; David Walls (1978) − using the internal colony framework of van den Berghe 
(1957) − argues that Central Appalachia does not meet the rigorous standard as an internal 
colony.  The region’s residents are not a racial or ethnic minority, were not forced into 
settlements within territorial Central Appalachia and there is not a separate governmental 
agency or legal status for the region’s residents.  Walls does, however, see Central 
Appalachia as a region on the internal periphery. “…it seems reasonable to me to apply the 
term peripheral to such regions within advanced capitalist countries as Appalachia which 
share many of the characteristics of underdevelopment, poverty, and dependency found in the 
peripheral countries of the Third World.” (Walls 1978, p. 13) The application of the 
periphery theory to Central Appalachia recognizes that the region’s economic and social 
development lags behind the “core” of American society and that the region’s residents are 
not directly benefiting from the greater prosperity of the nation. Both theoretical analyses 
(internal colony and internal periphery) discuss Central Appalachia’s singular industrial 
dependence, cultural isolationism and entrenched poverty as key regional characteristics. 
While the internal periphery gives credence to the “otherized” nature of Appalachian 
residents, the internal colony theory really focuses on this otherization by identifying the 
residents as a distinct cultural group.  In other words, the internal colony theory sees Central 
Appalachians as a distinct group akin to a colonialized population not just victim of economic 
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exploitation – the defining feature of a population in the internal periphery (Mattox 2015).  
“A group of people is colonized if and only if they are socially subordinate to some 
culturally, socially, or politically distinct group that discursively marks the colonized as 
having some perceived or imaginary ethnic (cultural, social, bodily, and/or political) 
inferiority which makes them the target of such oppression.” (Mattox 2015, p. 7) The distinct 
nature and history of poverty and culture within Central Appalachia have created a 
stereotypical Central Appalachian caricature or image (hillbilly, missing teeth, no shoes, 
heavy accent, prevalence of incest etc.) – one even used by President Lyndon Johnson to sell 
his War on Poverty initiatives.  Central Appalachians have been otherized by the mainstream.  
Coupled with the history of economic exploitation the internal colony theory provides an 
important theoretical framework for discussing the interplay between Central Appalachians 
and our increasingly globalized, digital society.   
 
 
The Realities of Central Appalachia 
 
Central Appalachia is one of five subregions within the Appalachian region of the United 
States.  The Central Appalachia region encompasses 29,773 square miles comprised of 82 
counties in four states – Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.  The majority of 
the counties (53) are located in the state of Kentucky while the remaining are disbursed 
between the other three states (fifteen in Tennessee, seven in Virginia and seven in West 
Virginia).  The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) designates Appalachian 
subregions based on geographic, economic and demographic factors for the purposes of 
research and analysis.  These factors include unemployment rates, household poverty, 
employment type, and educational attainment1.  
Today, approximately two million people reside in Central Appalachia (Pollard and Jacobsen 
2012).  Central Appalachia has an older and whiter population than the United States at large. 
Central Appalachia is also poorer, less healthy and less educated than most other regions 
within the United States. As of Fiscal Year 2013 49 of Central Appalachia’s counties (60 
percent) were officially designated as economically distressed: to be designated as 
economically distressed, a county must have a poverty and unemployment rate that is 150% 
of the national average (Appalachian Regional Commission 2007). Currently, the region’s 
poverty rate stands at 23 percent (as compared to 15 percent nationally). This rate is six 
percent higher than any of the other four Appalachian subregions. The unemployment rate is 
eight percent and the median income is $32,887 per year (Pollard and Jacobsen 2012).  The 
median income in 2012 was substantially below the national median of $51,017 (DeNavas-
Walt et al. 2013) and below each of the other Appalachian subregions by, at least, $9,000.  In 
addition, Central Appalachia still faces stark disparities in education and health as compared 
to the rest of nation. Twelve percent of Central Appalachian residents aged 25 and over have 
Bachelor’s degrees, compared to 27 percent nationwide (Pollard and Jacobsen, 2012). 
“Central Appalachia…has higher rates of heart disease, cancer, particularly breast cancer, 
stroke, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) compared to the United States as 
a whole (Halverson, Ma, and Harner 2004).” (Pugh 2014, p.1) Fifty percent of Central 
Appalachian counties have only one hospital and 20 percent have zero (Appalachian 
Community Fund, n.d.). These statistics, while sobering, have been a part of Central 
Appalachian life for decades and an image seared into the American mindset.   
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The realities of Central Appalachian poverty became part of the American mainstream 
psyche in the late 1950s and early 1960s when scholars and journalists started taking an 
interest in the striking poverty of the region. Books were written, documentaries released and 
campaigns waged to help the people within the area. Unfortunately, the region’s residents 
were often used as the face of American poverty in policymaking and political arenas.  The 
images of the poor mountain child with dirt on his face, messy hair, torn pants standing on a 
dilapidated house on a mountainside became the common image of a Central Appalachian 
resident. These images, while highlighting the inequities and inequalities faced by residents, 
further separated the Central Appalachian people from mainstream life.  The Appalachian 
Regional Commission (ARC) was created to help develop the area, federal anti-poverty 
programs sent in service workers and religious organizations created mission projects to 
“save” local residents.  Essentially, Central Appalachians had become an “other” needing to 
be rescued within American society.   
 
 
Central Appalachia and Coal 
 
While the mainstream image of Central Appalachia was one of extreme poverty and need, the 
Central Appalachian people had created a culture of resilience and determination rooted in 
deep religious faith after decades of work in coal mining and related industries. Coal mining 
to Central Appalachians is what lobster fishing is to Mainers or banking is to Manhattan.  It 
has been the core of Central Appalachian economic development and, at the same time, 
hardship.  The relationship has traditionally been long, complex, and violent (Gaventa, 1980).   
While coal mining historically provided the main source of employment in the region it also 
created communities built on corporate control.  Miners were underpaid (and fought with 
their life for unionization), they often resided in company towns where everything from the 
stores to the schools were owned by the coal mining companies and, lastly, their occupation 
was inherently dangerous (and made more dangerous by lax safety standards and oversight). 
Unionization fights were notoriously bloody (see the Battle of Blair Mountain) as workers 
did not even have access to private space in which to organize.  Company towns were owned 
exclusively by coal mining companies and non-company towns were run (through political 
and legal networks) by coal mining companies.  Unionization did finally succeed in the 
region’s mines but the almost singular dependence for economic development on coal 
companies continued.  Still today, it is very difficult for individuals to own land in Central 
Appalachia.  Due to the value of coal much of the land and mineral rights are owned by the 
industry (Gaventa 1980).  Sixty percent of the land and eighty percent of the minerals in 
Central Appalachia are owned by outside coal interests (Burns 2007). The changing nature of 
the coal mining industry has created a community suffering the short and long-term effects of 
coal mining while receiving little benefit from its continued operation.   
In 1932, the Appalachian coal mining industry employed 705,000 miners (Lewis 1978).  
Advances in modern technology and the coal mining industry are intertwined.  While large 
portions of the Central Appalachian public came to directly and indirectly rely on coal for 
their economic well-being, the coal mining industry began to make technological advances to 
mechanize the industry. This mechanization transformed coal mining from a person-based, 
underground operation to a machine-based surface mining operation (the wage and safety 
gains made through unionization were lost through mechanization as a labor force was no 
longer needed).  As a result, the region suffered significant job losses and, subsequently, 
losses in economic spending associated with an employed middle class labor base.  “Coal 
employment has declined from approximately 475,000 jobs at the end of World War II to 
only around 38,000 today. From 1973 to 2003, the region lost 62 percent of its coal jobs.” 
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(Coal and the Future, Para. 1) Moreover, the region has taken another hit with the increase in 
more profitable coal mining in the country’s western states (e.g. Wyoming).  In two years 
(2011-2013), Harlan County, Kentucky (one of the nation’s poorest counties) went from 44 
active mines to 22 (Maher 2013).  The combined influence of mechanization and competition 
have left the region’s residents with additional strains in an already economically distressed 
region.  
 
Corresponding to an increase in surface mining practices, the number of mining jobs 
in Appalachia has declined by more than 50% between 1985 and 2008 (Freme, 2008). 
These declining economic opportunities place the population at greater risk for 
layoffs, job loss (with corresponding multiplier effects through local economies), and 
poverty. (Hendryx, 2011, p. 45)   
 
Surface mining and its most destructive form, MTR (mountaintop removal) mining, cause 
many harmful environmental and human impacts in Central Appalachia. The blasting of the 
mountain peaks often causes local homes and buildings, many of which are old, to be rocked 
off of their foundations; thereby, further impacting one of the few community assets in the 
economically distressed local towns and cities. Mountaintop removal alone has blown off 1.4 
million acres of mountain top since 1970 (Sierra Club, n.d.). The blasting and mining 
processes also create substantial health impacts in these communities. The coal dust settles on 
local buildings and in the lungs of residents. Asthma and cancer rates in Central Appalachia 
are among the highest in the nation.  Further, local rivers and forests are being polluted and 
destroyed by coal sludge.  The region’s best asset, its natural landscape, has been used to feed 
big coal rather than to feed the economic needs of the residents (e.g. through tourism) (I Love 
Mountains [ILM] 2007; Clean Air Task Force 2002).  
The industry that helped build the region and molded its resilient culture have left it 
with little else to rely on. It has been be said that the previous reliance of the region on coal 
for employment, business development, economic well-being and infrastructure created an 
internal colony (Lewis 1978).   
 
 
The Digital Society and Poverty 
 
As with the mechanization of the coal mining industry, technological advances have been a 
mixed bag for many of America’s poor and disenfranchised.  Mechanization in particular has 
afforded companies with the capacity to continue producing at a high rate while reducing 
labor costs; therefore, many industries which had been the backbone of local communities 
reduced payroll and abandoned factories, mines and mills which resulted in economic 
devastation for cities across the nation.  In an isolated region like Central Appalachia, which 
had been primarily dependent on coal mining, there is little to fall back on.  Concurrent to 
industry mechanization, however, advances in computers and communication have created 
another reality for the disenfranchised. The vast wealth of knowledge on the internet coupled 
with its capacity to link individuals globally has opened up the globe and its innovations to 
individuals in isolated regions.  
 
In a study titled, "Information Economy Report 2010: ICTs, Enterprises and Poverty 
Alleviation," the UN body [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] 
said that on the back of the widening diffusion of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs)--especially mobile telephones--new micro-enterprises are 
mushrooming in developing countries, creating new livelihoods for the poor. 
(Amojelar 2010, Para. 2) 




In addition to providing internet access and tools to the disenfranchised, internet technologies 
have, and have additional capacities to, change the face of poverty reduction strategies, 
community organizing and civic engagement. These innovations have changed the way in 
which individuals interact with their computers and one another. The internet has provided 
communities across the globe with mechanisms to foster empowerment among local 
residents, innovate techniques for business development (e.g. microfinance) and build 
community-based systems for governance and participation. Even with these exciting 
changes, however, big questions regarding access, online stratification and participation 
remain.  Moreover, questions regarding the impact of these technologies on the loss of local 
cultures is of large concern (Bissell 2004; Postman 2011).  
 
 
What Does Digital Inequality Mean?  
 
Historically, concerns of access to the internet were a large focus of policymakers concerned 
about the equitable distribution of the internet.  As concerns of access have diminished across 
the United States, many policymakers and advocates are now focused on a new set of internet 
concerns – those dealing with digital inequality.  This new set of concerns centers largely on 
the differences between populations based on what they do online and how they do it not 
simply whether different populations have physical access to the online environment. 
Moreover, digital inequality looks at the political economy of internet usage and how it 
impacts relationships between populations and internet usage.  
 
As the technology penetrates into every crevice of society, the pressing question will 
be not ‘who can find a network connection at home, work, or in a library or 
community center from which to log on?’, but instead, ‘what are people doing, and 
what are they able to do, when they go on-line.’ Second, we would recognize that the 
“Internet” itself is not a fixed object, but rather a protean family of technologies and 
services that is being rapidly reshaped through the interacting efforts of profit-seeking 
corporations, government agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Patterns of 
inequality will reflect not just differences in individual resources, but also the way in 
which economic and political factors make such differences matter. (DiMaggio & 
Hargittai 2001, p. 3-4)   
 
Looking at these questions of digital inequalities creates the opportunity for meaningful 
examination into a potential effect of the legacy of economic and political decisions on a 
subpopulation (i.e. the legacy of internal colonialism in Central Appalachia) as evidenced by 
online activity. 
The new poverty created from digital inequality reflects the structural social-economic 
dimensions of the rest of society.  Ono and Zavodny (2007) found that this new poverty 
based on digital inequality was reflective across five different countries on three different 
continents.  Norris (2001) characterized this new poverty as creating technological-based 
groups of haves and have-nots. The have and have-nots divide is evident in three areas – 
technology (type of equipment, capabilities of internet connection type), proficiency (skills- 
knowledge of available tools and how to use them online), and opportunity (outcomes of 
internet use – financial investment, employment opportunities, knowledge building) 
(Whitacre & Mills, 2007; Hargattai, 2007; Mossberger, Tolbert, & Stansbury, 2003).  
Hargittai and Hinnent (2008) suggest that there are clear distinctions between the types of 
activities in which users from middle and upper class backgrounds engage via internet versus 
those from lower class and impoverished backgrounds; specifically, what they call “capital-
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enhancing” activities (employment opportunities, networking, financial advice, civic 
engagement) – those from middle and upper classroom backgrounds engage in more.  These 
activities can potentially assist and improve the economic and educational opportunities for 
active users and, if that improvement is linked to the users original economic status, 
contribute to enhancing economic inequality through digital means (Hseih, Rei, &Keil, 
2008).  Thereby, if a subpopulation is starting from a foundation built on a history of internal 
colonialism, the internet can potentially serve to create a new form of poverty especially 
when society is increasingly reliant on digital technologies for job placement (e.g. LinkedIn), 




Central Appalachia  
 
Central Appalachia has faced significant barriers to internet participation from the onset.  The 
topography of the region and its sparse population created obstacles for the introduction of 
internet (particularly broadband) in the region.  Moreover, the poverty faced by the region’s 
residents resulted in concerns regarding digital inequality as seen in other rural areas. “[There 
is a] persistent gulf in technological diffusion to rural areas results in a decreased propensity 
to take advantage of the opportunities that information and communication technologies 
provide for aiding users in everyday activities.” (Stern, Adams, & Elsasser 2009, p. 413) 
Many individuals cannot afford the technology and as time went by, they fell further and 
further behind the learning curve due to the rapid rate of internet growth. Of particular note is 
the large number of seniors which reside in the region; a subpopulation which has had 
specific issues related to technological adaptation (LaRouge, Van Slyke, Seale & Wright 
2014).  As access concerns have been reduced, however, many Central Appalachians have 
begun to use the internet in traditional (e.g. research, gaming, social media, banking) and 
nontraditional ways.  
The Central Appalachia Regional Network (CARN) has been a leader in utilizing online 
technologies to fight for broadband access and land ownership rights in the region. The Art of 
the Rural is utilizing community radio and internet streaming to showcase issues and culture 
in Central Appalachia.  Finally, Appalshop is a nonprofit organization whose mission it is to 
highlight and preserve Central Appalachian culture through a variety of multimedia 
techniques including the vast array of internet options (e.g. photo cataloguing, internet 
storage and recording etc…).  In addition, many organizations have used (and are using) 
internet technologies to organize. This is evident by the formation of websites with 
interactive tools such as Wikis, calendars, meetup groups etc… as well as Calls to Action 
posted via web technologies on websites and social media networks (e.g. Facebook).  
Community organizing is a strategy employed across communities which focuses on bringing 
together residents in geographic locals and their allies to fight for or against a variety of 
issues affecting local well-being.  The foundation of community organizing is empowerment 
and the role of community identity in mobilization. The internet has expanded traditional 
community organizing by opening up communication channels for the dissemination of 
information beyond the mass media and person-to-person based communication.  This has 
been especially important for the organizations in Central Appalachia fighting against the 
coal industry and its harmful environmental practices.  
While it is hard to dispute the role of the internet in community organizing, cultural 
preservation and advocacy, questions about the internet’s role in homogenizing culture 
remain.  One key question is how does the internet shape perception of poverty for 
disenfranchised communities?   







Studies show that, in the United States, success on the internet is closely tied to the same 
standards which define success in the non-virtual world.  In online political forums, for 
example, using the right type of language (no ethnic dialects, for example) is a key 
component to gaining popularity and respect.  Most successful internet blogs are those 
belonging to middle to upper-middle class white men. (McLeod 2008, Pole 2010).  
'Hegemony' [according to Gramsci] in this case means the success of the dominant classes in 
presenting their definition of reality, their view of the world, in such a way that it is accepted 
by other classes as 'common sense'. (Goldberg, n.d., Para. 1)  Hegemony is the consistent 
implementation of processes, norms, rules, laws and policies across cultural institutions to 
create and enforce a dominant ideology. Studies have found that the online activity is largely 
confined to websites promoting cultural hegemony. At the same time, members of the non-
dominant group do visit and spend time on websites with counterhegemonic themes at higher 
rates (Dorsher 1999).  In a study of Latino uses of the internet, Lillie (1998) found 
 
Members of virtual communities do engage in types of social uses such as 
maintenance of a collective identity shared with other members of virtual 
communities. The survey results show that communication with other US Latinos for 
the purpose of sharing personal experiences and ideas about Latinos has been a 
valuable use of Internet technologies for most of the respondents (Section VI). 
 
Findings indicate that members of minority groups can and do utilize online sources to 
discuss, maintain and strengthen culture but at the same time the internet structure itself is 
dominated by a few websites promoting a hegemony. While the ideal of the internet may be a 
tossed salad of diverse cultures the reality may mean a more globalized assimilation of 
cultures.  This potential reality raises important questions for the maintenance of subcultures 
(particularly those within disenfranchised communities) and perceptions of wealth and 
poverty.  As society moves more toward a digital reality do subcultures find a place to thrive 
or does language, image and value become a set standard across the globe?        
 
 
The Central Appalachian Subculture and Perceptions of Poverty 
 
The Central Appalachian subculture is rooted in familial kinship, Christian Protestantism, 
community pride and fatalism (Walls 1976; Welch 1999).  Many families have a long history 
of residence in the region.  The residential settlement patterns resulted in strong familial 
bonds as many settled together in areas known as hollers.  These isolated areas between two 
mountains or hills created strong ties between residents due, largely, to the lack of immediate 
access to neighboring communities.  Thus, community support and mutual reliance (familial 
and relational) is a key component of the subculture.  This support and reliance is further 
enhanced by the relationship between the residents and the church.  The majority of Central 
Appalachians are Protestant evangelicals ranging from the stereotypical snake handlers to 
Pentecostals to modern Methodists and Southern Baptists (Spiker 2014). Common 
characteristics of churches in the region include “…[an] independent church, strong 
emotionalism, the primacy of the Bible, and an uneducated ministry. Worship practices 
include conversionist preaching and rituals such as footwashing and baptism by immersion.” 
(Rice, n.d., para. 7 )  Tied to this religious fundamentalism is the strong thread of fatalism 
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that exists in the Central Appalachian subculture. Traditionally, fatalism has been tied to 
religious fundamentalism (Quinney 1964). Central Appalachians accept life’s good and bad 
and the conditions associated with its realities.  “Fatalism and religious fundamentalism 
developed to deal with the harshness of the land, the consequences of poverty, and the 
physical isolation.”  (Elam 2002, p. 10) One area where this fatalism is most prevalent is in 
healthcare. “An equal barrier to controlling diabetes, Salyers [a former County Health 
Director in the region] says, is a deep-seated fatalism about both health and poverty.  “They 
come in and say, ‘It runs in the family. I’ve known I’m going to get it. Just give me a pill.“ 
(Browning 2012, para. 12) Lastly, dealing with these realities has also contributed to strong 
strains of community and civic pride among Central Appalachians.  The region’s cultural folk 
art and music are key components of the American tapestry. Across Central Appalachia, 
museums, antique shops and tourism stops have all been opened focused on the promotion of 
and education about these rich traditions.   
Family, faith and fatalism have shaped the Central Appalachian subculture and helped the 
residents face the hardships associated with poverty.  Inevitably these hardships also helped 
shape resident perception of poverty.  Poverty has been found to create long-term disparities 
in health, education and employment; however, research has found that when individuals live 
in communities where people experience similar hardships, the self-perceptions of poverty 
are less stigmatized.   
 
Those with concealable stigmas (students who indicated that they were gay, that they 
were bulimic, or that their family earned less than $20,000 each year) reported lower 
self-esteem and more negative affect than both those whose stigmas were visible and 
those without stigmatizing characteristics. Only the presence of similar others lifted 
the self-esteem and mood of students with concealable stigmas… Thus, contact with 
similar others protects the psychological self from negative cultural messages.  
(Frable, Platt, and Hoey 1998, p. 909) 
 
In the past, the isolation of Central Appalachia certainly contributed to less stigmatization of 
economic class differences. Historically, images of Central Appalachia were used to gain 
national support for the War on Poverty. The images of poor mountain white kids were 
utilized to counter the idea that War on Poverty programs were going to only help minorities.  
These images became internalized by many of the region’s residents who, prior to the 
mainstreaming of Central Appalachian poverty, did not include “being poor” as a main 
cultural characteristic or identity. In the case of Central Appalachia, it is important to 
consider the transition of these cultural messages in the digital age where images and 
interaction are no longer severely limited to those in your immediate networks and 
neighborhoods. Rather than simply relying on those closest to you by physical proximity for 
interaction and communication, Individuals create their own identities online through the 
autonomous sharing and transfer of information across networks chosen by the individual and 
this autonomy has transformed social relations and, by extension, cultural exchange. “What is 
clear is that without the Internet we would not have seen the large-scale development of 
networking as the fundamental mechanism of social structuring and social change in every 
domain of social life.” (Castells 2013: p. 145).     
The internet can be used a means to promote self-pride, access previously inaccessible 
information and/or create a new personal reality.  All of these can have a positive impact on 
self-perceptions of poverty. While the internet (and media in general) seems to mainstream 
images of McMansions, Caribbean vacations, BMWs and Louis Vuitton as normal, those 
images can be easily counteracted by the characteristics of a subculture. The strong religious 
identity in Central Appalachia, for example, promotes the importance of living for the next 
stage of life and the idea that God only gives you what you can handle. This type of belief 
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system is echoed on social media sites across the internet. These mechanisms help the 
religious cope with hardship. For example, in his 2013 study, Knowles found that many 
religious organizations are now utilizing the internet effectively to promote traditional 
Christian beliefs including fatalism. Knowles examined the content of and moderation 
techniques of a popular Christian website, RaptureReady, and found that, “Internet is 
effectively utilized to strengthen religious authority.” Howard (2011) contends that new 
religious communities rooted in fatalism have been formed in the discursive space of the 
internet. Beyond explicit religious-based websites, however, scholars have found that the 
internet can weaken and/or strengthen fatalistic attitudes amongst persons with life-
threatening or life-altering diseases based on the type of resources sought online (Lee, 
Neiderdeppe, & Freres 2012).  
Central Appalachia residents have also used the internet to form associations for and against a 
variety of political causes, to organize cultural events and to foster civic pride based on the 
strong history of the region. For example, in West Virginia, where the majority of resident 
still identify as Democrats, residents were not happy with the direction President Barack 
Obama was taking the nation2. In 2012, the residents utilized the internet to organize support 
for a federal inmate as a primary challenger to Obama in the presidential race. The inmate 
garnered 40 percent of the vote (Associated Press 2012). Many West Virginians viewed this 
as taking a stand. Conversely, outsiders mocked the vote and the residents for their 
backwards views. The cultural clash was evident. Needless to say, however, this was a case 
where a subculture organized and resisted in the face of dominant hegemony despite the cries 
of “stupid hillbilly” being flung around the public sphere. The self-perception of Central 
Appalachians was one of resistance and rebellion not of stupid, dumb and poor.  
The fight over mountaintop removal is also being played out online. Residents are strongly 
divided over the issue as coal is seen both as a cultural identity/source of pride and as an evil 
industry continuing to destroy. The common theme of both groups, however, is that neither 
see themselves as victims.  They are fighting for what they view as right and the “true” values 
of Central Appalachia.  The internet has afforded Central Appalachians with a means to 
change the perception of the region to outsiders and to, concurrently, reflect on the role of 
poverty as an image and reality. The internet is a double-edged sword; a means to 
communicate one’s own message and to receive the strong messages of others. The influence 
of both has important implications for the Central Appalachian subculture. In addition, it is 
important to reflect on the legacy of internal colonialism on perpetuating digital inequality.  
Many of the activities in which Central Appalachians are engaged – mountaintop removal, 
community organizing – are rooted in needing to overcome the legacies of internal 
colonialism and economic exploitation. While these activities are potentially empowering, 
they also require time that those who are technological haves (versus have nots – see page 12) 
do not necessarily have to engage in. Central Appalachians are using the internet to empower 
through activities that give them rights already afforded to many technological haves – 
ecological safety, basic income, and positive cultural stereotypes. Finally, the geographic 
isolation, demographics (e.g. aging population) and socioeconomic realities of Central 
Appalachia create an environment wherein internet knowledge and internet tools lag behind 
other United States regions; thus, potentially creating a new Central Appalachian digitally-





                                                 
2 President Obama’s approval rating in West Virginia in Sept. 2012 was 32 percent (Public Policy Polling 2012) 





Central Appalachia is a region in the midst of change and resistance. The region remains one 
of the poorest in the United States. The health of the residents and the environment are 
continuously under pressure from the coal industry and the negative effects are growing. The 
link between internal colonialism and the coal industry remain. Concurrently, the internet has 
created new ways for residents to integrate into mainstream American culture while also 
promoting the subculture of the region. The internet also has the capacity to the persistence of 
poverty through the formation of digital inequality. Today, Central Appalachia and its 
residents are still seen by mainstream Americans as poor and, often, hillbillies but, to some 
extent, the moniker of the hillbilly is now a source of pride. The internet allows for images of 
subcultures to come from the subculture itself. This alone creates the capacity for subcultures 
to change their own image and the perceptions of that image to self and society. There is 
more to Central Appalachia than poverty and the residents are proving it. Residents and 
policymakers alike, however, have to be mindful of the impact on and relationship to societal 
structural inequities that internet technologies have created and the reasons behind those 
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Abstract: Traditional peer review (TPR) has several limitations and weaknesses. Post-
publication peer review is one practical way to repair the ills of TPR and reinforce it. A 
literature that is marked by errors is unhealthy and should, if given the opportunity, be 
corrected or further improved. The anonymous voice is one source of critique and 
differs from the blind peer review in TPR in which the reviewer remains anonymous to 
the authors and/or vice versa, but the identity is known to the editor. If unregulated, the 
anonymous voice can pose a threat to established editorial norms in TPR, to one of the 
most important criteria of science publishing, i.e., transparency, and to worthwhile 
discussion. Yet, if the anonymous voice is not heard, then a vast and potentially valuable 
pool of untapped opinions may be lost, opinions that may provide valuable solutions to 
improving TPR. 
 






“A person has an obligation to do the right thing if they can.” Helen Hill 
 
 
Anonymity in peer-review and science discussion 
The concept of anonymity is in fact not that alien to science, or to scientists (Neuroskeptic, 
2013). As the back-bone of the vast majority of the traditional peer review (TPR) system, 
single-blind, or double-blind peer review have always embraced the concept of anonymity to 
try and ensure that peer review is as unbiased as possible, by concealing the identities of the 
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reviewers and/or the authors for single and double-blind peer reviews, respectively. An early 
trial (McNutt et al., 1990) showed that the quality of peer reviews was higher if it was 
conducted blinded to the name of authors and their institutions. A trial conducted by van 
Rooyen et al. (2010) gave the possibility to reviewers of making their signed report publicly 
available (i.e., Open Peer Review or OPR) versus regular TPR. They found that neither 
model affected the quality of the peer reviews, although the OPR model saw a significant 
reduction in the number of reviewers who wanted to participate, indicating that they preferred 
an anonymous form of review to an open form. A more recent survey by Vinther et al. (2012) 
compared blind and open review systems and found that only 28% of reviewers and 37% of 
authors preferred the OPR system while 38% of reviewers and 43% of authors preferred 
double-blind review. Similar to the findings of van Rooyen et al. (2010), the quality of the 
reviews was not affected by the existence or absence of anonymity. However, Vinther et al. 
(2012) concluded that OPR may reduce the number of reviewers. Yet, these studies all 
focused on the importance of anonymity in TPR, and no formal study has yet emerged on the 
impact of the anonymous voice in post-publication peer review (PPPR), or quantified such an 
impact. To decrease potential bias during TPR, Molecular Cell recently attempted triple-blind 
peer review, in which the authors’ names were unknown to the editor during the first round of 
assessment (http://go.nature.com/cqkDcw; Nature Plant editorial, 2015). The difference with 
anonymous commenting that one may observe at PubPeer  – a PPPR web-site that allows 
named or anonymous commenting about published manuscripts – is that in TPR, the peers 
are contracted and their identities are known to the editors who vet them, i.e., their identity is 
confidential, whereas as PubPeer, they could be anyone. However, the apparent spike in 
retractions in recent years may be reflecting that not all is well with TPR, and that it is not 
only subject to bias and subjectivity, but it is also fallible and incomplete (Teixeira da Silva 
and Dobránszki, 2015). Despite these weaknesses, TPR may still in fact be the best system 
available, but could be reinforced by open peer review (OPR), or by PPPR. 
A recent editorial by Prof. Michael R. Blatt (Blatt, 2015), the editor-in-chief of Plant 
Physiology, has caused ripples in the PPPR community. The editorial has, to some extent, 
defined the extremes of the conversation underlying the importance of the anonymous voice 
in PPPR. Referring to PubPeer, Blatt states the following: “The majority of posts on PubPeer 
are mounted anonymously. So, while there is no danger of public embarrassment for the 
commenter, likewise there is no opportunity to gain from a personal exchange with the 
author.” Blatt goes further by collectively labelling anonymous commentators, as indicated in 
the editorial’s title, as vigilantes, claiming that their objective “often is to pillory, to do so 
publicly and without accountability.” A vigilante, however, by definition, “is a civilian or 
organization that undertakes law enforcement (or actions in the pursuit of self-perceived 
justice) that is without legal authority” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigilante), calling into 
question the label assigned to anonymous commentators by Blatt. Curiously, Odom (2015) 
criticizes the abuse of peer-review protection, claiming that it “results in outcomes very 
similar to those of internet trolls: harmful comments can be made without recourse.” Most 
likely referring both to TPR and PPPR, Odom further states about the anonymous voice: 
“everyone knows anonymity breeds contempt.” 
Unlike PPPR, OPR serves its purpose at the opposite pole of the anonymity scale, in which 
peers are clearly identified. Yet, the potential conflicts of interest (COIs) between peers that 
could arise from OPR most likely prevent its wide-scale implementation, simply because the 
vast majority of scientists who are actively researching and publishing will be somewhat 
reticent to offer their opinions and criticism in person, thus avoiding professional COIs and 
possible negative retribution. In fields of research where the number of scientists is limited, 
this risk increases. Bastian (2015) defines this as “a status bias problem.” Yet, the very same 
individuals will find refuge in TPR, and would – almost ironically – be comfortable with 
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anonymity within the TPR framework, most likely because it is formalized and organized by 
editors and a publisher.  
 
 
The functions of PPPR, and its potential benefits and dangers 
TPR, OPR and PPPR are, in terms of anonymity and effectiveness, complementary concepts. 
PPPR appears to have established itself as one of the most robust tool to avoid COIs and 
serves as a mechanism to correct already published literature, as its primary function 
(Teixeira da Silva 2013, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). PPPR also has other functions: expanding the 
scientific discussion, including analysis, commentary and criticism (Pontille and Torny, 
2015). PPPR allows for the public discussion of the merits or issues related to errors in the 
literature, including negative instances of duplicate data, plagiarism, or image manipulation, 
by a pool of peers or experts that extends beyond the limited number of individuals in the 
TPR model assigned to complete the task of quality control. This publisher-independent peer 
pool is able to critically evaluate, with a set of potentially unbiased eyes, the published 
literature that was approved for publication by a limited number of individuals. 
Despite this, PPPR has some inherent flaws and weaknesses. The broader concern is that 
anonymous commentators can hide their identities (Nature Plant editorial, 2015; Blatt, 2015). 
The problem then does not necessarily lie with the importance of the anonymous voice, but 
rather how it can or should be moderated or regulated (Blatt, 2015). Papers with serious 
errors are more likely to be retracted when they are discussed publicly as a direct function of 
PPPR (Van Noorden, 2014). Cases at PubPeer have sown that the anonymous voice has 
played its concrete part (e.g., sixth retraction that emerged for Olivier Voinnet as a result of 
mostly anonymous commenting at PubPeer; Keith, 2015). 
Although Bastian (2014) correctly points out that science can only benefit from the 
implementation of PPPR, she fails to recognize that part of the success of PPPR has already 
depended on the anonymous voice. In a recent blog, Bastian gave full credit to the 
importance of the anonymous voice in TPR but still failed to openly concede its importance 
in PPPR (Bastian, 2015), even though her own paper was critically evaluated by anonymous 
voices on PubPeer (2015). Despite this form of denial, reticence (Nature Plants editorial, 
2015), or fear (Blatt, 2015), greater recognition of the importance of the anonymous voice is 
now being formally given (Teixeira da Silva, 2015d). Many scientists would fear the 
repercussions of calling out errors in their peers’ papers, and that concern or fear of 
professional retribution is perfectly valid in fields of science that have a narrow peer base, 
where the same peers review each other’s papers. In the OPR setting, constant knowledge of 
knowing the identity of the reviewer would place an unprecedented stress on the authors, and 
also on the peer reviewer. This stress arises from the need to maintain civility, a tool used to 
mute criticism and differences of opinion (Bruenig, 2014). A different stress on authors 
emerges from sites like PubPeer where criticisms may be valid, or not, insignificant or large, 
and in the case of anonymous reviewers, there is concern about their lack of accountability 
(Neuroskeptic, 2013). For this reason, PubMed Commons, another PPPR tool, does not 
permit anonymous comments. 
  
 
Can anonymity in PPPR be effective? 
To achieve effective PPPR, two important ingredients are required. The first is a base of 
scientists that is receptive to the notion that PPPR is now an integral part of the publishing 
landscape. The second is a structure in place by publishers that allows comments to be 
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received by editors, i.e., comments that are inputted from beyond their own controlled editor 
and peer pools. These comments would point out actual or perceived errors or problems. 
The Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE)’s Code of Conduct (2011) states clearly that 
“Editors should have systems to ensure that peer reviewers’ identities are protected unless 
they use an open review system that is declared to authors and reviewers.” In TPR, the editor 
selects the reviewers (editors’ tasks include: “monitoring the performance of peer reviewers 
and taking steps to ensure this is of high standard” (COPE, 2011)) but in PPPR it is 
voluntary, and if anonymous, then unknown. Thus, a key question then emerges: who is 
suitable or qualified enough to be engaged in PPPR? This facet might not really be important 
because there are different levels of PPPR, i.e. novice or experienced readers might perceive 
errors in a published paper in different ways, or might detect a range of different problems. 
Consequently, scanning papers for errors such as duplicated figures, does not require a 
special set of skills, i.e., it does not require a peer per se. In contrast, in-depth analysis of the 
scientific content, methodology used, or conclusions drawn would require topic-specific and 
specialized peers (Teixeira da Silva and Dobránszki, 2015). 
The ideal PPPR structure would accommodate anonymous comments, which would be sifted 
and moderated by a voluntary publicly regulated editor board. Whereas ORP and TRP are 
organized, PPPR is least organized, and this lack of centralized control can be anarchic, or 
cause damage if unregulated. However, without a pro-active base of scientists, and an 
equivalent receptive editor-journal-publisher triage, PPPR cannot function effectively. The 
lethargy with which publishers are adapting to PPPR – aptly termed “publication-pollution 
denialism” by Caplan (2015) – does not appear to be accompanying the speed at which the 
literature is being produced. The adoption of PPPR is limited by overburdened peers and 
editors. Moderation would then be the key to solving the importance of the anonymous voice 
in PPPR such as PubPeer since a criticism remains valid, independent of the voice 
pronouncing it (Neuroskeptic, 2013; Blatt, 2015). However, moderation is a tricky and 
prickly issue since issues such as false accusations, libelous claims and sock-puppetry need to 
be taken into account, i.e., a sensitive balance between commenting, civility, regulation and 
moderation (Yong et al., 2013). This issue, as well as the ethics of the anonymous voice, 
needs greater discussion. 
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Responding to requests from readers and authors, we are launching a new "Book reviews" 
section in KOME, from Vol.4 onwards. Currently, we are looking for reviewers for the 
following books [by the courtesy of Routledge, Rowman & Littlefield, Palgrave Macmillan 
and State University of New York Press]: 
 
 
Jeff Lewis (2015) Media, Culture and Human Violence: From Savage Lovers to Violent 
Complexity. Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. ISBN: 978-1-78348-515-4, 287 pages. 
 
Andreas Hepp, Monika Elsler, Swantje Lingenberg, Anne Mollen, Johanna Möller, Anke 
Offerhaus (2015): The Communicative Construction of Europe. Cultures of Political 
Discourse, Public Sphere and the Euro Crisis. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN: 9781137453129, 
296 pages. 
 
Dal Yong Jin (2015) Digital Platforms, Imperialism and Political Culture. Routledge. ISBN: 
9781138859562, 204 pages. 
 
Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, John Martinkus (2014): Media Framing of the Muslim World. 
Conflicts, Crises and Contexts. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN: 9781137334817, 216 pages. 
 
Basarab Nicolescu (2014): From Modernity to Cosmodernity. Science, Culture, and 
Spirituality. State University of New York Press. ISBN: 9781438449647, 271 pages. 
 
Richard Andrews (2013) A Theory of Contemporary Rhetoric. Routledge. ISBN: 
9780415503556, 232 pages. 
 
 
If you are interested in reviewing one of these titles, contact the editors at 
kome@komejournal.com. Please indicate which title/s you would like to review and send us 
a link to your short CV or institutional webpage. 
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